-
904 F.2d 572·
11th Cir.·
1990-06-27
·cited 121×
The court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for the arrest because arguable probable cause existed, and that the plaintiff's defamation claim under Section 1983 failed because it did not allege the deprivation of a tangible interest beyond reputation.
-
602 F.2d 1205·
5th Cir.·
1979-09-24
·cited 100×
The court held that Section 1983 does not preclude the incorporation of state law remedies, including vicarious liability, for the deprivation of civil rights.
-
761 F.2d 335·
7th Cir.·
1985-04-18
·cited 68×
The court held that the allegations, read as a whole, do not state a claim of reckless disregard for serious medical needs satisfying the 'deliberate indifference' standard.
-
716 F.2d 646·
9th Cir.·
1983-09-22
·cited 68×
The court held that conditioning a street vacation on the dedication of unrelated geothermal wells without just compensation violates the Fifth Amendment's unconstitutional conditions doctrine and the Equal Protection Clause. However, the court reversed and remanded the procedura
-
736 F.2d 243·
5th Cir.·
1984-07-16
·cited 58×
The court held that the trial judge erred in submitting the due process liberty interest claim to the jury because there was no evidence to support it.
-
772 F.2d 1205·
5th Cir.·
1985-10-07
·cited 56×
The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the second amendment to the complaint would be futile, and therefore, further proceedings would be a waste of resources.
-
916 F.2d 1521·
11th Cir.·
1990-11-07
·cited 54×
The court held that prior precedent improperly granted Eleventh Amendment immunity to Alabama county sheriffs without a proper analysis of state funding for judgments.
-
879 F.2d 473·
9th Cir.·
1988-08-15
·cited 54×
The court held that the City failed to preserve most of its challenges to jury instructions and sufficiency of evidence due to procedural defaults, and that any errors in the qualified immunity instruction were harmless.
-
919 F.2d 665·
11th Cir.·
1990-12-18
·cited 53×
The court held that while punitive damages may be appropriate, appellate courts cannot mandate their award, as this is a discretionary decision for the fact finder. The majority's imposition of punitive damages constituted an abuse of discretion.
-
895 F.2d 1469·
3d Cir.·
1990-02-08
·cited 49×
The court held that the jury's findings on § 1983 claims were not sufficient to establish a Title VII hostile work environment claim, and that certain judgments n.o.v. were appropriate while others were not.
-
813 F.2d 709·
5th Cir.·
1987-04-06
·cited 49×
The court held that allegations of bias and conspiracy in pre-termination hearings, even if true, do not state a procedural or substantive due process claim when a post-termination administrative remedy is available.
-
762 F.2d 912·
11th Cir.·
1985-06-11
·cited 48×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the § 1983 due process claim, but correctly dismissed the § 504 claim for failure to allege discrimination.
-
739 F.2d 466·
9th Cir.·
1984-08-03
·cited 42×
The court should have abstained from hearing the case due to important state interests implicated in the unlawful detainer proceedings.
-
692 F.2d 1032·
5th Cir.·
1982-12-06
·cited 40×
The court affirmed the compensatory damages award but reversed the attorney's fees award, remanding for recalculation and holding the fees are payable by the County. The good faith defense on the § 1983 claim was not decided as recovery was affirmed on the state claim.
-
903 F.2d 1546·
11th Cir.·
1990-06-26
·cited 39×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a late motion to amend the complaint, excluding employment guidelines due to lack of authentication, and granting a directed verdict for the defendants on due process and emotional distress claims.
-
613 F.2d 245·
10th Cir.·
1979-11-26
·cited 38×
The dissenting judge would affirm the district court's judgment, finding the Board entitled to immunity based on good faith.
-
829 F.2d 255·
1st Cir.·
1987-09-22
·cited 37×
The court held that the plaintiff was in the midst of administrative proceedings when she filed her federal suit, and thus should have exhausted state remedies before proceeding in federal court.
-
713 F.2d 143·
5th Cir.·
1983-09-01
·cited 37×
The court held that the plaintiff's complaint failed to state an arguable violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to intervene in a related class action. The dismissal of damages claims was affirmed,
-
818 F.2d 1291·
7th Cir.·
1987-04-24
·cited 36×
Unreviewed factual findings of a state or local agency should not be given preclusive effect in a subsequent suit brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
-
771 F.2d 1020·
7th Cir.·
1985-08-26
·cited 35×
The court held that while the plaintiff's counsel's "Golden Rule" argument was improper, it was not reversible error given the trial court's actions. However, the jury's $112,000 damage award was found to be excessive.
-
743 F.2d 1488·
11th Cir.·
1984-10-11
·cited 35×
-
800 F.2d 600·
6th Cir.·
1986-09-05
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court erred in denying Giles' First and Eighth Amendment claims and in awarding only nominal damages to Parrish for his First Amendment violations. The court reversed the denial of Giles' claims and remanded for further proceedings on damages.
-
626 F.2d 1115·
3d Cir.·
1980-06-30
·cited 32×
The majority opinion awarded additional backpay to Ms. Gurmankin for the period 1970-1976, importing a Title VII presumption into a Section 1983 claim.
-
851 F.2d 1321·
11th Cir.·
1988-08-10
·cited 31×
The plurality opinion held that private defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in a section 1983 action. The dissenting judges disagreed, arguing that qualified immunity should not extend to private actors.
-
893 F.2d 404·
1st Cir.·
1990-01-08
·cited 30×
The court held that the plaintiffs' Section 1983 claim for wrongful termination was time-barred because the administrative action did not toll the statute of limitations, and their malicious prosecution claim failed because the alleged conduct did not rise to the level of a const
-
730 F.2d 1002·
5th Cir.·
1984-04-30
·cited 30×
A prisoner's failure to move for a directed verdict on certain claims at trial precludes him from raising the sufficiency of the evidence for those claims on appeal, and jury verdicts will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.
-
459 F.2d 81·
6th Cir.·
1972-04-26
·cited 30×
Federal law enforcement officers do not have immunity from damage suits for constitutional violations if they act without good faith and probable cause.
-
746 F.2d 185·
3d Cir.·
1984-10-12
·cited 29×
The court held that the plaintiff's section 1983 claims were barred for failure to comply with the Virgin Islands Tort Claims Act notice requirements.
-
777 F.2d 1207·
7th Cir.·
1985-11-18
·cited 28×
The court held that while the plaintiff's suit was frivolous and defendants were entitled to fees, the district court failed to adequately determine if all hours billed were reasonably expended in light of the frivolous nature of the claims. The court remanded for further finding
-
841 F.2d 518·
3d Cir.·
1988-03-11
·cited 27×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate a constitutional violation under section 1983, as the teacher's actions did not rise to the level of excessive force or abuse of power, and the injuries were unexpected and unintended.
-
870 F.2d 616·
11th Cir.·
1989-04-19
·cited 26×
The court held that Gwin's equal protection claims challenging the Board's parole procedures and denial of compassionate leave are properly brought under section 1983 and do not require exhaustion of state remedies, reversing the district court's dismissal of these claims.
-
720 F.2d 1416·
5th Cir.·
1983-12-12
·cited 26×
A guilty plea does not preclude a subsequent Section 1983 action for Fourth Amendment violations that were not litigated in the state proceedings, and dismissal of claims regarding warrantless conversation interception was proper.
-
710 F.2d 632·
10th Cir.·
1983-04-18
·cited 26×
The court held that the termination of employment was neither federal nor state action, as the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the decision was attributable to a governmental policy or rule, despite the agency's governmental funding and the presence of public officials on it
-
578 F.2d 846·
9th Cir.·
1978-07-21
·cited 26×
The dissenting judge would reverse the district court's decision, find jurisdiction, and infer a cause of action against the city directly from the Fourteenth Amendment.
-
783 F.2d 59·
7th Cir.·
1986-01-29
·cited 25×
Evidence of a non-discriminatory retaliatory motive is irrelevant to proving that the employer's proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination was a pretext for age discrimination.
-
749 F.2d 234·
5th Cir.·
1984-12-26
·cited 24×
The court concurred that the record did not entirely exclude the possibility of bad faith termination, which could entitle the plaintiff to relief under section 1983.
-
854 F.2d 179·
7th Cir.·
1988-07-28
·cited 23×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under section 1983 because her allegations did not establish a municipal policy or custom of discrimination and retaliation, and that her appeal regarding the Title VII dismissal was moot.
-
795 F.2d 310·
3d Cir.·
1986-07-09
·cited 23×
The dissenting judge argues that the majority erred in excusing deficient pleadings and the failure to seek leave to amend, asserting that civil rights claims require specific factual allegations tying defendants to the alleged deprivations.
-
850 F.2d 537·
9th Cir.·
1988-06-23
·cited 22×
A district court cannot reduce a statutory attorney fee award below the lodestar amount based on the existence of a contingent-fee agreement or the simplicity of the case's issues.
-
786 F.2d 1098·
11th Cir.·
1986-04-15
·cited 22×
The court held that state administrative proceedings did not bar the deputy sheriff's federal First Amendment claim, submitting the protected speech issue to the jury was not plain error, and the damages awarded were not excessive.
-
718 F.2d 1472·
9th Cir.·
1983-10-25
·cited 22×
Post-deprivation processes can satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirement for liberty interests, and detention beyond a lawful term is not automatically cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
-
537 F.2d 385·
10th Cir.·
1976-06-22
·cited 22×
The court's holding is not explicitly stated as this is a concurring opinion focusing on reasoning.
-
497 F.2d 139·
5th Cir.·
1974-07-18
·cited 22×
The court held that refusing water service to new applicants based on a third party's unpaid water bill violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but modified the class definition to be more specific.
-
942 F.2d 1435·
9th Cir.·
1991-08-26
·cited 21×
The court held that the majority's application of deliberate indifference standards to jail management was incorrect, suggesting judicial overreach.
-
891 F.2d 1542·
11th Cir.·
1990-01-16
·cited 21×
The federal district court properly dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for lack of jurisdiction, as it sought to review final state court judgments and enjoin ongoing state proceedings.
-
811 F.2d 782·
2d Cir.·
1987-02-12
·cited 21×
The court held that appellants were accorded all the process they were due, as post-deprivation remedies were adequate for their claims regarding pension calculations.
-
603 F.2d 522·
5th Cir.·
1979-09-28
·cited 21×
The court held that while the school district's no-outside-employment rule was facially valid, its selective and discriminatory enforcement against Mr. Gosney violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.
-
777 F.2d 1403·
10th Cir.·
1985-11-22
·cited 20×
The court held that the school board and its members in their official capacities are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and that the actual malice standard applies to defamation claims brought by public officials against non-media defendants.
-
765 F.2d 275·
1st Cir.·
1985-06-26
·cited 20×
Plaintiffs who achieve a significant benefit through their lawsuit, even without a formal judgment or settlement, can be considered prevailing parties for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if the suit acted as a catalyst for the defendants' actions.
-
479 F.2d 86·
8th Cir.·
1973-05-17
·cited 20×
The dissenting judge would apply Iowa's five-year general statute of limitations to the civil rights action.