3,807 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 3,026 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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The court held that the district court erred in setting aside the jury's false arrest verdict against Officer Holihan and in its jury instructions on malicious prosecution, remanding both claims for a new trial.
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The court affirmed the district court's findings on timely filing, standing, and most discrimination claims, but remanded for further findings on specific issues including policy authority, back pay, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.
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938 F.2d 860·
8th Cir.·
1991-07-10
·cited 14×
A plaintiff awarded back pay for a procedural due process violation must prove that the deprivation of property would not have occurred if proper procedures had been followed; otherwise, back pay is a windfall.
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The court should have allowed the jury's verdict against Furrow to stand, as the Eighth Amendment right to protection from inmate attack was clearly established.
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The court held that a plaintiff challenging race-conscious employment decisions made pursuant to a consent decree must prove the decree was not remedial or not narrowly tailored, and that the trial court properly granted a directed verdict when no such evidence was presented.
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934 F.2d 158·
8th Cir.·
1991-05-23
·cited 14×
The court held that while the plaintiff was a prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees, the district court erred in granting a twenty-five percent enhancement based on the results achieved and the contingent nature of the case, as these factors were already reflected in the l
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933 F.2d 521·
7th Cir.·
1991-05-23
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court should have liberally construed the pro se plaintiff's letter as an amended complaint, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a late notice of appeal.
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931 F.2d 624·
9th Cir.·
1991-05-01
·cited 14×
The officers are entitled to qualified immunity because the nature and scope of the plaintiffs' right to gather shellfish in non-reservation areas was not clearly established at the time of the arrests.
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922 F.2d 1183·
5th Cir.·
1991-02-01
·cited 14×
The court held that federal law governs false arrest claims under § 1983, and probable cause is sufficient for a valid arrest, but genuine issues of material fact remain regarding excessive force and denial of medical attention for a pretrial detainee. Municipalities are not enti
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922 F.2d 216·
5th Cir.·
1991-01-31
·cited 14×
A motion for costs does not toll the time to appeal, and a notice of appeal using "et al." is insufficient to confer jurisdiction over unnamed parties.
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Summary judgment for the defendant officers was appropriate because the force used was objectively reasonable, the plaintiff failed to identify his assailant for the assault claim, and the plaintiff did not demonstrate serious medical needs or harm from delayed treatment.
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917 F.2d 1449·
6th Cir.·
1990-11-01
·cited 14×
The court affirmed liability for Eighth Amendment violations by two officers but reversed substantive due process claims, finding the Eighth Amendment the exclusive remedy. State law negligence claims were vacated for further consideration of immunity.
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The court held that the plaintiffs stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the Hawaii Admission Act and that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, reversing the dismissal.
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The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's federal and state claims, finding no state action for the § 1983 claim and no constitutional injury, and also affirmed Rule 11 sanctions due to the frivolous nature of the appeal.
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Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity when their conduct does not violate clearly established rights and they did not know or should not have known their conduct violated such rights.
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The court held that the dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim was improper because the inmates presented sufficient evidence of a prima facie violation, including dangers beyond toxic gases, to survive a Rule 41(b) dismissal.
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A material issue of fact exists regarding the use of excessive force, which should have precluded summary judgment.
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901 F.2d 696·
9th Cir.·
1990-05-11
·cited 14×
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The court held that the plaintiff's speech was not constitutionally protected as a matter of public concern, and there was no evidence of retaliation for that speech, thus reversing the jury's award.
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Revocation of permits for activities on public land does not constitute a taking of property because the permit holder lacks a protectable property interest.
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900 F.2d 1305·
8th Cir.·
1990-04-19
·cited 14×
The court held that claims seeking restoration of good-time credits must generally be brought as habeas corpus petitions, requiring exhaustion of state remedies, while claims for damages or declaratory relief not affecting confinement length may proceed under § 1983.
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The court held that the pre-deprivation procedures provided by the Nursing Home Care Reform Act, including notice and an opportunity to respond, were sufficient to satisfy due process requirements for issuing a conditional license and placing a facility on a list of violators. Te
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897 F.2d 942·
8th Cir.·
1990-03-02
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the pro se prisoner's complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) by confusing it with a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, and that the allegations stated a claim.
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895 F.2d 994·
4th Cir.·
1990-02-13
·cited 14×
The court held that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the necessity of silencing Collinson, precluding summary judgment on qualified immunity.
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The court held that Wisconsin Administrative Code § HSS 303.11 does not create a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore, placing an inmate in temporary lockup under the regulation does not constitute an unconstitutional deprivation without due proce
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890 F.2d 273·
10th Cir.·
1989-11-27
·cited 14×
The court held that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the objective reasonableness of the officer's use of deadly force, precluding summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
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A mayor's removal of a speaker from a public meeting for disruptive conduct and failure to adhere to the agenda does not violate the First Amendment, even if the speaker's remarks were critical of the commission.
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Officials are not personally liable for allowing state wards to be physically abused by foster parents because the law regarding their duty to protect is not clearly established for foster care.
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874 F.2d 374·
6th Cir.·
1989-05-12
·cited 14×
Social workers are entitled to absolute immunity for filing a juvenile abuse petition due to their quasi-prosecutorial function, and qualified immunity protects their investigative actions in this case.
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A municipality cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a single incident of alleged police misconduct stemming from inadequate training, absent evidence of a pattern of similar incidents or widespread incompetence.
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872 F.2d 224·
8th Cir.·
1989-04-05
·cited 14×
The court held that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the jailer Johnson, as reasonable minds could differ on the use of force and the claim presented a substantive due process violation. The court affirmed directed verdicts for other defendants, finding insufficie
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Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity under § 1983 for actions taken within their prosecutorial duties, including decisions to investigate, prosecute, and present evidence to a grand jury.
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869 F.2d 1341·
9th Cir.·
1989-03-16
·cited 14×
The court held that the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against individual defendants and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against individual police officers, tribal defendants, and the City of Browning, but affirmed the dismissal of the § 1983 claim
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866 F.2d 788·
5th Cir.·
1989-02-28
·cited 14×
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The court held that the Virginia Plan's reimbursement procedures for Medicaid patients create an enforceable right under the Medicaid Act, actionable via § 1983, and that the Act's enforcement mechanisms do not foreclose this private judicial remedy.
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864 F.2d 1196·
5th Cir.·
1989-02-08
·cited 14×
The court held that biographical questions during booking are not interrogation under the Fifth Amendment and that a plaintiff must demonstrate a real threat of future harm to have standing for injunctive relief. The court also affirmed the denial of a goading interrogatory as un
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866 F.2d 519·
1st Cir.·
1989-02-02
·cited 14×
The court held that a notice of appeal using "et al." is insufficient to confer jurisdiction for any party other than the specifically named appellant, even if all parties intended to appeal.
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863 F.2d 1180·
5th Cir.·
1989-01-23
·cited 14×
A municipal policy does not need to be unconstitutional in itself to support Section 1983 liability if the policy causes a predicate unconstitutional act.
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864 F.2d 416·
6th Cir.·
1988-12-14
·cited 14×
A court clerk issuing an arrest warrant at a judge's direction is performing a judicial function and is absolutely immune from suit. A municipal court is not a 'person' under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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861 F.2d 40·
2d Cir.·
1988-11-04
·cited 14×
A district court abuses its discretion by dismissing a pro se prisoner's complaint solely for violating Rule 8's "short and plain statement" requirement without granting leave to amend, unless extraordinary circumstances exist.
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The court held that a search warrant is required to enter a third party's home to arrest a suspect, even if the suspect is a guest, unless exigent circumstances exist. The court also held that the claim against the City for inadequate training must be retried under the 'deliberat
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A municipality's gross negligence in hiring an officer, without more, does not establish a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor does it satisfy the "policy" requirement for municipal liability.
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846 F.2d 1057·
7th Cir.·
1988-05-05
·cited 14×
Private intervening defendants who did not violate plaintiffs' constitutional rights may nonetheless be held liable for attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if the plaintiffs achieved prevailing-party status by succeeding on the merits against those intervenors. The critical di
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845 F.2d 163·
8th Cir.·
1988-04-20
·cited 14×
The court held that a plaintiff must prove individualized intent to discriminate to prevail in a § 1983 claim, and that Batson v. Kentucky does not establish a prima facie case when the plaintiff is not of the same race as the excluded jurors.
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The court held that a dismissal based on pendent jurisdiction grounds should be without prejudice, and the district court erred in dismissing the claim with prejudice.
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840 F.2d 743·
10th Cir.·
1988-02-23
·cited 14×
The court held that the trial court did not err in its Title VII findings, but erred in granting summary judgment on some § 1983 and § 1985 claims due to the preclusive effect of administrative findings.
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The court held that summary judgment for the defendant is appropriate because the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and the defendant presented legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the termination.
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834 F.2d 19·
1st Cir.·
1987-11-30
·cited 14×
The court held that the denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds was improper for the positions at issue, as the rights violated were not clearly established at the time of the conduct.
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829 F.2d 570·
6th Cir.·
1987-09-25
·cited 14×
The court held that the one-year statute of limitations adopted in Mulligan v. Hazard for § 1983 claims in Ohio can be applied retroactively to the plaintiff's claim because there was no clear precedent upon which the plaintiff could have justifiably relied at the time of filing.