521 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 1,043 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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624 F.2d 695·
5th Cir.·
1980-08-22
·cited 88×
The court held that the officers' conduct, while potentially a state law tort, did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of municipal liability against the City of Fayetteville under either a deficient training policy or a condoned custom theory, and affirmed the judgment on the merits.
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750 F.2d 1383·
7th Cir.·
1984-12-19
·cited 87×
The court held that the district judge erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the City of Berwyn due to a procedural defect and that the plaintiff should have been offered a new trial instead of a remittitur on punitive damages against Montoro. The court also
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700 F.2d 678·
11th Cir.·
1983-03-17
·cited 85×
The court held that summary judgment was improperly granted for the hospital, doctor, county, commissioners, and sheriff, as genuine issues of material fact remained regarding their liability under federal and state law. The exclusion of expert testimony was also deemed erroneous
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The court's opinion, which this judge concurs with, holds that a local government entity is liable under § 1983 when its official policy or custom inflicts injury, not solely for the acts of its employees or agents.
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610 F.2d 693·
10th Cir.·
1979-11-19
·cited 83×
Summary judgment for police chiefs on failure to train/supervise claims was inappropriate because a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether they had sufficient notice of prior misconduct and failed to act.
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752 F.2d 285·
7th Cir.·
1985-01-04
·cited 82×
The court held that a jury could find a public employee was wrongfully terminated for political reasons, but punitive damages require a showing of actual knowledge of violating rights, not just reckless indifference. The court also found the county could be liable for its own pol
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530 F.2d 1210·
5th Cir.·
1976-04-30
·cited 82×
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528 F.2d 856·
1st Cir.·
1976-01-22
·cited 82×
The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the defendants' failure to properly object to jury instructions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 51 precluded appellate review of the substantive legal issues.
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663 F.2d 778·
8th Cir.·
1981-11-09
·cited 81×
The court held that punitive damages in a § 1983 action require a finding of actual malice, not merely reckless or callous disregard for a prisoner's rights.
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560 F.2d 37·
1st Cir.·
1977-08-04
·cited 81×
Federal courts should not infer a right of action for damages against political subdivisions for constitutional violations by their employees, as this is inconsistent with the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and not constitutionally compelled.
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49 F.3d 679·
11th Cir.·
1995-04-06
·cited 80×
Polk County sheriff's deputies arrested several individuals at a nightclub following disturbances on April 15 and May 6, 1990. The arrested individuals and the nightclub owner sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and other federal and state law violations. The Eleventh Ci
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742 F.2d 469·
8th Cir.·
1984-08-29
·cited 80×
The court held that the magistrate erred in granting a directed verdict for the prison superintendent, as the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of reckless disregard for their Eighth Amendment rights to proceed to a jury.
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789 F.2d 1513·
11th Cir.·
1986-05-23
·cited 77×
A local governmental body does not deprive a person of their right to life under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when it grossly negligently trains an agent who then fails in an attempt to rescue that person from an existing peril not created by the agency.
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668 F.2d 869·
6th Cir.·
1982-01-04
·cited 77×
The dissenting judges argue that the panel decision incorrectly applies standards for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly regarding 'failure to train' and the 'policy or custom' requirement.
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The court held that indefinite solitary confinement to protect a prisoner from other inmates, when the prisoner has violated no rules, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and violates due process and equal protection. The court also held that a prisoner's fear of death is no
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639 F.2d 415·
8th Cir.·
1981-01-28
·cited 74×
The court held that the jury instructions improperly applied Eighth Amendment standards to pre-trial detainees and that the directed verdict for Deputy Crowe was erroneous, requiring a new trial.
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588 F.2d 740·
9th Cir.·
1978-12-27
·cited 74×
The court held that a public official can be liable under section 1983 for omissions that cause a deprivation of due process, even without direct personal participation in the forfeiture decision. The court also held that the good faith defense is unavailable if the official knew
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767 F.2d 161·
5th Cir.·
1985-08-05
·cited 73×
Police officers are liable under both Texas law and the Fourteenth Amendment for recklessly using deadly force that kills an innocent third party, even when the force might have been justified against the actual suspect. A municipality is liable under § 1983 for a policy of consc
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The court held that the Union engaged in racial discrimination by denying seniority rights and charging initiation fees to former CSC employees, and that the statute of limitations did not bar claims for continuing discrimination. The court also affirmed the availability of punit
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The court held that the plaintiff had a high probability of prevailing on the merits regarding the use of an offensive word in an academic context and the lack of adequate notice, warranting interlocutory relief.
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A school resource officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment when he grabbed a thirteen-year-old student's face, threw him to the ground using an armbar technique, and twisted his wrist, despite having arguable probable c
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Officer Smith of the Palm Bay Police Department shot and killed Aaron Zylstra during a traffic stop that escalated when Zylstra refused police commands, jumped back into his vehicle, and attempted to flee, striking Smith with the car door. The Eleventh Circuit held that Smith's u
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The court held that the district court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict for two defendants, and that the jury's punitive damages award against another defendant was supported by the evidence. The court also held that prisoners can bring claims for excessive
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Thomas Ireland's father appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims arising from his son's death following a violent altercation with corrections officers at the Charlotte County Jail on August 24, 2015. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissa
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The dissenting judge believes the majority opinion incorrectly interprets precedent and collapses the distinction between negligence and wanton conduct.
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The court held that the allegations, read as a whole, do not state a claim of reckless disregard for serious medical needs satisfying the 'deliberate indifference' standard.
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A prosecutor is absolutely immune from damages liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for authorizing the release of evidence, as this is considered a quasi-judicial act within the scope of their authority. A supervisor cannot be held liable for a subordinate's constitutional deprivati
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The court held that conditioning a street vacation on the dedication of unrelated geothermal wells without just compensation violates the Fifth Amendment's unconstitutional conditions doctrine and the Equal Protection Clause. However, the court reversed and remanded the procedura
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The dissenting judge would reverse and remand for a new trial, finding sufficient evidence to permit a jury to conclude that the defendants assaulted the plaintiff, inflicting cruel and unusual punishment.
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The court held that the district court erred in placing the burden on the defendant to prove entitlement to qualified immunity and in treating the legal question of whether the law was clearly established as a material issue of fact.
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772 F.2d 1395·
7th Cir.·
1985-09-05
·cited 66×
Excessive force claims during an arrest should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard, not the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process, which lacks textual support and relies on subjective judicial feelings.
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684 F.2d 1159·
5th Cir.·
1982-09-07
·cited 65×
Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights, even if the arrest was later found to be illegal.
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574 F.2d 1·
1st Cir.·
1978-03-30
·cited 64×
The dissenting judge would hold that social workers are entitled to qualified immunity and that private parties acting with immune state actors should also be dismissed from liability.
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778 F.2d 678·
11th Cir.·
1985-12-16
·cited 63×
The court held that the trial court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the City of Atlanta and Director Hudson were liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to a policy or custom of understaffing that le
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The court held that excessive force claims are governed by the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard, not the Fourteenth Amendment's 'shocks the conscience' test. The court also held that sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding of probable cause for arrest
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The court held that the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims should not be retroactively applied if it shortens the period, and that federal law, not state law, governs the accrual of civil conspiracy claims. The court also held that Bivens claims can be based on the First Am
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A plaintiff must plead specific facts tending to support the existence of a municipal policy that caused the injury, and bare allegations of policy are insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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752 F.2d 817·
3d Cir.·
1984-12-27
·cited 62×
The New Jersey Tort Claims Act, which grants broad immunity to state agents, cannot shield them from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the Fourteenth Amendment right to personal security. Involuntarily committed individuals retain a federally protected liberty intere
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The court held that the dismissal of the plaintiff's civil rights suit was improper because the record did not show that the plaintiff's request for writs to secure witnesses was evaluated, and the district court should have further considered exceptional circumstances for appoin
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662 F.2d 1385·
11th Cir.·
1981-12-07
·cited 62×
The court held that the denial of the appellants' motion for additional time to respond was not an abuse of discretion, and that summary judgment was proper as no genuine issue of material fact existed.
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The court held that claims for equitable relief were moot due to policy changes, and claims for back pay were barred by lack of subject matter jurisdiction under both Title VII and § 1983.
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529 F.2d 70·
2d Cir.·
1975-12-31
·cited 62×
The court held that public prosecutors are immune from § 1983 liability for official acts, private attorneys do not act 'under color of law' unless they engage in joint activity with state agents, and municipalities are not 'persons' under § 1983.
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A municipality and its employees can be enjoined from acting in violation of federal constitutional rights, even if the municipality is not considered a 'person' for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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709 F.2d 782·
2d Cir.·
1983-06-02
·cited 61×
The court held that the prior appellate decision established the law of the case, meaning the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury, and that the trial court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
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628 F.2d 488·
5th Cir.·
1980-10-22
·cited 61×
The court held that the speech of a public employee was protected under the Pickering balancing test, not the compelling state interest test.
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626 F.2d 1317·
5th Cir.·
1980-10-03
·cited 61×
The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, finding no abuse of discretion in denying the plaintiff's discovery continuance motion and no genuine issue of material fact regarding the officer's qualified immunity or the city's policy for § 1983 claims.
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88 F.3d 1573·
11th Cir.·
1996-07-09
·cited 60×
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that under Alabama law, sheriffs are not final policymakers for their counties in the area of law enforcement. The court also held that hearsay evidence, which is not shown to be reducible to admissible form at