639 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 169 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · browse and sort
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The court held that the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims should not be retroactively applied if it shortens the period, and that federal law, not state law, governs the accrual of civil conspiracy claims. The court also held that Bivens claims can be based on the First Am
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771 F.2d 556·
1st Cir.·
1985-08-22
·cited 62×
The court held that the strip search of a prison visitor violated the Fourth Amendment and that the defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity.
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760 F.2d 765·
7th Cir.·
1985-04-17
·cited 62×
A plaintiff must plead specific facts tending to support the existence of a municipal policy that caused the injury, and bare allegations of policy are insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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736 F.2d 903·
3d Cir.·
1984-06-14
·cited 62×
The court held that a jury must decide whether police officers had probable cause to file criminal charges, and thus summary judgment for the officers on the plaintiff's § 1983 claim was inappropriate, but affirmed summary judgment for the municipality.
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The court held that the denial of the appellants' motion for additional time to respond was not an abuse of discretion, and that summary judgment was proper as no genuine issue of material fact existed.
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628 F.2d 488·
5th Cir.·
1980-10-22
·cited 61×
The court held that the speech of a public employee was protected under the Pickering balancing test, not the compelling state interest test.
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The court held that the trial court's jury instructions on municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were too lax and did not comply with the established standard for proving a custom or policy, requiring a new trial.
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956 F.3d 1291·
11th Cir.·
2020-04-15
·cited 58×
The Eleventh Circuit held that a county's mandatory eight-hour DUI hold policy, which requires detention even when breathalyzer tests show 0.000 BAC and the arrestee has posted bond, can violate the Fourth Amendment if probable cause for detention has dissipated.
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The court held that res judicata barred the action against the City of Augusta but not against the individual defendants, and that the complaint stated a possible claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the individual defendants.
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762 F.2d 753·
9th Cir.·
1985-06-04
·cited 57×
The court held that the City of Los Angeles violated Chalmers' due process rights by enforcing vague and conflicting ordinances, and that the jury's damage award was supported by the evidence.
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The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the second amendment to the complaint would be futile, and therefore, further proceedings would be a waste of resources.
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922 F.2d 712·
11th Cir.·
1991-01-28
·cited 55×
The court held that it has jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity even when factual disputes exist, and that the superintendent's failure to act on known medical deficiencies could constitute deliberate indifference, but the attending physician's actions did not
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712 F.2d 339·
8th Cir.·
1983-07-11
·cited 55×
The dissenting judge believes the district court properly granted judgment n.o.v. and would remand for a new trial on damages if liability is assumed.
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The court held that municipalities and counties are not liable under Bivens for the acts of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior, and that joint and several liability was improperly imposed on Deputy Saldivar for the actions of Officer Maddox.
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A jury question was presented as to whether certain officers and jailers falsely arrested, imprisoned, or denied medical care to the plaintiff, but not as to others or the City.
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805 F.2d 962·
11th Cir.·
1986-12-09
·cited 53×
The court held that a public censure resolution by a city council, if retaliatory, can violate First Amendment rights and procedural due process, but not the Sixth Amendment or the prohibition against bills of attainder if it lacks the force of law.
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666 F.2d 1328·
10th Cir.·
1981-12-14
·cited 52×
The court held that while state law primarily governs family relations, the Constitution protects fundamental rights within family life, and state interference with these rights may be actionable under Section 1983 if egregious and lacking due process.
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882 F.2d 720·
3d Cir.·
1989-08-16
·cited 51×
The court held that reasonable school officials would not have realized they were violating a well-established duty by failing to pursue or discouraging complaints of sexual abuse, thus entitling them to qualified immunity.
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836 F.2d 346·
7th Cir.·
1988-01-07
·cited 50×
The court held that a pretrial detainee's claim for failure to protect falls under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment, and that the county could be liable under section 1983 for a policymaker's decision.
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895 F.2d 1469·
3d Cir.·
1990-02-08
·cited 49×
The court held that the jury's findings on § 1983 claims were not sufficient to establish a Title VII hostile work environment claim, and that certain judgments n.o.v. were appropriate while others were not.
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The court held that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for officers Booth and Greene regarding the June 9, 1978 search because it applied an erroneous legal standard requiring proof of assault and battery. The court also held that municipalities are not subject
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The court held that the District Attorney and Clerk of Superior Court were immune, but reversed summary judgment for the remaining defendants, finding they were not entitled to absolute immunity and the record was insufficient to establish qualified immunity.
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The court held that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief regarding the canine unit policy, but that the district court erred in granting judgment n.o.v. for the City and former chief, as there was sufficient evidence of inadequate training and supe
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717 F.2d 932·
4th Cir.·
1983-09-19
·cited 47×
The court held that the district court did not err in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the city and chief, nor in denying a new trial, as there was insufficient evidence of a municipal policy to allow the use of a dangerous instrumentality.
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830 F.2d 977·
9th Cir.·
1987-10-15
·cited 46×
The court held that the Ranch's "as applied" taking claim was not ripe, its facial challenge was unsupported, and its due process claim failed due to adequate state remedies and lack of municipal policy. The denial of attorneys' fees to the County was not an abuse of discretion.
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749 F.2d 1423·
10th Cir.·
1984-11-23
·cited 46×
The court held that the jury's verdicts for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendants were largely supported by the evidence, and that the plaintiffs substantially complied with the Oklahoma Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act notice requirement.
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730 F.2d 1367·
10th Cir.·
1984-03-30
·cited 46×
The court held that the § 1983 claims were timely filed under Colorado's residuary statute of limitations and that the plaintiff stated a claim for deprivation of liberty without due process, distinguishing the case from Baker v. McCollan. The harassment claim also requires furth
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The court held that the LHSAA's student transfer rule does not violate the First Amendment's free exercise clause or the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, and that its application does not violate the equal protection clause.
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825 F.2d 1004·
6th Cir.·
1987-07-31
·cited 44×
The court held that the district court did not err in exercising pendent jurisdiction over the state law retaliation claim, nor in its jury instructions or decision to grant a jury trial for that claim. However, the court's finding of school board liability for retaliation under
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The court held that a jury could reasonably find a municipality liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for gross negligence in training its police officers, even if the harm resulted from a single evening's events, provided there is evidence beyond the incident itself linking the training
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The court reversed the district court's dismissal, finding a glimmer of a prima facie case for reversal based on the chaotic conditions at Harlem Hospital and potential constitutional deprivations.
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804 F.2d 796·
2d Cir.·
1986-11-06
·cited 43×
A jail policy authorizing strip/body cavity searches of all arrestees without reasonable suspicion violates the Fourth Amendment, and the county and sheriff can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for such a policy.
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783 F.2d 1002·
11th Cir.·
1986-03-03
·cited 43×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the excessive force claim against Officer Black and in granting summary judgment for Officer Whitley on the failure to intervene claim, but affirmed summary judgment for other defendants on other claims.
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779 F.2d 1363·
8th Cir.·
1985-12-26
·cited 43×
The court held that the deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity for the warrantless home arrest, and that the use of excessive force presented a question of fact for the jury. However, the county was not liable due to lack of notice of prior misconduct.
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805 F.2d 81·
2d Cir.·
1986-11-10
·cited 42×
A landowner has a constitutionally protected property interest in receiving certificates of occupancy if they meet all requirements, and denial solely for unaccepted roads violates due process. However, there is no constitutional right to compel a municipality to accept dedicated
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660 F.2d 680·
5th Cir.·
1981-11-06
·cited 42×
Summary judgment for damages under section 1983 is affirmed, but the case is remanded for a name-clearing hearing regarding the allegation that the deputy lied on his employment application.
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588 F.2d 246·
8th Cir.·
1978-12-07
·cited 42×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence of retaliatory motive to support the jury verdict, and that the jury instruction was not reversible error, but vacated the attorney fee award and remanded for reconsideration of post-trial back pay and attorney fees.
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678 F.2d 1264·
5th Cir.·
1982-06-24
·cited 41×
The court held that the jury's finding of no probable cause supported the Fourth Amendment violation claim, but Officer Rowland was entitled to qualified immunity due to jury findings of good faith. Municipal liability was not established without proof of a policy or custom.
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891 F.2d 458·
3d Cir.·
1989-11-21
·cited 40×
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871 F.2d 1151·
1st Cir.·
1989-03-30
·cited 40×
The court held that the jury's verdicts against the City of Everett under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were supported by sufficient evidence, both based on an unconstitutional custom of breaking down doors without a warrant and on a policy of deliberate indifference to inadequate training an
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The court held that a school board can be sued under § 1983 and that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar back pay awards against locally controlled school boards. It also affirmed the district court's findings of discrimination and violations of desegregation standards for m
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841 F.2d 337·
9th Cir.·
1988-03-10
·cited 38×
The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the plaintiff's Title VII claim was abandoned or time-barred, and her § 1983 claim failed because the municipality cannot be held liable under a respondeat superior theory and the supervisor was not a final policymake
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839 F.2d 240·
6th Cir.·
1988-02-01
·cited 38×
The court held that the City of Cleveland could not be held liable under § 1983 for the decedent's suicide due to a lack of evidence of a municipal policy or custom, but affirmed the jury's verdict on state law claims of wrongful death and assault and battery.
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767 F.2d 651·
9th Cir.·
1985-08-02
·cited 38×
Parents possess a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the companionship and society of their child, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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697 F.2d 121·
6th Cir.·
1982-12-30
·cited 38×
A claim for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be actionable if it alleges a deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law, and such a claim accrues upon the favorable termination of the underlying criminal proceeding.
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A municipality's negligent failure to enforce its own ordinance or maintain a crossing does not rise to the level of a constitutional tort actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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The dissenting judge would affirm the district court's judgment, finding the Board entitled to immunity based on good faith.
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867 F.2d 1201·
9th Cir.·
1989-02-09
·cited 37×
Prosecutors are not absolutely immune for investigative actions or public statements unrelated to the judicial phase of a prosecution, and a county can be liable under § 1983 if its elected officials act as policymakers.
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728 F.2d 428·
10th Cir.·
1984-02-16
·cited 37×
The court held that under Oklahoma law, an employee handbook can create a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment, requiring due process before termination.