521 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 1,043 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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The court held that the district court erred in denying the municipal defendants' motion for attorneys' fees incurred in defending against Eastway's civil rights claim, as the claim was unreasonable and groundless.
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855 F.2d 736·
11th Cir.·
1988-09-19
·cited 217×
The court held that prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity and that a compensatory damage award for a procedural due process violation was appropriate.
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The court denied petitions for rehearing and a suggestion for rehearing en banc, modifying its prior opinion to remove reliance on disputed stipulations. The court also awarded plaintiffs 75% of their costs.
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The court affirmed in part and reversed in part a workers' compensation order awarding benefits to a claimant who suffered two distinct back injuries while employed by different entities.
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The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's civil rights claims, finding that most allegations were either barred by immunity doctrines, failed to state a claim due to vagueness and conclusory nature, or were unsupported by specific facts.
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20 F.3d 1550·
11th Cir.·
1994-05-05
·cited 186×
The Eleventh Circuit held that a government employee with a state-created property interest in employment who alleges pretextual termination states only a procedural due process claim, not a substantive due process claim, under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court overruled ten ye
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Attorney's fees were warranted under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, but the trial court's award was inadequate and improperly calculated. The court vacated the award and remanded for redetermination.
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Summary judgment was inappropriate because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the officer used excessive force and whether the city maintained a policy or custom that led to the constitutional violation.
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The court held that the second tasing of an incapacitated detainee constituted excessive force violating clearly established law, but supervisory liability claims failed due to lack of evidence of a policy or custom based on multiple incidents.
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344 F.3d 1263·
11th Cir.·
2003-09-09
·cited 150×
Focus on the Family challenged a contract between the Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority (PSTA) and Eller Media that allegedly barred Focus from advertising its "Love Won Out" conference on bus shelters in Pinellas County, Florida. The district court granted summary judgment for
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The court held that sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 require a finding of subjective bad faith, while Rule 11 sanctions can be imposed for signing papers that are not well-grounded in fact or law after reasonable inquiry, or are filed for an improper purpose.
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479 F.2d 701·
7th Cir.·
1973-05-16
·cited 141×
The dissenting judge would reverse the dismissal of claims alleging cruel and unusual punishment due to reckless endangerment and apply the full procedural safeguards of Morrissey v. Brewer to parole and good time revocation proceedings.
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The district court erred in failing to construe the pro se complaint liberally to include a claim against Crawford in his official capacity.
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Cindy Fils and Nemours Maurice sued police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force after being tased and arrested outside a nightclub in Aventura, Florida on August 23, 2003. The district court denied the officers' motions for summary judgment based on qualified immun
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The court held that a police officer's disruptive speech, even if concerning public matters, is not protected by the First Amendment when it significantly impairs governmental efficiency, and that denying a motion to amend a complaint to add an equal protection claim was not an a
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The court held that the plaintiff should be allowed limited discovery and an opportunity to amend his complaint to state a claim for "deliberate indifference" against the county under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that his breach of contract claim as a third-party beneficiary should be r
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The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the City of Fort Lauderdale on immunity grounds, vacating the judgment and remanding for consideration of constitutional issues and pendent state claims.
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847 F.2d 1211·
7th Cir.·
1988-05-23
·cited 131×
The dissenting judges argue that the defendant's actions, in failing to dispatch an ambulance and advising against seeking other medical help, constituted gross negligence or reckless indifference, making it actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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The court held that the district court correctly denied the County's motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of deliberate indifference, and affirmed the judgment.
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Local legislators are entitled to absolute immunity under § 1983 for conduct in furtherance of their legislative duties, but municipalities are not entitled to legislative immunity from damages for uncompensated takings of private property through zoning regulations.
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545 F.2d 565·
7th Cir.·
1976-10-28
·cited 125×
The court held that the negligence of prison guards causing the loss of a prisoner's transcript was not a state deprivation of property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment, nor was it action 'under color of state law' for purposes of Section 1983.
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728 F.2d 762·
5th Cir.·
1984-04-02
·cited 124×
The court held that a municipality can be held liable under section 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of an appointed official if that official's acts represent official policy, even if the municipality's written policies are facially constitutional.
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The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict against the Village of Melrose Park for failure to train or supervise its officers, and reversed the conspiracy to obstruct justice conviction due to lack of an overt act. However, it affirmed the j
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The court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for the arrest because arguable probable cause existed, and that the plaintiff's defamation claim under Section 1983 failed because it did not allege the deprivation of a tangible interest beyond reputation.
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653 F.2d 1220·
8th Cir.·
1981-07-13
·cited 120×
The court held that a jury may award damages for the violation of substantive constitutional rights independent of actual physical or emotional injury, and that the $300,000 verdict was not excessive.
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608 F.2d 654·
5th Cir.·
1979-12-21
·cited 116×
The court held that prosecutors, judges, and supervisory officials are immune from § 1983 liability for actions within their official capacities, and that private citizens cannot be held liable for conspiracy with immune officials based on derivative immunity. The § 1985 claim fa
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537 F.2d 829·
5th Cir.·
1976-08-25
·cited 116×
The court held that a complaint alleging supervisory defendants breached a duty owed to the plaintiff, causing constitutional injury, states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and dismissal for failure to state a claim was improper.
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569 F.2d 10·
D.C. Cir.·
1977-09-21
·cited 115×
The court held that a prosecutor acting as a witness in a courtroom, answering a judge's question, is performing a function intimately associated with the judicial process and is therefore entitled to absolute immunity from civil suit.
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818 F.2d 791·
11th Cir.·
1987-06-09
·cited 114×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the complaint did not allege facts showing the defendants had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to the child. The court also held that the Georgia fos
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The court held that while a municipality's failure to discipline an employee can, in some circumstances, constitute an official policy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the evidence presented in this case was insufficient as a matter of law to establish such a policy.
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The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of federal jurisdiction and that a claim was stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but affirmed the refusal to convene a three-judge court.
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689 F.2d 964·
11th Cir.·
1982-10-21
·cited 108×
The court held that the district court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial, as the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find that his demotion was in retaliation for protected First Amendment activities.
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The court held that supervisory officials are not absolutely immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that the District of Columbia should share liability for police misconduct.
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The court held that exhaustion of adequate state administrative remedies can be a prerequisite to filing a section 1983 suit, departing from a strict no-exhaustion rule.
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The court held that the district court must reevaluate comparator evidence under a new standard and affirmed summary judgment on certain retaliation claims while vacating and remanding others.
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The court held that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for claims against the individual defendants based on qualified immunity and against the City for municipal liability under § 1983, and that § 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for §
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705 F.2d 1110·
9th Cir.·
1983-05-09
·cited 103×
The court held that a probationary public employee's speech on matters of public concern is protected by the First Amendment, and dismissal based on such speech, even without a property interest in the job, entitles the employee to reinstatement and damages.
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699 F.2d 864·
7th Cir.·
1983-01-31
·cited 102×
The court held that the sheriff, in his official capacity, was liable for damages resulting from the execution of an outdated writ of restitution due to a pervasive custom of executing stale writs. The court also held that the Parratt v. Taylor doctrine did not bar claims for sub
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The court held that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's findings of liability and damages against the police detective, police chief, and city for constitutional violations under section 1983, and that no errors occurred requiring a new trial.
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The court held that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the case for violation of a local rule and that the plaintiff's allegations sufficiently stated a claim for excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, state officials sued in their official capacitie
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The court held that Section 1983 does not preclude the incorporation of state law remedies, including vicarious liability, for the deprivation of civil rights.
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351 F.2d 533·
9th Cir.·
1965-10-08
·cited 100×
A prosecuting attorney is not immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when acting outside their quasi-judicial capacity, such as in an investigative or police-like role.
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649 F.2d 134·
2d Cir.·
1981-05-13
·cited 98×
The dissenting judge argues that the trial court's jury charge was proper when viewed as a whole and that other alleged errors do not warrant reversal.
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787 F.2d 1496·
11th Cir.·
1986-04-28
·cited 96×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict finding the city liable under section 1983 for a custom or policy of police misconduct, and that the existence of adequate state remedies does not bar such a claim when constitutional rights are violate
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The court held that while the employee had a property interest in his job and the supervisor's actions constituted a due process violation, the city was not liable because the supervisor's actions did not represent official policy and the city commission exercised final authority
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The court held that the Chief of Police's decision not to promote plaintiffs was substantially motivated by their protected speech and filing of a lawsuit, but affirmed the trial court's finding for other individual defendants. The case is remanded for further determination on wh
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The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment by misinterpreting precedent and failing to view evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
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A dismissal of criminal charges after an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal constitutes a favorable termination for purposes of a federal civil rights claim, and all claims arising from a single transaction should not be barred by state statutes of limitation.
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The dissenting judge argues that allegations of gross negligence or deliberate indifference are insufficient to sustain a due process § 1983 claim, which requires pleading intentional action, abuse of power, or actions tantamount to intent.
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710 F.2d 4·
1st Cir.·
1983-06-17
·cited 88×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdicts against the individual defendants for constitutional and state law violations, but that the district court erred in exercising pendent jurisdiction over the State of Rhode Island.