1,645 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 299 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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796 F.2d 1394·
11th Cir.·
1986-08-15
·cited 54×
The court affirmed convictions, holding that a defendant waives a juror misconduct claim by failing to report it before the verdict, and that other claims lacked merit or sufficient proof.
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785 F.2d 1506·
11th Cir.·
1986-04-07
·cited 54×
The court affirmed the convictions of all appellants, finding no reversible error in the trial court's rulings regarding guilty pleas, evidentiary decisions, or the admission of evidence.
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758 F.2d 823·
2d Cir.·
1985-03-26
·cited 54×
The court held that the surveillance officers had probable cause to arrest Piedrahita, that Albeiro's statement was admissible co-conspirator hearsay, that sufficient evidence supported the convictions, and that Ginsberg's conviction for possession was supported by evidence of ai
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731 F.2d 610·
9th Cir.·
1984-04-17
·cited 54×
The court held that the Miranda warnings given to the defendant were defective because they failed to inform him of his right to have counsel present during questioning, and the admission of his post-arrest statements was not harmless error.
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672 F.2d 232·
1st Cir.·
1982-03-08
·cited 54×
The court held that the evidence was admissible, the trial was timely under the Speedy Trial Act, and the jury instructions were proper, affirming the conviction.
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649 F.2d 724·
9th Cir.·
1981-06-29
·cited 54×
The court held that the initial police encounter with the defendant constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and that the evidence obtained was tainted by this unlawful seizure.
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593 F.2d 210·
3d Cir.·
1979-02-02
·cited 54×
The court held that a separate conviction for possession with intent to distribute is impermissible when the possession is an essential element of the distribution offense charged and proven.
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553 F.2d 946·
5th Cir.·
1977-06-10
·cited 54×
The court held that the warrantless entry into the defendant's home was lawful under the exigent circumstances exception and that the defendant failed to prove a violation of the knock and announce statute.
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528 F.2d 345·
9th Cir.·
1976-01-22
·cited 54×
The court held that the appellant's contentions regarding the legality of her arrest, the officers' entry into her motel room, the sufficiency of the search warrant, and the seizure of the ledger were without merit.
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882 F.2d 147·
5th Cir.·
1989-08-18
·cited 53×
The court affirmed the conviction because probable cause existed to search the vehicle, but vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing because the district court improperly departed from the sentencing guidelines.
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671 F.2d 1294·
11th Cir.·
1982-04-01
·cited 53×
The court held that the seizure of the suspect's ticket constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure based on reasonable suspicion, and the subsequent detention and search were justified by probable cause arising from a suspicious bulge.
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947 F.2d 224·
7th Cir.·
1991-10-21
·cited 52×
The exclusionary rule should apply to sentencing, as allowing illegally seized evidence would significantly undermine the Fourth Amendment.
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891 F.2d 396·
1st Cir.·
1989-12-13
·cited 52×
The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the defendant waived his motion for acquittal by failing to renew it, that the sentencing was proper, that the judge's questioning did not constitute plain error, and that the voir dire was adequate.
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807 F.2d 1446·
8th Cir.·
1986-12-31
·cited 52×
The court held that the initial stop of the vehicle was a valid investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion, and probable cause existed to arrest the defendant. The admission of a co-conspirator's statement, even if potentially erroneous, was harmless error.
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802 F.2d 1119·
9th Cir.·
1986-10-16
·cited 52×
The court held that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant, the government's conduct was not outrageous, and inconsistent jury verdicts do not require reversal of a conviction.
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740 F.2d 174·
2d Cir.·
1984-07-20
·cited 52×
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to support Bedoya's conspiracy conviction, reversing both appellants' conspiracy convictions. The court affirmed Valencia's conviction on the substantive count.
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733 F.2d 692·
9th Cir.·
1984-05-22
·cited 52×
The court held that the majority erred in upholding Mansfield's conviction, as the evidence did not establish probable cause for his arrest.
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648 F.2d 625·
9th Cir.·
1981-06-15
·cited 52×
The court held that convictions must be reversed if jurors were prejudiced by knowledge of a defendant's prior trial, and that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on the right to remain silent. An investigatory stop is permissible even if it briefly restricts a suspect's fr
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610 F.2d 1296·
5th Cir.·
1980-02-04
·cited 52×
The court held that a co-defendant's attorney's comments about another co-defendant's silence, if not intended to comment on that silence, do not violate the Fifth Amendment. The court also held that mere presence or knowledge of illegal activity is insufficient to prove particip
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571 F.2d 1384·
5th Cir.·
1978-04-28
·cited 52×
The court held that the admission of flight evidence, hearsay testimony, and the restriction of cross-examination were not reversible errors, and the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.
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881 F.2d 1551·
11th Cir.·
1989-09-01
·cited 51×
The court affirmed convictions for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, finding sufficient evidence and proper procedures.
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817 F.2d 580·
9th Cir.·
1987-05-18
·cited 51×
The court held that giving a "Jewell" instruction on deliberate avoidance was error because the evidence pointed to actual knowledge, but this error was harmless. The court also held that the prosecutor's misstatement about a co-defendant's indictment was improper but harmless du
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724 F.2d 1498·
11th Cir.·
1984-02-13
·cited 51×
The court affirmed all of appellant's convictions, finding no reversible error in the admission of evidence or the sufficiency of the indictment.
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696 F.2d 479·
7th Cir.·
1982-12-14
·cited 51×
The court held that the arrests, searches, and convictions were lawful, rejecting numerous challenges to the proceedings.
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560 F.2d 1236·
5th Cir.·
1977-10-14
·cited 51×
A prior jury verdict of guilty, where judgment and sentence have not yet been entered, is admissible for impeachment purposes if the defendant has the opportunity to explain its legal status.
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488 F.2d 143·
9th Cir.·
1973-12-07
·cited 51×
The court held that the cocaine was lawfully seized despite potential non-compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 3109 because an undercover officer was lawfully present and had constructive possession of the contraband. The court also held that the trial judge properly refused to instruct t
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641 F.2d 330·
5th Cir.·
1981-04-02
·cited 50×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute, and that DeLeon's other contentions lacked merit.
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604 F.2d 748·
2d Cir.·
1979-07-31
·cited 50×
The court held that admitting evidence of prior similar acts to prove intent and knowledge was reversible error when the defense had unequivocally conceded those elements.
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532 F.2d 1046·
5th Cir.·
1976-06-07
·cited 50×
The court held that the government's failure to disclose the appellant's inculpatory oral statement prior to trial was harmless error and did not warrant a mistrial.
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519 F.2d 294·
D.C. Cir.·
1975-02-05
·cited 50×
The court held that the rent receipts were improperly admitted as hearsay and that the government failed to prove constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt.
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919 F.2d 405·
7th Cir.·
1990-11-13
·cited 49×
The court argues that a single, deferential standard of review, specifically the 'clearly erroneous' rule, should be applied to all determinations of probable cause, regardless of who made the initial determination (magistrate, judge, or jury).
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A district court cannot depart downward under Sentencing Guidelines § 5K1.1 for substantial assistance without a motion from the government.
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898 F.2d 1505·
11th Cir.·
1990-04-25
·cited 49×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions, that the district court did not err in denying severance or motions to suppress, that prosecutorial misconduct was harmless, and that sentencing was proper.
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777 F.2d 543·
10th Cir.·
1985-11-12
·cited 49×
The court held that the roadblock stop, subsequent detention, and vehicle search were lawful, and the trial court did not err in refusing to admit the co-defendant's attorney's testimony.
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759 F.2d 1486·
11th Cir.·
1985-04-23
·cited 49×
The court held that the police had probable cause to arrest Mahdi and reasonable suspicion to detain Willis, and that the subsequent arrests and evidence seizures were constitutional.
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692 F.2d 1041·
6th Cir.·
1982-11-11
·cited 49×
The court held that the defendant abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy in the suitcase by disclaiming ownership, and the initial encounter in Atlanta was not a seizure, while the subsequent encounter in Detroit was a permissible investigatory stop based on reasonable s
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653 F.2d 1002·
5th Cir.·
1981-08-20
·cited 49×
The court held that the admission of DEA agent testimony regarding general investigative procedures was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial, warranting reversal of the convictions.
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641 F.2d 1161·
5th Cir.·
1981-04-08
·cited 49×
The court held that the appellants' Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the search and seizure, and the district court did not err in denying the motion for use immunity.
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The court held that the evidence obtained from the appellant's person and suitcase was admissible because the initial encounter was not a seizure, the subsequent arrest was based on probable cause, and the consent to search was voluntary.
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601 F.2d 69·
2d Cir.·
1979-06-20
·cited 49×
The court held that the unauthorized sale of government information constitutes a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641, and that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
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562 F.2d 1138·
9th Cir.·
1977-07-13
·cited 49×
The court held that the hearsay statement was improperly admitted under the coconspirator exception as to Dixon.
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940 F.2d 722·
1st Cir.·
1991-07-29
·cited 48×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying David's motions to suppress evidence obtained from a beeper clone and telephone intercepts, and that the evidence was sufficient to support David's conviction for continuing criminal enterprise and Yarden's convictions
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933 F.2d 417·
7th Cir.·
1991-05-01
·cited 48×
The court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding that the indictment was not multiplicitous, severance was not required, the display of cocaine was proper, expert testimony was admissible, and there was sufficient evidence for the convictions.
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907 F.2d 629·
7th Cir.·
1990-07-16
·cited 48×
The court did not definitively rule on whether co-conspirator hearsay alone can support a conviction, reserving the issue for later.
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871 F.2d 511·
5th Cir.·
1989-04-14
·cited 48×
The court held that the defendant's constitutional challenges to the sentencing statute were foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent, and the trial court did not err in its application of the sentencing guidelines regarding organizer status or acceptance of responsibility.
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855 F.2d 753·
11th Cir.·
1988-09-19
·cited 48×
An officer's subjective motive for making a traffic stop is irrelevant if the stop is objectively legal and authorized by law.
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839 F.2d 285·
6th Cir.·
1988-02-12
·cited 48×
Statements made during investigatory detentions in airport security rooms, where the suspect voluntarily accompanied officers and reasonably believed they were not confined, do not require Miranda warnings.
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808 F.2d 886·
1st Cir.·
1986-12-30
·cited 48×
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to convict the appellant of aiding and abetting the importation of controlled substances on January 14, 1985, as the circumstantial evidence did not establish his intent to make the venture succeed.
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780 F.2d 804·
9th Cir.·
1986-01-14
·cited 48×
The court held that the defendant's evidence was insufficient to create a jury question on entrapment, as the informant was not a government agent and the defendant showed predisposition.
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756 F.2d 1505·
11th Cir.·
1985-04-08
·cited 48×
The court affirmed the conviction, finding no error in the trial court's rulings regarding the Speedy Trial Act, disclosure of a confidential informant, exclusion of evidence, or jury instructions.