2,534 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 1,907 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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888 F.2d 669·
10th Cir.·
1989-10-27
·cited 82×
The court held that the warrantless search of the defendant's car was valid under exceptions for searches incident to arrest and probable cause, that possession with intent to distribute is a valid predicate offense for using a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, and that th
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846 F.2d 1384·
D.C. Cir.·
1988-04-12
·cited 82×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish a single chain conspiracy for distributing cocaine and laundering its proceeds, and that the appellants' actions were in furtherance of this overarching objective. The court affirmed convictions except for one sentencin
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734 F.2d 306·
7th Cir.·
1984-05-11
·cited 82×
The court held that a jury instruction on aiding and abetting a conspiracy is permissible even if not explicitly stated in the indictment, and that sufficient evidence supported the defendant's conviction for possession with intent to distribute.
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672 F.2d 887·
11th Cir.·
1982-04-09
·cited 82×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the appellants' convictions for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, possession with intent to distribute, and distribution of methaqualone.
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Hearsay evidence is inadmissible to prove a defendant's predisposition in entrapment cases, except in limited circumstances to rebut specific assertions of government misconduct.
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620 F.2d 324·
2d Cir.·
1980-03-12
·cited 82×
The court held that agents' eavesdropping by pressing an ear to a connecting door did not violate the Fourth Amendment, arrests were based on probable cause, and a warrantless entry into a hotel room, though illegal, did not require reversal of convictions.
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599 F.2d 880·
9th Cir.·
1979-03-26
·cited 82×
The court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require probable cause for every named probable converser in a wiretap application, and that an innocent, immaterial misstatement in an affidavit does not invalidate a wiretap order. The court reversed Davenport's conviction for f
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The court held that non-electronic eavesdropping from an adjacent motel room does not violate the Fourth Amendment, but reversed the possession conviction due to insufficient evidence.
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An attorney operating under an actual conflict of interest deprives a defendant of their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel, and reversal is automatic without a showing of prejudice.
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526 F.2d 380·
5th Cir.·
1976-01-26
·cited 82×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conspiracy and distribution convictions, the search warrant for the premises was valid, and the government's failure to disclose all details of a witness's deal was harmless error.
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521 F.2d 730·
9th Cir.·
1975-07-24
·cited 82×
The court held that statements of a co-conspirator, even if hearsay, are admissible if made in furtherance of the conspiracy and if independent evidence establishes the conspiracy and the declarant's and defendant's connection to it, and do not violate the Confrontation Clause if
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679 F.2d 1373·
11th Cir.·
1982-07-09
·cited 81×
The court held that 21 U.S.C.A. § 955a extends U.S. criminal jurisdiction to all stateless vessels on the high seas engaged in drug distribution, regardless of a nexus to the United States, and that such seizures do not violate the Fourth Amendment.
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660 F.2d 547·
5th Cir.·
1981-11-02
·cited 81×
A district court may consider a defendant's refusal to cooperate with an investigation as a factor in sentencing, provided the defendant raises any Fifth Amendment claims timely. The court also found that restricting cross-examination and giving a partial entrapment instruction w
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Randy Hines appeals his conviction for possession of cannabis with intent to sell near a school, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained through an illegal search. The Florida Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Deputy Simmons unconstitutionally reac
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897 F.2d 1034·
10th Cir.·
1990-03-05
·cited 80×
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to transfer venue, denying the motion for severance, admitting evidence seized under a warrant, applying the sentencing guidelines, or in its factual determinations regarding sentencing enhancements and base of
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866 F.2d 1071·
9th Cir.·
1988-04-22
·cited 80×
The dissenting judge believes the warrantless protective sweep of the apartment was not justified by exigent circumstances and that evidence seized should be excluded.
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785 F.2d 214·
8th Cir.·
1986-02-25
·cited 80×
The court affirmed the convictions and sentences, finding no reversible error in the trial court's rulings on severance, cross-examination, admission of co-defendant testimony, suppression of evidence, or sufficiency of evidence for the conspiracy charge.
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The court held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain convictions for Evan Leake on all counts, and for Russell Greenway and Edward Shorr on Count 4. The court affirmed all other convictions.
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The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a change of venue, reinstating bail, or in sentencing the defendant, and that the defendant received effective assistance of counsel and was not prejudiced by the prosecutor's closing re
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650 F.2d 788·
5th Cir.·
1981-07-17
·cited 80×
The court held that the Coast Guard's boarding and search of the vessel were lawful, the evidence was sufficient for conviction, and the admitted documents were properly authenticated and admissible. The court also instructed the district court to delete the special parole term f
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635 F.2d 356·
5th Cir.·
1981-01-26
·cited 80×
The court held that a canine sniff of the exterior of luggage does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, and the positive alert provided probable cause for a search warrant.
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The court held that the defendant's retrial for conspiracy to distribute marijuana is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, as prior acquittals did not necessarily resolve facts essential to the current charge.
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The court held that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a finding of knowledge for the drug charges and that the 'deliberate ignorance' jury instruction was proper. The conviction for unlawful use of a passport and visa was also affirmed.
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548 F.2d 1329·
9th Cir.·
1977-01-25
·cited 80×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish Mummert's predisposition to commit the offenses, thus precluding entrapment as a matter of law. Reynoso's due process claim based on informant threats was also rejected.
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488 F.2d 374·
5th Cir.·
1973-11-28
·cited 80×
The court held that probable cause existed for the arrest of both defendants and that Horton voluntarily consented to the search of the vehicle. However, there was insufficient evidence to convict Jordan.
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487 F.2d 448·
2d Cir.·
1973-11-07
·cited 80×
The dissenting judge would affirm the conviction, arguing that the trial court properly handled the potential conflict of interest arising from joint representation by questioning the defendants and counsel.
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135 F.3d 703·
11th Cir.·
1998-02-17
·cited 79×
The dissenting judge argued that the government violated the defendant Varona's proffer agreement by using her immunized statement to obtain testimony from a co-conspirator about the same drug delivery she described. The judge asserted that this violation constituted plain error
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The court affirmed the convictions, holding that there was sufficient evidence for aiding and abetting, the prosecutor's arguments were proper or invited error, and the sentencing provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act were constitutional.
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Prosecution for RICO and CCE after a prior conspiracy conviction does not violate double jeopardy, but consecutive sentencing for CCE and its conspiracy predicate offense does. The court remands for resentencing for Michael Grayson.
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669 F.2d 655·
11th Cir.·
1982-03-01
·cited 79×
The court held that the trial judge erred in suppressing evidence obtained during the initial search, finding the warrantless entry constitutional under existing law. It also affirmed the convictions of Bennett and Marszalkowski.
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556 F.2d 1265·
5th Cir.·
1977-08-03
·cited 79×
The court held that the presentence report was not discoverable under the Jencks Act, Brady, or Rule 16 because these provisions are directed toward evidence in the hands of the prosecutor.
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554 F.2d 665·
5th Cir.·
1977-06-22
·cited 79×
The court held that statements made by the appellants to an undercover agent in Martinique were admissible as co-conspirator hearsay and did not violate their Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights because they were not in custody for Miranda purposes and the right to counsel had not ye
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524 F.2d 441·
5th Cir.·
1975-12-05
·cited 79×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to submit the entrapment defense to the jury for all defendants, and that the trial court's limitation of the contingent fee informer charge to one defendant was not reversible error.
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The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting cross-examination regarding the informant's residence, nor was the trial court's active participation in questioning witnesses erroneous.
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475 F.2d 240·
2d Cir.·
1973-03-08
·cited 79×
The court held that excluding the defendant and the public from a suppression hearing, except for the limited portion concerning secret profile criteria, was plain error. Additionally, the trial judge's jury instructions were so deficient as to constitute plain error.
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The court affirmed convictions and sentences for most defendants, but vacated and remanded for resentencing for some, finding no error in wiretap evidence, transcript use, or most evidentiary rulings, but remanding for resentencing consistent with guidelines.
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900 F.2d 1064·
7th Cir.·
1990-04-24
·cited 78×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying Poliak's motion for an evidentiary hearing on his alleged plea agreement, nor in denying Laskowski's motion to suppress statements made after his arrest, nor in admitting evidence of Laskowski's prior marijuana dealing
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The court held that the initial stop of the appellants' automobile was supported by reasonable suspicion and that the sentencing statute for crack cocaine offenses was not unconstitutionally vague.
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874 F.2d 1145·
7th Cir.·
1989-04-21
·cited 78×
The court held that the evidence presented at the first trial was sufficient to support the defendants' convictions, and therefore, their retrial did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court also found sufficient evidence presented at the second trial to support the conv
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864 F.2d 1512·
10th Cir.·
1988-12-30
·cited 78×
The court held that a pretextual stop is unconstitutional if a reasonable officer would not have made the stop in the absence of the invalid purpose, and that the scope of a traffic stop is limited to its initial justification unless reasonable suspicion of other crimes exists.
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A passenger train sleeping compartment is analogous to a hotel room for Fourth Amendment purposes, and a search without probable cause and a warrant violates a passenger's legitimate expectation of privacy.
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830 F.2d 41·
5th Cir.·
1987-10-06
·cited 78×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Gracielo and Sabino of conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute, but insufficient to convict Jesus.
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764 F.2d 1514·
11th Cir.·
1985-07-12
·cited 78×
The court held that the government's use of a confidential informant did not constitute overreaching, evidence of prior bad acts was admissible, taped conversations were properly admitted, the evidence was sufficient to support convictions, and a variance between the indictment a
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The court held that the disqualification of retained counsel was permissible under the Sixth Amendment, double jeopardy did not bar prosecution for continuing criminal enterprise after a conviction for a predicate offense, and the restriction of cross-examination was proper. Howe
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547 F.2d 291·
5th Cir.·
1977-02-18
·cited 78×
The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing improper cross-examination of character witnesses and by displaying hostility towards defense counsel, which collectively deprived the appellants of a fair trial.
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The dissenting judge believes the panel opinion correctly applied legal principles to undisputed facts and would reverse the conviction.
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526 F.2d 1349·
9th Cir.·
1975-10-31
·cited 78×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying motions to enjoin tax levies, for return of property, for dismissal or alternative funds, for extensive discovery, to suppress evidence seized incident to arrest, or to disclose informant identities, and that the searc
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491 F.2d 167·
9th Cir.·
1974-01-21
·cited 78×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's convictions for conspiracy to possess and distribute heroin and possession with intent to distribute and distribution of heroin. The court also found that the admission of certain evidence and the prosecutor's
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913 F.2d 1552·
11th Cir.·
1990-10-11
·cited 77×
The court held that the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain the convictions of all defendants for conspiracy and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.
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The court held that the '100 to 1 ratio' of cocaine to cocaine base in the Sentencing Guidelines is rationally related to Congress's objective of protecting public welfare and does not violate the Fifth Amendment's due process clause or the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual pu