1,015 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 1,841 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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A prisoner's transfer between facilities or placement in restrictive confinement for administrative reasons, even if motivated in part by punitive intent, does not violate constitutional rights if the administrative reasons alone would have justified the action.
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The court held that the evidence presented was insufficient to establish a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights under the Eighth or Sixth Amendments, thus affirming the directed verdict.
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The court held that the due process clause does not impose liability on state officers for failing to protect a member of the public from the criminal acts of a third person, absent a special relationship.
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A non-lawyer, pro se litigant is not entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
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650 F.2d 647·
5th Cir.·
1981-07-13
·cited 24×
The court held that a prisoner's section 1983 action cannot be summarily dismissed for docket control or to discourage suits, even if the prisoner has been transferred from the facility where the alleged violations occurred.
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A district court may assess costs against civil rights litigants who have been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
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A death resulting from the negligent action of a state official does not, in itself, constitute a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and therefore does not support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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637 F.2d 170·
1st Cir.·
1981-03-17
·cited 24×
Pro se plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
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The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the pro se plaintiff's complaints against the arresting officers and Police Chief Boone, as the allegations stated actionable claims under federal civil rights law.
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615 F.2d 1037·
5th Cir.·
1980-04-21
·cited 24×
The court held that federal courts should honor state statutes of limitations, including their tolling provisions, unless they are inconsistent with federal law.
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616 F.2d 727·
4th Cir.·
1980-02-28
·cited 24×
The court held that the district court had jurisdiction and that the award of attorneys' fees was proper, but erred in compelling an interrogatory regarding legal aid eligibility, though this error was harmless.
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The court held that individual officers are immune from liability due to good faith reliance on existing Tennessee law, but the city may be liable under Monell for constitutional violations resulting from its policy or custom.
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A state may constitutionally create a system for reenfranchising convicted felons that distinguishes between state and federal probationers, provided the classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.
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Plaintiffs' claims challenging a building permit, variance, and state court decisions on federal civil rights grounds were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel because the New York Court of Appeals, applying the Kovarsky doctrine, had jurisdiction under CPLR § 103(c) to
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The court held that the plaintiff's statements regarding internal school operations were not protected by the First Amendment and that his termination was not retaliatory, with the primary reason being poor school attendance.
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The court held that New York Disciplinary Rule 7-109 C, which prohibits attorneys from paying expert witnesses on a contingent fee basis, has a rational basis and does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's due process or equal protection clauses.
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The Pension Fund Board of Trustees is not a 'person' amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but its individual members are. The no-refund provisions of the pension statute are constitutional.
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Prison regulations restricting inmate law clinic assistance in suits against the institution and censoring outgoing mail may violate constitutional rights if they impede access to the courts without reasonable alternatives. The court affirmed the dismissal of some claims but reve
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The court held that the district court's finding that the officer used excessive force was not clearly erroneous, affirming the judgment.
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The court held that the company's labor camp, functioning as a company town, is subject to First Amendment restraints, requiring reasonable access for the public to communicate with workers, and that the plaintiffs have standing to assert their own rights to disseminate informati
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The court held that the district court erred in dismissing Counts IX and X for lack of jurisdiction, finding sufficient allegations of purposeful discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and related jurisdictional statutes.
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The court held that the city ordinance created an arbitrary classification violating the Equal Protection Clause and that municipalities are not liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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Garcia appealed the dismissal of his complaint seeking damages for thirty months of wrongful imprisonment resulting from police misconduct in a reverse-sting operation. The court affirmed, holding that Florida law does not recognize a cause of action for money damages against the
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The court held that the district court erred in dismissing official-capacity claims and applying collateral estoppel without proper notice, and that the police officers were not in privity with the state for collateral estoppel purposes under Georgia law.
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The court held that the evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to find that Officer Gardner used excessive force, thus reversing the directed verdict against him. However, the court affirmed the directed verdict for the County on the § 1983 claim due to lack of evidence of a mun
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The court held that state caseworkers' conduct in failing to inform a juvenile offender of potentially exculpatory information was not, as a matter of law, intentional or reckless, and thus not actionable under section 1983 for denial of due process.
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The court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under section 1983 because her allegations did not establish a municipal policy or custom of discrimination and retaliation, and that her appeal regarding the Title VII dismissal was moot.
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The district court erred in dismissing the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims under § 1983, as the Parratt analysis is inapplicable to Fourth Amendment claims and due process claims challenging established policies, and in dismissing supervisory officials when liability was a
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The dissenting judge argues that the majority erred in excusing deficient pleadings and the failure to seek leave to amend, asserting that civil rights claims require specific factual allegations tying defendants to the alleged deprivations.
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The court held that plaintiffs failed to present specific evidence of a policy for summary judgment, but that the trial court erred in directing a verdict on the First Amendment claim due to sufficient circumstantial evidence of official knowledge and participation.
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707 F.2d 175·
5th Cir.·
1983-06-13
·cited 23×
The court held that a hospital employee guidebook can create a property interest in continued employment, and that procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to rebut charges, but the specific application varies by individual circumstances.
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The court held that a private corporation cannot be held liable under § 1983 based solely on respondeat superior; liability requires proof of an impermissible policy. The court also found that erroneous jury instructions regarding municipal liability and strip search reasonablene
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The court held that the sheriff's liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful incarceration by subordinates requires personal involvement or a causal connection, not mere vicarious liability. Sheriff's liability under Texas common law for deputies' acts requires further factual
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608 F.2d 159·
5th Cir.·
1979-12-10
·cited 23×
The court held that a pro se prisoner's claims that the parole board's refusal to allow access to files and consideration of the offense violated due process and double jeopardy were properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
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Rosanna's challenge to probation conditions must be brought as a habeas corpus petition, requiring exhaustion of state remedies, while Nathan's challenge to conditions affecting his family rights is a valid civil rights claim under § 1983.
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that the bail bondsman's actions in forcibly apprehending the plaintiff and transporting him to Nevada did not constitute action "under color of state law." The court found that the bondsman's conduct was purely p
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The court held that the segregation of inmates in a special housing unit did not violate their Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment rights, and the procedures used satisfied due process requirements.
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The court held that a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is barred by the statute of limitations if not filed within the applicable period, and the cause of action accrues at the time of the alleged violation, not upon subsequent judicial or prosecutorial actions.
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The court held that the officer's use of deadly force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, even if the suspect was surrounded, because the suspect posed a significant threat of serious physical harm to others.
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The dissenting judge argues that the petitioner has demonstrated cause for procedural default and that the state's procedural bar is inadequate, thus the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should be heard on its merits.
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The court held that the sheriff is not the final policymaker for deputy training under Washington law, and the jury instructions on municipal liability did not meet the deliberate indifference standard required by Canton v. Harris.
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914 F.2d 505·
4th Cir.·
1990-10-12
·cited 22×
The court held that Rule 11 sanctions can be imposed after a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2), and that the attorneys violated Rule 11 by failing to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts and law, and by filing the complaint for an improper purpose.
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The court held that while the Due Process Clause imposes an affirmative duty of care on the state for individuals in its custody, the evidence was insufficient to establish that Baltimore County's failure to train its officers in suicide prevention was the proximate cause of the
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The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting protective orders, that summary judgment for the city and police chief was appropriate, but that directed verdicts for one officer on claims of false arrest, imprisonment, and civil rights violations
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The court held that the University of California Regents, as an arm of the state, is not a 'person' amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court also held that while the County's strip search, x-ray, and blood test policies were reasonable, its failure to provide a bed or m
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The court held that a prisoner held beyond his sentence term may recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a prison official acted with deliberate indifference to the unjustified deprivation of liberty, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in estopping defendants from
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The court held that a plaintiff must be given an opportunity to prove that a municipality's policymakers absolutely delegated final policymaking authority to a subordinate official, even if positive law suggests otherwise, by demonstrating a custom or usage of abdicating review p
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869 F.2d 1467·
11th Cir.·
1989-04-14
·cited 22×
The court held that a prisoner's claim of retaliation for filing grievances, if proven, states a constitutional claim under the First Amendment.
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869 F.2d 989·
6th Cir.·
1989-03-16
·cited 22×
The Supreme Court's decision in Owens v. Okure mandates that state general or residual statutes of limitations for personal injury actions apply to section 1983 claims, rejecting the intentional tort analogy previously used by this court.