-
737 F.2d 1·
D.C. Cir.·
1984-06-08
·cited 237×
The court held that the District of Columbia and its employees can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and that certain claims against FBI defendants were barred by the statute of limitations, while others against MPD defendants and the District lacked sufficient evidence.
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739 F.2d 553·
11th Cir.·
1984-08-20
·cited 188×
The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's civil rights claims, finding that most allegations were either barred by immunity doctrines, failed to state a claim due to vagueness and conclusory nature, or were unsupported by specific facts.
-
774 F.2d 1495·
11th Cir.·
1985-10-15
·cited 178×
The existence of a state statute providing redress does not automatically insulate a wrongdoer from a federal § 1983 claim if the state remedy is not adequate in fact.
-
961 F.3d 1276·
11th Cir.·
2020-06-15
·cited 160×
Medically vulnerable pretrial detainees at a Miami-Dade jail challenged COVID-19 conditions of confinement as violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the district court granted a preliminary injunction requiring measures including social distancing. The Eleventh Circu
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601 F.2d 1242·
2d Cir.·
1979-07-09
·cited 136×
The court held that the plaintiff should be allowed limited discovery and an opportunity to amend his complaint to state a claim for "deliberate indifference" against the county under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that his breach of contract claim as a third-party beneficiary should be r
-
728 F.2d 762·
5th Cir.·
1984-04-02
·cited 124×
The court held that a municipality can be held liable under section 1983 for the unconstitutional actions of an appointed official if that official's acts represent official policy, even if the municipality's written policies are facially constitutional.
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699 F.2d 874·
7th Cir.·
1983-02-01
·cited 124×
The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict against the Village of Melrose Park for failure to train or supervise its officers, and reversed the conspiracy to obstruct justice conviction due to lack of an overt act. However, it affirmed the j
-
754 F.2d 1336·
7th Cir.·
1985-01-29
·cited 110×
The court held that summary judgment should not be granted if the plaintiff alleges an agreement between a private party and law enforcement to violate constitutional rights, and the defendants fail to foreclose the possibility of such an agreement.
-
661 F.2d 116·
9th Cir.·
1981-11-09
·cited 109×
The court held that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in federal court and that the statute of limitations had run on the civil rights claims, affirming all dismissals.
-
689 F.2d 964·
11th Cir.·
1982-10-21
·cited 108×
The court held that the district court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial, as the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find that his demotion was in retaliation for protected First Amendment activities.
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633 F.2d 599·
2d Cir.·
1980-08-28
·cited 104×
The court held that it had appellate jurisdiction and that the district court properly dismissed all claims, including those barred by the statute of limitations and res judicata.
-
662 F.2d 181·
3d Cir.·
1981-09-28
·cited 101×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's findings of liability and damages against the police detective, police chief, and city for constitutional violations under section 1983, and that no errors occurred requiring a new trial.
-
602 F.2d 1205·
5th Cir.·
1979-09-24
·cited 100×
The court held that Section 1983 does not preclude the incorporation of state law remedies, including vicarious liability, for the deprivation of civil rights.
-
632 F.2d 185·
2d Cir.·
1980-09-25
·cited 90×
A dismissal of criminal charges after an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal constitutes a favorable termination for purposes of a federal civil rights claim, and all claims arising from a single transaction should not be barred by state statutes of limitation.
-
777 F.2d 1436·
11th Cir.·
1985-12-11
·cited 89×
The court held that the plaintiff stated claims for substantive due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against individual officers and the municipality, and that the district court erred in dismissing these claims.
-
838 F.2d 663·
3d Cir.·
1988-01-26
·cited 88×
The dissenting judge argues that allegations of gross negligence or deliberate indifference are insufficient to sustain a due process § 1983 claim, which requires pleading intentional action, abuse of power, or actions tantamount to intent.
-
710 F.2d 4·
1st Cir.·
1983-06-17
·cited 88×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdicts against the individual defendants for constitutional and state law violations, but that the district court erred in exercising pendent jurisdiction over the State of Rhode Island.
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733 F.2d 1539·
11th Cir.·
1984-06-11
·cited 86×
The court held that dating is a constitutionally protected association under the First Amendment and that the award of $100,000 for procedural due process violations was grossly excessive.
-
700 F.2d 678·
11th Cir.·
1983-03-17
·cited 85×
The court held that summary judgment was improperly granted for the hospital, doctor, county, commissioners, and sheriff, as genuine issues of material fact remained regarding their liability under federal and state law. The exclusion of expert testimony was also deemed erroneous
-
668 F.2d 869·
6th Cir.·
1982-01-04
·cited 77×
The dissenting judges argue that the panel decision incorrectly applies standards for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly regarding 'failure to train' and the 'policy or custom' requirement.
-
731 F.2d 1379·
9th Cir.·
1984-04-25
·cited 75×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing governmental entity defendants and individual defendants, and in granting a directed verdict for the remaining defendants.
-
692 F.2d 387·
5th Cir.·
1982-11-29
·cited 74×
The court held that a justice of the peace is not immune from liability for non-judicial acts, and that police officers are protected by qualified immunity based on an objective good-faith standard. The court also found that the Parratt v. Taylor doctrine does not bar claims for
-
880 F.2d 305·
11th Cir.·
1989-08-10
·cited 69×
The court held that coercing a minor to abort violates her constitutional right to privacy and that coercing minors to refrain from consulting parents violates parental rights to direct upbringing. It also held that compelling action against religious beliefs can violate free exe
-
665 F.2d 261·
9th Cir.·
1981-08-07
·cited 66×
Police officers are not liable for damages incurred after a district attorney files charges, unless the presumption of the prosecutor's independent judgment is rebutted. The judgment of liability is affirmed, but the damages award is vacated and remanded for a new trial.
-
639 F.2d 639·
10th Cir.·
1981-01-16
·cited 64×
The court held that intervening Supreme Court precedent (Owen v. City of Independence) allows for compensatory damages and backpay against local government officials in their official capacities, even if they acted in good faith, for procedural due process violations. Reinstateme
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611 F.2d 1109·
5th Cir.·
1980-02-15
·cited 63×
The court held that an independent school district is amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that a teacher's classroom expression, even if controversial, is protected speech unless it overbalances her usefulness as an instructor.
-
781 F.2d 1334·
9th Cir.·
1986-01-30
·cited 62×
The court held that the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims should not be retroactively applied if it shortens the period, and that federal law, not state law, governs the accrual of civil conspiracy claims. The court also held that Bivens claims can be based on the First Am
-
662 F.2d 1385·
11th Cir.·
1981-12-07
·cited 62×
The court held that the denial of the appellants' motion for additional time to respond was not an abuse of discretion, and that summary judgment was proper as no genuine issue of material fact existed.
-
735 F.2d 838·
5th Cir.·
1984-07-09
·cited 60×
The court held that the trial court's jury instructions on municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were too lax and did not comply with the established standard for proving a custom or policy, requiring a new trial.
-
712 F.2d 1517·
1st Cir.·
1983-07-28
·cited 58×
The court held that res judicata barred the action against the City of Augusta but not against the individual defendants, and that the complaint stated a possible claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the individual defendants.
-
772 F.2d 1205·
5th Cir.·
1985-10-07
·cited 56×
The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the second amendment to the complaint would be futile, and therefore, further proceedings would be a waste of resources.
-
621 F.2d 1331·
5th Cir.·
1980-07-24
·cited 54×
The court held that municipalities and counties are not liable under Bivens for the acts of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior, and that joint and several liability was improperly imposed on Deputy Saldivar for the actions of Officer Maddox.
-
608 F.2d 644·
5th Cir.·
1979-12-21
·cited 54×
A jury question was presented as to whether certain officers and jailers falsely arrested, imprisoned, or denied medical care to the plaintiff, but not as to others or the City.
-
684 F.2d 1·
D.C. Cir.·
1982-07-02
·cited 48×
The court held that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for officers Booth and Greene regarding the June 9, 1978 search because it applied an erroneous legal standard requiring proof of assault and battery. The court also held that municipalities are not subject
-
607 F.2d 1269·
9th Cir.·
1979-10-19
·cited 48×
The court held that the District Attorney and Clerk of Superior Court were immune, but reversed summary judgment for the remaining defendants, finding they were not entitled to absolute immunity and the record was insufficient to establish qualified immunity.
-
875 F.2d 1546·
11th Cir.·
1989-06-27
·cited 47×
The court held that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief regarding the canine unit policy, but that the district court erred in granting judgment n.o.v. for the City and former chief, as there was sufficient evidence of inadequate training and supe
-
730 F.2d 1367·
10th Cir.·
1984-03-30
·cited 46×
The court held that the § 1983 claims were timely filed under Colorado's residuary statute of limitations and that the plaintiff stated a claim for deprivation of liberty without due process, distinguishing the case from Baker v. McCollan. The harassment claim also requires furth
-
616 F.2d 152·
5th Cir.·
1980-04-30
·cited 45×
The court held that the LHSAA's student transfer rule does not violate the First Amendment's free exercise clause or the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, and that its application does not violate the equal protection clause.
-
777 F.2d 801·
1st Cir.·
1985-11-27
·cited 44×
The court held that a jury could reasonably find a municipality liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for gross negligence in training its police officers, even if the harm resulted from a single evening's events, provided there is evidence beyond the incident itself linking the training
-
710 F.2d 41·
2d Cir.·
1983-06-09
·cited 44×
The court reversed the district court's dismissal, finding a glimmer of a prima facie case for reversal based on the chaotic conditions at Harlem Hospital and potential constitutional deprivations.
-
812 F.2d 1154·
9th Cir.·
1987-03-16
·cited 43×
-
678 F.2d 1264·
5th Cir.·
1982-06-24
·cited 41×
The court held that the jury's finding of no probable cause supported the Fourth Amendment violation claim, but Officer Rowland was entitled to qualified immunity due to jury findings of good faith. Municipal liability was not established without proof of a policy or custom.
-
594 F.2d 489·
5th Cir.·
1979-05-07
·cited 40×
The court held that a school board can be sued under § 1983 and that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar back pay awards against locally controlled school boards. It also affirmed the district court's findings of discrimination and violations of desegregation standards for m
-
678 F.2d 582·
5th Cir.·
1982-06-16
·cited 38×
A municipality's negligent failure to enforce its own ordinance or maintain a crossing does not rise to the level of a constitutional tort actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
-
613 F.2d 245·
10th Cir.·
1979-11-26
·cited 38×
The dissenting judge would affirm the district court's judgment, finding the Board entitled to immunity based on good faith.
-
649 F.2d 434·
6th Cir.·
1981-05-22
·cited 36×
The court held that summary judgment for individual defendants was improper due to lack of notice under Rule 56(c), but res judicata barred the § 1983 claim against all defendants despite the intervening Monell decision.
-
820 F.2d 194·
6th Cir.·
1987-06-04
·cited 34×
The court held that the magistrate erred in dismissing the substantive due process claim regarding child custody, and that the claim regarding false imprisonment should be analyzed under Parratt v. Taylor, but reversed the summary judgment on the custody claim.
-
801 F.2d 316·
8th Cir.·
1986-09-12
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the § 1983 claim against individual officers based on Parratt v. Taylor, as intentional abuse of power implicates substantive due process. However, the court affirmed the directed verdict for the City, finding no unconsti
-
766 F.2d 1567·
1st Cir.·
1985-08-08
·cited 34×
The court held that a general jury verdict based on multiple theories of liability, where at least one theory lacks sufficient evidentiary support, must be reversed because it is impossible to determine the jury's basis for the verdict. The court also held that a governmental emp
-
737 F.2d 1148·
D.C. Cir.·
1984-06-22
·cited 34×
The court held that a prisoner alleging unprovoked macing and beating by correctional officers states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even without permanent injury, if the force was applied maliciously and sadistically.