-
613 F.2d 438·
2d Cir.·
1980-01-08
·cited 199×
The court affirmed in part and reversed in part a workers' compensation order awarding benefits to a claimant who suffered two distinct back injuries while employed by different entities.
-
739 F.2d 553·
11th Cir.·
1984-08-20
·cited 188×
The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's civil rights claims, finding that most allegations were either barred by immunity doctrines, failed to state a claim due to vagueness and conclusory nature, or were unsupported by specific facts.
-
846 F.2d 1328·
11th Cir.·
1988-06-13
·cited 166×
Summary judgment was inappropriate because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the officer used excessive force and whether the city maintained a policy or custom that led to the constitutional violation.
-
906 F.2d 667·
11th Cir.·
1990-07-24
·cited 139×
The district court erred in failing to construe the pro se complaint liberally to include a claim against Crawford in his official capacity.
-
888 F.2d 1562·
11th Cir.·
1989-11-30
·cited 136×
The court held that a police officer's disruptive speech, even if concerning public matters, is not protected by the First Amendment when it significantly impairs governmental efficiency, and that denying a motion to amend a complaint to add an equal protection claim was not an a
-
901 F.2d 989·
11th Cir.·
1990-05-21
·cited 133×
The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the City of Fort Lauderdale on immunity grounds, vacating the judgment and remanding for consideration of constitutional issues and pendent state claims.
-
888 F.2d 783·
11th Cir.·
1989-11-17
·cited 130×
The court held that the district court correctly denied the County's motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of deliberate indifference, and affirmed the judgment.
-
643 F.2d 1188·
5th Cir.·
1981-05-01
·cited 126×
Local legislators are entitled to absolute immunity under § 1983 for conduct in furtherance of their legislative duties, but municipalities are not entitled to legislative immunity from damages for uncompensated takings of private property through zoning regulations.
-
699 F.2d 874·
7th Cir.·
1983-02-01
·cited 124×
The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict against the Village of Melrose Park for failure to train or supervise its officers, and reversed the conspiracy to obstruct justice conviction due to lack of an overt act. However, it affirmed the j
-
653 F.2d 1220·
8th Cir.·
1981-07-13
·cited 120×
The court held that a jury may award damages for the violation of substantive constitutional rights independent of actual physical or emotional injury, and that the $300,000 verdict was not excessive.
-
619 F.2d 196·
2d Cir.·
1980-04-08
·cited 114×
The court held that while a municipality's failure to discipline an employee can, in some circumstances, constitute an official policy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the evidence presented in this case was insufficient as a matter of law to establish such a policy.
-
948 F.3d 1318·
11th Cir.·
2020-01-30
·cited 103×
The court held that the district court must reevaluate comparator evidence under a new standard and affirmed summary judgment on certain retaliation claims while vacating and remanding others.
-
923 F.2d 1474·
11th Cir.·
1991-02-19
·cited 103×
The court held that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for claims against the individual defendants based on qualified immunity and against the City for municipal liability under § 1983, and that § 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for §
-
705 F.2d 1110·
9th Cir.·
1983-05-09
·cited 103×
The court held that a probationary public employee's speech on matters of public concern is protected by the First Amendment, and dismissal based on such speech, even without a property interest in the job, entitles the employee to reinstatement and damages.
-
662 F.2d 181·
3d Cir.·
1981-09-28
·cited 101×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's findings of liability and damages against the police detective, police chief, and city for constitutional violations under section 1983, and that no errors occurred requiring a new trial.
-
787 F.2d 1496·
11th Cir.·
1986-04-28
·cited 96×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict finding the city liable under section 1983 for a custom or policy of police misconduct, and that the existence of adequate state remedies does not bar such a claim when constitutional rights are violate
-
688 F.2d 1328·
11th Cir.·
1982-10-12
·cited 95×
The court held that while the employee had a property interest in his job and the supervisor's actions constituted a due process violation, the city was not liable because the supervisor's actions did not represent official policy and the city commission exercised final authority
-
669 F.2d 979·
5th Cir.·
1982-03-08
·cited 95×
The court held that the Chief of Police's decision not to promote plaintiffs was substantially motivated by their protected speech and filing of a lawsuit, but affirmed the trial court's finding for other individual defendants. The case is remanded for further determination on wh
-
632 F.2d 185·
2d Cir.·
1980-09-25
·cited 90×
A dismissal of criminal charges after an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal constitutes a favorable termination for purposes of a federal civil rights claim, and all claims arising from a single transaction should not be barred by state statutes of limitation.
-
838 F.2d 663·
3d Cir.·
1988-01-26
·cited 88×
The dissenting judge argues that allegations of gross negligence or deliberate indifference are insufficient to sustain a due process § 1983 claim, which requires pleading intentional action, abuse of power, or actions tantamount to intent.
-
717 F.2d 220·
5th Cir.·
1983-10-17
·cited 84×
-
649 F.2d 1193·
5th Cir.·
1981-07-10
·cited 83×
The court's opinion, which this judge concurs with, holds that a local government entity is liable under § 1983 when its official policy or custom inflicts injury, not solely for the acts of its employees or agents.
-
789 F.2d 1513·
11th Cir.·
1986-05-23
·cited 77×
A local governmental body does not deprive a person of their right to life under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when it grossly negligently trains an agent who then fails in an attempt to rescue that person from an existing peril not created by the agency.
-
668 F.2d 869·
6th Cir.·
1982-01-04
·cited 77×
The dissenting judges argue that the panel decision incorrectly applies standards for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly regarding 'failure to train' and the 'policy or custom' requirement.
-
767 F.2d 161·
5th Cir.·
1985-08-05
·cited 73×
Police officers are liable under both Texas law and the Fourteenth Amendment for recklessly using deadly force that kills an innocent third party, even when the force might have been justified against the actual suspect. A municipality is liable under § 1983 for a policy of consc
-
493 F.2d 799·
5th Cir.·
1974-04-12
·cited 73×
-
791 F.2d 1182·
5th Cir.·
1986-06-13
·cited 69×
The dissenting judge believes the majority opinion incorrectly interprets precedent and collapses the distinction between negligence and wanton conduct.
-
723 F.2d 675·
9th Cir.·
1984-01-10
·cited 68×
A prosecutor is absolutely immune from damages liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for authorizing the release of evidence, as this is considered a quasi-judicial act within the scope of their authority. A supervisor cannot be held liable for a subordinate's constitutional deprivati
-
464 F.2d 272·
3d Cir.·
1972-06-26
·cited 68×
The dissenting judge would reverse and remand for a new trial, finding sufficient evidence to permit a jury to conclude that the defendants assaulted the plaintiff, inflicting cruel and unusual punishment.
-
781 F.2d 1334·
9th Cir.·
1986-01-30
·cited 62×
The court held that the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims should not be retroactively applied if it shortens the period, and that federal law, not state law, governs the accrual of civil conspiracy claims. The court also held that Bivens claims can be based on the First Am
-
662 F.2d 1385·
11th Cir.·
1981-12-07
·cited 62×
The court held that the denial of the appellants' motion for additional time to respond was not an abuse of discretion, and that summary judgment was proper as no genuine issue of material fact existed.
-
532 F.2d 259·
2d Cir.·
1976-03-08
·cited 62×
The court held that claims for equitable relief were moot due to policy changes, and claims for back pay were barred by lack of subject matter jurisdiction under both Title VII and § 1983.
-
626 F.2d 1317·
5th Cir.·
1980-10-03
·cited 61×
The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, finding no abuse of discretion in denying the plaintiff's discovery continuance motion and no genuine issue of material fact regarding the officer's qualified immunity or the city's policy for § 1983 claims.
-
813 F.2d 824·
7th Cir.·
1987-03-06
·cited 60×
The court held that the district judge did not err in denying the defendants' motion for a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and that the admission of expert testimony was proper.
-
735 F.2d 838·
5th Cir.·
1984-07-09
·cited 60×
The court held that the trial court's jury instructions on municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were too lax and did not comply with the established standard for proving a custom or policy, requiring a new trial.
-
528 F.2d 499·
5th Cir.·
1976-02-27
·cited 58×
-
566 F.2d 1334·
9th Cir.·
1977-12-14
·cited 56×
The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the height limitation and pre-1971 hiring procedures. The court also found that the attempted use of the 1972 examination was a Title VII violation, but the imposition of hiring quotas was not warranted.
-
608 F.2d 644·
5th Cir.·
1979-12-21
·cited 54×
A jury question was presented as to whether certain officers and jailers falsely arrested, imprisoned, or denied medical care to the plaintiff, but not as to others or the City.
-
919 F.2d 665·
11th Cir.·
1990-12-18
·cited 53×
The court held that while punitive damages may be appropriate, appellate courts cannot mandate their award, as this is a discretionary decision for the fact finder. The majority's imposition of punitive damages constituted an abuse of discretion.
-
877 F.2d 947·
11th Cir.·
1989-07-20
·cited 53×
A county cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a district attorney's prosecutorial decisions, as the district attorney acts as a state official, not a county policymaker, under Georgia law.
-
805 F.2d 962·
11th Cir.·
1986-12-09
·cited 53×
The court held that a public censure resolution by a city council, if retaliatory, can violate First Amendment rights and procedural due process, but not the Sixth Amendment or the prohibition against bills of attainder if it lacks the force of law.
-
808 F.2d 1228·
7th Cir.·
1986-12-29
·cited 52×
The court held that the RICO claims were barred by res judicata because the plaintiffs failed to raise their fraud claims as defenses in the prior state court foreclosure proceedings. However, the court reversed the district court's injunction against state court proceedings, fin
-
726 F.2d 1499·
10th Cir.·
1984-02-02
·cited 52×
The court held that the trial court erred in submitting the due process claims to the jury, as the plaintiff failed to establish a property interest in continued employment or a liberty interest in her reputation, and the erroneous submission was not harmless error given the gene
-
664 F.2d 99·
5th Cir.·
1981-12-18
·cited 52×
The court held that the city's new ordinance was an unconstitutional taking and that municipalities do not have qualified immunity in § 1983 actions.
-
666 F.2d 1328·
10th Cir.·
1981-12-14
·cited 52×
The court held that while state law primarily governs family relations, the Constitution protects fundamental rights within family life, and state interference with these rights may be actionable under Section 1983 if egregious and lacking due process.
-
783 F.2d 319·
2d Cir.·
1986-02-11
·cited 51×
A municipality can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a policy of deliberate indifference to its officers' use of excessive force, and evidence of unadjudicated third-party claims is admissible to prove such a policy.
-
836 F.2d 346·
7th Cir.·
1988-01-07
·cited 50×
The court held that a pretrial detainee's claim for failure to protect falls under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment, and that the county could be liable under section 1983 for a policymaker's decision.
-
784 F.2d 277·
7th Cir.·
1986-02-24
·cited 48×
The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the defendants' conduct constituted state action. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
-
11 F.4th 1317·
11th Cir.·
2021-09-02
·cited 47×
Marcus Underwood sued the City of Bessemer and two police officers for excessive force after they shot him approximately 20 times during a June 2014 encounter where his slowly-moving car came toward them on a residential street. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for
-
717 F.2d 932·
4th Cir.·
1983-09-19
·cited 47×
The court held that the district court did not err in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the city and chief, nor in denying a new trial, as there was insufficient evidence of a municipal policy to allow the use of a dangerous instrumentality.