-
693 F.2d 733·
8th Cir.·
1982-11-12
·cited 47×
The court held that summary judgment was improperly granted because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the city deprived developers of zoning rights without due process and whether city officials conspired with private developers to restrain trade.
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591 F.2d 426·
2d Cir.·
1979-01-16
·cited 47×
The court held that a cause of action against a municipality may exist under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, superseding a direct claim under the 14th Amendment.
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730 F.2d 1367·
10th Cir.·
1984-03-30
·cited 46×
The court held that the § 1983 claims were timely filed under Colorado's residuary statute of limitations and that the plaintiff stated a claim for deprivation of liberty without due process, distinguishing the case from Baker v. McCollan. The harassment claim also requires furth
-
971 F.2d 708·
11th Cir.·
1992-09-10
·cited 43×
Melanie Martinez, a city purchasing director, was terminated in retaliation for testifying before a municipal board of inquiry about the city manager's violations of bid procedures. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the jury verdict against the individual defendant city manager Conno
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839 F.2d 621·
9th Cir.·
1988-02-16
·cited 43×
The court held that a pro se plaintiff must be informed of the specific deficiencies in their complaint before dismissal, and granted leave to amend for most claims, reversing the district court's dismissal with prejudice.
-
703 F.2d 1141·
9th Cir.·
1983-04-14
·cited 43×
The court held that the failure to submit a development plan does not, in itself, bar an inverse condemnation claim, and that damages may be recoverable for inverse condemnation.
-
501 F.2d 687·
2d Cir.·
1974-08-13
·cited 43×
The court held that absent proof of discrimination, informal word-of-mouth recruiting is permissible for staff appointments, and Title VII does not preempt claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
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954 F.2d 1540·
11th Cir.·
1992-02-19
·cited 40×
A guardian sued Monroe County jail officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injuries sustained by an inmate who attempted suicide while in custody, claiming failure to provide safe care and inadequate training. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the sheriff on the pol
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871 F.2d 1151·
1st Cir.·
1989-03-30
·cited 40×
The court held that the jury's verdicts against the City of Everett under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were supported by sufficient evidence, both based on an unconstitutional custom of breaking down doors without a warrant and on a policy of deliberate indifference to inadequate training an
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824 F.2d 1049·
D.C. Cir.·
1987-07-21
·cited 39×
The verdict awarding $75,000 to an inmate injured in a fight over a sandwich should not stand.
-
507 F.2d 281·
6th Cir.·
1974-11-13
·cited 39×
An award of attorney fees is permissible under the "private attorney general" exception to the American Rule for suits vindicating public constitutional rights, and such awards can be assessed against local officials payable from public funds, but not against municipalities direc
-
841 F.2d 337·
9th Cir.·
1988-03-10
·cited 38×
The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the plaintiff's Title VII claim was abandoned or time-barred, and her § 1983 claim failed because the municipality cannot be held liable under a respondeat superior theory and the supervisor was not a final policymake
-
773 F.2d 191·
8th Cir.·
1985-09-11
·cited 38×
The court held that a mayor's actions, when taken under the authority of his office, can represent official policy, making the municipality liable under § 1983. The court also found that the damage awards were excessive and ordered a remittitur.
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581 F.2d 556·
5th Cir.·
1978-10-06
·cited 38×
-
867 F.2d 1201·
9th Cir.·
1989-02-09
·cited 37×
Prosecutors are not absolutely immune for investigative actions or public statements unrelated to the judicial phase of a prosecution, and a county can be liable under § 1983 if its elected officials act as policymakers.
-
876 F.2d 808·
10th Cir.·
1989-05-22
·cited 35×
The court held that sexual harassment can violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and that a supervisor's termination of an employee can constitute official policy for which a county may be liable under Section 1983, but other acts of harassment may not.
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525 F.2d 909·
5th Cir.·
1976-01-08
·cited 35×
The dissenting judges maintain that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment applies to corporal punishment administered to public school children under color of state law. They argue that the availability of state remedies does not preclude federal
-
785 F.2d 631·
8th Cir.·
1986-03-07
·cited 34×
The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to establish county liability under § 1983, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding discovery, mistrial, evidence admission, or damage and fee awards.
-
766 F.2d 1567·
1st Cir.·
1985-08-08
·cited 34×
The court held that a general jury verdict based on multiple theories of liability, where at least one theory lacks sufficient evidentiary support, must be reversed because it is impossible to determine the jury's basis for the verdict. The court also held that a governmental emp
-
710 F.2d 240·
6th Cir.·
1983-06-16
·cited 34×
A state statute authorizing police to use deadly force to apprehend unarmed, non-violent fleeing felons is unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments as an unreasonable seizure and a violation of due process.
-
572 F.2d 1233·
8th Cir.·
1978-03-07
·cited 34×
The court held that the 180-day statute of limitations for housing discrimination claims applied to §§ 1981 and 1982, but a three-year statute applied to the § 1983 claim. The court also held that the plaintiffs' claim under the Fair Housing Act was untimely.
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900 F.2d 101·
7th Cir.·
1990-04-16
·cited 32×
The court held that the complaint sufficiently alleged actions taken under color of state law and that a single decision by a final policymaker could establish municipal liability under § 1983.
-
867 F.2d 1·
1st Cir.·
1989-01-24
·cited 32×
The court held that the district court erred in awarding back pay post-verdict and in nullifying the jury's answer regarding official policy, necessitating a new trial on damages but not liability. It also affirmed that certain positions, like Municipal Secretary and Personnel Di
-
796 F.2d 1307·
10th Cir.·
1986-07-16
·cited 32×
The court held that the city's failure to object to an improper jury instruction at trial waived the right to raise the error on appeal, even after remand for reconsideration in light of a Supreme Court decision.
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734 F.2d 185·
5th Cir.·
1984-05-29
·cited 32×
The court held that while the mayor/magistrate was immune for judicial acts, his prior non-judicial acts of investigation and complaint issuance, done with malice, were not shielded by judicial immunity. The city was liable because the mayor's actions represented official city po
-
702 F.2d 393·
2d Cir.·
1983-03-11
·cited 31×
The court held that the complaint failed to state a claim for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it did not allege a causal link between the City's alleged policy and the plaintiffs' injuries, and the evidence was insufficient to prove such causation.
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689 F.2d 1220·
5th Cir.·
1982-10-28
·cited 31×
The court held that punitive damages are not available against a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, regardless of the egregiousness of the conduct.
-
660 F.2d 111·
4th Cir.·
1981-10-02
·cited 30×
Summary judgment for the county and its boards was improper because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether their policies or customs, or lack thereof, caused the plaintiff's constitutional deprivation.
-
626 F.2d 1060·
1st Cir.·
1980-06-17
·cited 30×
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying defendants' motions, allowing certain cross-examination, or instructing the jury on punitive damages against the City, affirming the jury's verdict.
-
597 F.2d 344·
2d Cir.·
1979-04-26
·cited 30×
The court held that a village is a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 following Monell, and that while a justice has absolute immunity for damages, other officials have only qualified immunity, making dismissal premature if bad faith is alleged.
-
437 F.2d 352·
5th Cir.·
1971-01-05
·cited 30×
The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that federal courts should abstain from deciding a constitutional challenge to a local ordinance when state courts can resolve the underlying state law issues, and that federal courts are generally prohibited from enjoining pending state
-
798 F.2d 1168·
8th Cir.·
1986-08-19
·cited 29×
The dissenting judge argues that the evidence was insufficient to support findings of municipal liability and a First Amendment violation, and that a new trial on damages is warranted due to an improper jury instruction.
-
910 F.2d 1422·
7th Cir.·
1990-08-16
·cited 28×
The court held that the United States and the City of Waukegan were properly dismissed, but the claim against Lake County for violating William Ross's constitutional rights by preventing rescue was cognizable under § 1983.
-
901 F.2d 561·
7th Cir.·
1990-04-12
·cited 28×
County prosecutors and sheriffs cannot evade constitutional and statutory obligations for prompt presentment by claiming the prisoner was delivered by state police or by warehousing the prisoner outside the county.
-
857 F.2d 1300·
9th Cir.·
1988-09-20
·cited 26×
The City Council's arbitrary withholding of a building permit, after all requirements were met, violated the developer's substantive due process rights and constituted official policy, making the City and council members liable. The court also affirmed the dismissal of procedural
-
797 F.2d 743·
9th Cir.·
1986-08-15
·cited 26×
The court held that a claim for substantive due process violation is not barred by the availability of state remedies, and that a municipal liability claim based on alleged policy or custom cannot be dismissed on the pleadings alone.
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490 So. 2d 69·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1985-12-17
·cited 26×
The City of Miami appealed a jury verdict finding it liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a municipal policy regarding high-speed police pursuits that resulted in the death of an innocent bystander, Mrs. Doretha Rolle, when police rammed a suspect's vehicle into a bus bench. The cou
-
610 F.2d 1157·
3d Cir.·
1979-12-05
·cited 26×
The court held that the jury instructions on the statute of limitations were inadequate because they focused on the alteration of police logs rather than the misleading statements made to the plaintiff, requiring a new trial.
-
578 F.2d 846·
9th Cir.·
1978-07-21
·cited 26×
The dissenting judge would reverse the district court's decision, find jurisdiction, and infer a cause of action against the city directly from the Fourteenth Amendment.
-
947 F.2d 1042·
3d Cir.·
1991-10-18
·cited 25×
A municipality can be held liable under section 1983 for deliberate indifference to constitutional rights, which can be proven by demonstrating reckless conduct or a failure to act when officials should have known of a risk.
-
697 F.2d 657·
5th Cir.·
1983-02-07
·cited 25×
The court held that the city and city attorney could be held liable under § 1983 for unconstitutional application of zoning ordinances and deprivation of power, but the councilmen were not liable due to insufficient evidence.
-
570 F.2d 414·
2d Cir.·
1978-01-04
·cited 24×
Plaintiffs' claims challenging a building permit, variance, and state court decisions on federal civil rights grounds were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel because the New York Court of Appeals, applying the Kovarsky doctrine, had jurisdiction under CPLR § 103(c) to
-
915 F.2d 1530·
11th Cir.·
1990-10-31
·cited 23×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing official-capacity claims and applying collateral estoppel without proper notice, and that the police officers were not in privity with the state for collateral estoppel purposes under Georgia law.
-
891 F.2d 1039·
2d Cir.·
1989-12-13
·cited 23×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to find that Officer Gardner used excessive force, thus reversing the directed verdict against him. However, the court affirmed the directed verdict for the County on the § 1983 claim due to lack of evidence of a mun
-
770 F.2d 896·
10th Cir.·
1985-08-19
·cited 23×
The court held that plaintiffs failed to present specific evidence of a policy for summary judgment, but that the trial court erred in directing a verdict on the First Amendment claim due to sufficient circumstantial evidence of official knowledge and participation.
-
690 F.2d 126·
7th Cir.·
1982-10-05
·cited 23×
The court held that a private corporation cannot be held liable under § 1983 based solely on respondeat superior; liability requires proof of an impermissible policy. The court also found that erroneous jury instructions regarding municipal liability and strip search reasonablene
-
954 F.2d 343·
6th Cir.·
1992-01-06
·cited 22×
The court held that the officer's use of deadly force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, even if the suspect was surrounded, because the suspect posed a significant threat of serious physical harm to others.
-
927 F.2d 1473·
9th Cir.·
1991-03-12
·cited 22×
The court held that the sheriff is not the final policymaker for deputy training under Washington law, and the jury instructions on municipal liability did not meet the deliberate indifference standard required by Canton v. Harris.
-
913 F.2d 113·
4th Cir.·
1990-07-31
·cited 22×
The court held that while the Due Process Clause imposes an affirmative duty of care on the state for individuals in its custody, the evidence was insufficient to establish that Baltimore County's failure to train its officers in suicide prevention was the proximate cause of the
-
891 F.2d 373·
1st Cir.·
1989-12-11
·cited 22×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting protective orders, that summary judgment for the city and police chief was appropriate, but that directed verdicts for one officer on claims of false arrest, imprisonment, and civil rights violations