2,534 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 1,907 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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696 F.2d 479·
7th Cir.·
1982-12-14
·cited 51×
The court held that the arrests, searches, and convictions were lawful, rejecting numerous challenges to the proceedings.
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691 F.2d 1009·
11th Cir.·
1982-11-19
·cited 51×
The court held that even if the initial arrest was illegal, the evidence seized was admissible because the defendant's subsequent flight and struggle constituted a new, distinct crime for which he could be lawfully arrested, and the search was incident to that lawful arrest.
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The court held that the examination of the inside of the paper bag was legal and that Arkansas v. Sanders should not be applied retroactively.
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619 F.2d 1124·
5th Cir.·
1980-06-25
·cited 51×
The court held that extraterritorial jurisdiction attaches for conspiracy if intended territorial effects are shown, even without an overt act in the U.S., and that evidence seized and admitted was lawful.
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560 F.2d 1236·
5th Cir.·
1977-10-14
·cited 51×
A prior jury verdict of guilty, where judgment and sentence have not yet been entered, is admissible for impeachment purposes if the defendant has the opportunity to explain its legal status.
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496 F.2d 1354·
5th Cir.·
1974-07-15
·cited 51×
The court held that the warrantless search of the trailer was justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances, and that the evidence was sufficient to support convictions for conspiracy and possession for some defendants, but not for Ruiz on the possession count.
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488 F.2d 143·
9th Cir.·
1973-12-07
·cited 51×
The court held that the cocaine was lawfully seized despite potential non-compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 3109 because an undercover officer was lawfully present and had constructive possession of the contraband. The court also held that the trial judge properly refused to instruct t
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907 F.2d 7·
1st Cir.·
1990-06-21
·cited 50×
The court held that the district court did not commit clear error in enhancing the defendant's sentence for possessing a firearm during the commission of the offense and for acting as an organizer or leader of the criminal activity.
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902 F.2d 1508·
10th Cir.·
1990-05-09
·cited 50×
The court held that the trial court's refusal to give a requested jury instruction on separate transactions was not reversible error.
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895 F.2d 1216·
8th Cir.·
1990-02-12
·cited 50×
The court's concurrence argues that the Sentencing Guidelines failed to eliminate disparity and that the district judge should have reduced Kost's sentence for consistency and just results.
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860 F.2d 801·
7th Cir.·
1988-10-20
·cited 50×
The court held that the evidence was insufficient for a jury to conclude that the defendant organized or managed certain individuals under the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute.
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837 F.2d 1249·
5th Cir.·
1988-02-09
·cited 50×
The court held that the district court erred in sustaining appellant's conviction under count five and in failing to make required findings before admitting extrinsic offense testimony, but affirmed holdings on remaining points of error. The court also found that venue was proper
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821 F.2d 968·
4th Cir.·
1987-06-22
·cited 50×
The dissenting judge would reverse all convictions and grant new trials due to cumulative errors in admitting evidence and improperly joining defendants.
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720 F.2d 1239·
11th Cir.·
1983-12-05
·cited 50×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Vega but insufficient to convict Santiago and Figueroa of conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute.
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719 F.2d 1405·
9th Cir.·
1983-11-07
·cited 50×
The court held that a general unanimity instruction is sufficient in routine cases, and that the marital communications privilege does not apply to observations.
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641 F.2d 330·
5th Cir.·
1981-04-02
·cited 50×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute, and that DeLeon's other contentions lacked merit.
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604 F.2d 361·
5th Cir.·
1979-10-10
·cited 50×
The court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying a mistrial when a juror potentially witnessed a disturbance, continuing the trial in the defendant's voluntary absence, or admitting witness testimony that was invited by the defense.
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The court held that admitting evidence of prior similar acts to prove intent and knowledge was reversible error when the defense had unequivocally conceded those elements.
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589 F.2d 418·
9th Cir.·
1978-10-17
·cited 50×
The court held that the evidence seized from Rettig's residence must be suppressed because the search exceeded the scope of the warrant and was used as an instrument for a general search, despite the warrant's particularity.
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532 F.2d 1046·
5th Cir.·
1976-06-07
·cited 50×
The court held that the government's failure to disclose the appellant's inculpatory oral statement prior to trial was harmless error and did not warrant a mistrial.
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528 F.2d 580·
5th Cir.·
1976-03-10
·cited 50×
The court held that the conviction of Mario Sandoval should be reversed due to plain error in failing to provide a cautionary jury instruction regarding the uncorroborated testimony of a paid informant, while affirming the convictions of Guillermo Sandoval and Joe Garcia due to s
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The court held that the search of the appellant's vehicle was valid under the border search doctrine applicable at the time, and that the prosecutor's remarks regarding the appellant's silence and inconsistent statements were permissible.
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519 F.2d 294·
D.C. Cir.·
1975-02-05
·cited 50×
The court held that the rent receipts were improperly admitted as hearsay and that the government failed to prove constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt.
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The court affirmed the conviction, finding no reversible error in the trial court's rulings on continuances, evidence admission, jury instructions, or new trial motions.
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The court affirmed the convictions, finding sufficient evidence and no reversible error in evidentiary rulings or juror issues.
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The court argues that a single, deferential standard of review, specifically the 'clearly erroneous' rule, should be applied to all determinations of probable cause, regardless of who made the initial determination (magistrate, judge, or jury).
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913 F.2d 897·
11th Cir.·
1990-10-02
·cited 49×
A district court cannot depart downward under Sentencing Guidelines § 5K1.1 for substantial assistance without a motion from the government.
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898 F.2d 1505·
11th Cir.·
1990-04-25
·cited 49×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions, that the district court did not err in denying severance or motions to suppress, that prosecutorial misconduct was harmless, and that sentencing was proper.
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The court held that knowledge of the quantity of marijuana is not an element of the offense under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), and that a warrantless search of a vehicle is permissible if supported by probable cause.
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The court held that the roadblock stop, subsequent detention, and vehicle search were lawful, and the trial court did not err in refusing to admit the co-defendant's attorney's testimony.
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The court held that the police had probable cause to arrest Mahdi and reasonable suspicion to detain Willis, and that the subsequent arrests and evidence seizures were constitutional.
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705 F.2d 293·
8th Cir.·
1983-04-19
·cited 49×
The court should affirm Fitzgerald's conviction by severing valid portions of the warrants and suppressing only items seized outside their scope.
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The court held that the defendant abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy in the suitcase by disclaiming ownership, and the initial encounter in Atlanta was not a seizure, while the subsequent encounter in Detroit was a permissible investigatory stop based on reasonable s
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664 F.2d 1296·
5th Cir.·
1982-01-07
·cited 49×
The court held that the attachment of a tracking device inside an aircraft was justified by a warrant based on probable cause, and the subsequent search of the aircraft at the Panama City Airport was a valid border search, not requiring a warrant or probable cause. The evidence w
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The court held that the admission of DEA agent testimony regarding general investigative procedures was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, warranting reversal of the convictions.
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641 F.2d 1161·
5th Cir.·
1981-04-08
·cited 49×
The court held that the appellants' Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the search and seizure, and the district court did not err in denying the motion for use immunity.
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The court held that the evidence obtained from the appellant's person and suitcase was admissible because the initial encounter was not a seizure, the subsequent arrest was based on probable cause, and the consent to search was voluntary.
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The Florida Supreme Court consolidated three cases challenging the constitutionality of section 570.15, which requires trucks to stop at agricultural inspection stations. The Court upheld the statute as a valid exercise of police power, rejected vagueness and equal protection cha
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604 F.2d 1135·
8th Cir.·
1979-08-31
·cited 49×
The court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to require disclosure of the informant's identity, nor in failing to suppress evidence seized under the search warrants.
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600 F.2d 1098·
5th Cir.·
1979-08-13
·cited 49×
The court held that the mere presence of a former informant in the jury venire, without any allegation of actual communication or prejudice, did not warrant quashing the venire or individual juror questioning. The evidence was also sufficient to support the convictions.
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601 F.2d 69·
2d Cir.·
1979-06-20
·cited 49×
The court held that the unauthorized sale of government information constitutes a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641, and that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
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The court held that the Border Patrol agents lacked the specific articulable facts and rational inferences necessary to establish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop of the appellants' vehicles.
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The court held that the hearsay statement was improperly admitted under the coconspirator exception as to Dixon.
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The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed a defendant's conviction and sentence for drug and firearm offenses. The court held that additional points for firearm use were properly scored on the sentencing guidelines, and that sentences exceeding statutory maximums were permiss
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940 F.2d 722·
1st Cir.·
1991-07-29
·cited 48×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying David's motions to suppress evidence obtained from a beeper clone and telephone intercepts, and that the evidence was sufficient to support David's conviction for continuing criminal enterprise and Yarden's convictions
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933 F.2d 417·
7th Cir.·
1991-05-01
·cited 48×
The court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that the indictment was not multiplicitous, severance was not required, the display of cocaine was proper, expert testimony was admissible, and there was sufficient evidence for the convictions.
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907 F.2d 629·
7th Cir.·
1990-07-16
·cited 48×
The court did not definitively rule on whether co-conspirator hearsay alone can support a conviction, reserving the issue for later.
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889 F.2d 1425·
5th Cir.·
1989-11-29
·cited 48×
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to support Angela Onick's convictions for possession with intent to distribute, maintaining a drug house, and conspiracy, and vacated Tolliver's sentence for committing offenses while on bail due to lack of proper notice. The cour
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The court held that the defendant's constitutional challenges to the sentencing statute were foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent, and the trial court did not err in its application of the sentencing guidelines regarding organizer status or acceptance of responsibility.