1,645 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 299 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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667 F.2d 976·
11th Cir.·
1982-02-12
·cited 48×
The court held that the Miranda warnings given were adequate and the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.
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590 F.2d 789·
9th Cir.·
1979-02-01
·cited 48×
The court held that the search and seizure of evidence from the vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and the admission of TECS cards was proper.
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545 F.2d 1309·
2d Cir.·
1976-10-18
·cited 48×
The court held that the evidence established that the defendant 'used a firearm to commit a felony' under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) by using guns as part of a security operation for drug distribution, and that there was sufficient evidence of constructive possession of cocaine.
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Terrance Jackson was convicted by jury of cocaine possession with intent to sell, marijuana possession, and felony fleeing from police. The appellate court reversed all convictions and remanded for new trial, finding insufficient evidence for two convictions and prejudicial prose
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928 F.2d 956·
10th Cir.·
1991-03-20
·cited 47×
The court held that the evidence was not the fruit of an illegal detention and that the statutory sentencing disparity for cocaine base does not violate due process.
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734 F.2d 657·
11th Cir.·
1984-06-18
·cited 47×
The court held that while the prosecutor's argument regarding the absence of an alibi witness was improper, it did not constitute plain error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. The court affirmed the convictions.
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695 F.2d 78·
4th Cir.·
1982-12-07
·cited 47×
The district court's finding that the defendant was free to leave during the initial questioning was a factual determination that should be affirmed.
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657 F.2d 920·
7th Cir.·
1981-08-17
·cited 47×
The dissent argues that a sentencing judge improperly relied on their own evaluation of a prior acquittal's merits, violating due process.
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578 F.2d 121·
5th Cir.·
1978-08-10
·cited 47×
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531 F.2d 1303·
5th Cir.·
1976-05-24
·cited 47×
The court held that the trial court did not err in limiting cross-examination of government witnesses regarding a confidential informant's past activities, nor in refusing requested jury charges on knowledge and specific intent.
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The court held that the stop of the defendant's car was justified by traffic violations and the search of a box within the car was a valid inventory search, and that sufficient evidence supported the convictions.
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903 F.2d 1336·
10th Cir.·
1990-05-25
·cited 46×
The court affirmed the conviction but reversed the sentence, finding the upward adjustment for role in the offense was improperly applied.
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898 F.2d 1273·
7th Cir.·
1990-04-02
·cited 46×
The court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain the defendant's luggage for a narcotics-detection dog sniff, and the initial encounter was consensual, thus not implicating the Fourth Amendment.
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876 F.2d 1344·
7th Cir.·
1989-06-09
·cited 46×
The court held that the trial court did not err in limiting cross-examination of a government informant, and that sufficient evidence supported the convictions.
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846 F.2d 761·
D.C. Cir.·
1988-05-13
·cited 46×
The court held that expert testimony describing a drug operation's modus operandi, without directly stating whether the defendant had the requisite mental state, does not violate Fed.R.Evid. 704(b).
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770 F.2d 825·
9th Cir.·
1985-09-04
·cited 46×
The court affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence, remanding for resentencing due to procedural errors in the sentencing process.
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717 F.2d 552·
11th Cir.·
1983-10-17
·cited 46×
The admission of drug courier profile testimony for background purposes, even without objection at trial, does not constitute plain error if it was not used as substantive evidence of guilt.
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715 F.2d 505·
11th Cir.·
1983-09-19
·cited 46×
The court held that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in conducting voir dire, denying a mistrial, or refusing to excuse a juror for cause, and that the appellants' other claims lacked merit.
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658 F.2d 317·
5th Cir.·
1981-10-05
·cited 46×
The court held that the admission of cocaine into evidence was proper despite a break in chain of custody, and that limitations on cross-examination and exclusion of certain evidence did not prejudice the defendant.
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615 F.2d 29·
2d Cir.·
1980-01-03
·cited 46×
The court held that the federal narcotics agents lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigatory stop, as the appellants' conduct was not sufficiently unusual or indicative of criminal activity when viewed objectively.
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589 F.2d 430·
9th Cir.·
1978-11-09
·cited 46×
The court held that the appellants' Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the use of electronic tracking devices, the warrantless entry to arrest Botero, or the search warrant affidavit, and that Cantalupo's post-arrest statements were admissible.
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547 F.2d 987·
7th Cir.·
1976-11-24
·cited 46×
The court held that the conspiracy statute 21 U.S.C. § 846 does not require proof of an overt act, and that the jury instructions, when considered as a whole, fairly stated the law and did not constitute reversible error.
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531 F.2d 783·
5th Cir.·
1976-05-17
·cited 46×
The court held that the trial judge's comments on the credibility of defense witnesses constituted reversible error, and that the handling of motions to compel disclosure of a confidential informant also constituted error requiring remand.
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531 F.2d 431·
9th Cir.·
1976-02-13
·cited 46×
The court held that the warrantless search of the defendant's car was permissible under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment, and that while the admission of hearsay evidence to show predisposition was error, it was harmless.
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842 F.2d 965·
7th Cir.·
1988-03-29
·cited 45×
The court held that an investigatory stop, even with a drawn weapon, can be lawful if justified by the circumstances and officer safety concerns, and does not automatically constitute an arrest.
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625 F.2d 66·
5th Cir.·
1980-08-28
·cited 45×
Evidence consisting solely of the quantity of a controlled substance seized is sufficient to uphold an inference of intent to distribute.
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586 F.2d 1052·
5th Cir.·
1978-12-22
·cited 45×
The court held that the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on the limited use of impeachment evidence or prior offenses, and that the admission of a coconspirator's hearsay statement, though erroneous, did not substantially influence
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The court held that a conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of other felonies is duplicative and violates double jeopardy, but that sentences for substantive firearm offenses must be served consecutively to sentences for other felonies.
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934 F.2d 411·
2d Cir.·
1991-05-23
·cited 44×
The court held that the district court erred in believing it was bound by the jury's quantity finding for sentencing purposes and must make its own findings regarding the defendants' intent and ability to distribute the negotiated quantity of drugs.
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914 F.2d 1527·
8th Cir.·
1990-09-18
·cited 44×
The court affirmed convictions, finding substantial evidence supported conspiracy, possession, and distribution charges, and that evidentiary and procedural rulings were not erroneous.
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Larry Wheeler was convicted of both sale of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell under the same Florida statute. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the statutory structure of section 893.13(1)(a) demonstrates legislative intent to punish on
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882 F.2d 645·
2d Cir.·
1989-08-09
·cited 44×
The court held that the admission of redacted statements from a nontestifying codefendant, where names were replaced by neutral pronouns, did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. It also held that sufficient evidence supported the conviction for usi
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The court held that the circumstantial evidence presented was insufficient to prove intent to sell cocaine, as it was not inconsistent with a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
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848 F.2d 509·
5th Cir.·
1988-06-21
·cited 44×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, but reversed the conviction for violating the Travel Act due to insufficient evidence.
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831 F.2d 1413·
9th Cir.·
1987-01-28
·cited 44×
The court held that the DEA agents possessed reasonable and articulable suspicion to detain Sokolow and his luggage, and that the subsequent detentions and dog sniffs were permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
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805 F.2d 1502·
11th Cir.·
1986-12-16
·cited 44×
The court held that the seizure of the defendant was supported by reasonable suspicion and did not ripen into an arrest until probable cause existed, thus reversing the suppression order.
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772 F.2d 783·
11th Cir.·
1985-09-30
·cited 44×
The court held that the prosecutor's actions did not improperly bolster witness testimony because there was no indication of extrinsic evidence convincing the prosecutor of the defendants' guilt.
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769 F.2d 104·
2d Cir.·
1985-08-01
·cited 44×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the defendant to present a voice exemplar demonstrating a heavy accent without subjecting himself to cross-examination, due to the exemplar's low probative value and potential for prejudice.
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758 F.2d 1308·
8th Cir.·
1985-04-12
·cited 44×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict for importing and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and that venue was proper in the Western District of Missouri.
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The court held that the district court erred in granting a judgment of acquittal for Stearns on the conspiracy charge, and that the jury's verdict of conviction on the lesser included offense should be reinstated. The court affirmed all other convictions.
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734 F.2d 484·
10th Cir.·
1984-05-09
·cited 44×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance, discovery, or a specific jury instruction, and that the indictment was sufficient.
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722 F.2d 519·
9th Cir.·
1983-12-21
·cited 44×
The court held that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry into the defendants' hotel rooms and that the officers' reasonable belief of peril justified non-compliance with the "knock and announce" statute.
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722 F.2d 902·
1st Cir.·
1983-12-06
·cited 44×
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to prove Michael DeLutis was a party to the conspiracy, reversing his conviction. The convictions of George and Shirley Eunis were affirmed.
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658 F.2d 1337·
9th Cir.·
1981-10-13
·cited 44×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conspiracy conviction and that the co-conspirator's statements and seized evidence were properly admitted.
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575 F.2d 499·
5th Cir.·
1978-06-19
·cited 44×
The court held that the trial court did not err in allowing the firearms count to go to the jury and that the defendant's claims of constitutional violations and entrapment were without merit.
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539 F.2d 854·
2d Cir.·
1976-06-11
·cited 44×
The court held that the trial court erred by improperly placing the burden of proof on the defendant for the entrapment defense and by refusing to give an entrapment instruction to one of the defendants. The court also found the instruction regarding the scrutiny of an informer's
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Willie James Duncan appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, challenging the sufficiency of evidence regarding constructive possession. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, finding that the state presented sufficient evidence
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965 F.2d 262·
7th Cir.·
1992-06-02
·cited 43×
The court adopts a 'clearly erroneous' standard of review for probable cause determinations, but this standard does not resolve circuit disagreements on the level of deference owed.
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926 F.2d 1044·
11th Cir.·
1991-03-15
·cited 43×
The court held that the stop was lawful, consent to search was valid, and prior conviction evidence was admissible to prove intent. However, the evidence was insufficient to prove a continuous course of conduct for the Travel Act conviction.
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The court held that the government's failure to disclose the wife's immunity was not a Brady violation because the defense learned of it and presented it to the jury, and the evidence was not material. Venue was proper as the defendant had a continuing stake in the drug sales in