521 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 1,043 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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754 F.2d 1311·
5th Cir.·
1985-03-15
·cited 24×
The court held that punitive damages under section 1983 require a showing of willful misconduct or conscious indifference to the rights of others, not merely gross negligence.
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The court concurred that the record did not entirely exclude the possibility of bad faith termination, which could entitle the plaintiff to relief under section 1983.
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729 F.2d 416·
6th Cir.·
1984-03-09
·cited 24×
The court held that the evidence presented was insufficient to establish a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights under the Eighth or Sixth Amendments, thus affirming the directed verdict.
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715 F.2d 1513·
11th Cir.·
1983-09-26
·cited 24×
The court held that the due process clause does not impose liability on state officers for failing to protect a member of the public from the criminal acts of a third person, absent a special relationship.
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658 F.2d 494·
7th Cir.·
1981-08-25
·cited 24×
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647 F.2d 110·
10th Cir.·
1981-04-13
·cited 24×
A death resulting from the negligent action of a state official does not, in itself, constitute a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and therefore does not support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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A prisoner's pro se complaint alleging denial of due process for denied witness requests at disciplinary hearings is insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless it alleges the denial was for reasons unrelated to institutional security or correctional goals and con
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600 F.2d 52·
6th Cir.·
1979-06-18
·cited 24×
The court held that individual officers are immune from liability due to good faith reliance on existing Tennessee law, but the city may be liable under Monell for constitutional violations resulting from its policy or custom.
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The court held that the trial court should have appointed counsel for the indigent plaintiff, whose complaint stated a cause of action, to advance the proper administration of justice.
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Plaintiffs' claims challenging a building permit, variance, and state court decisions on federal civil rights grounds were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel because the New York Court of Appeals, applying the Kovarsky doctrine, had jurisdiction under CPLR § 103(c) to
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520 F.2d 993·
5th Cir.·
1975-10-08
·cited 24×
The Pension Fund Board of Trustees is not a 'person' amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but its individual members are. The no-refund provisions of the pension statute are constitutional.
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The court held that the district court's finding that the officer used excessive force was not clearly erroneous, affirming the judgment.
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The court held that while the refusal of injunctive relief was proper due to changed circumstances, the dismissal of the claim for cancellation of arrest records was premature and required a full hearing.
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The court held that the prisoner's claims of deprivations in maximum security did not rise to constitutional dimensions and were therefore not actionable.
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375 F.2d 447·
5th Cir.·
1967-03-30
·cited 24×
The court held that the city ordinance created an arbitrary classification violating the Equal Protection Clause and that municipalities are not liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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915 F.2d 1530·
11th Cir.·
1990-10-31
·cited 23×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing official-capacity claims and applying collateral estoppel without proper notice, and that the police officers were not in privity with the state for collateral estoppel purposes under Georgia law.
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The court held that the evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to find that Officer Gardner used excessive force, thus reversing the directed verdict against him. However, the court affirmed the directed verdict for the County on the § 1983 claim due to lack of evidence of a mun
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868 F.2d 9·
1st Cir.·
1989-03-20
·cited 23×
The court held that state caseworkers' conduct in failing to inform a juvenile offender of potentially exculpatory information was not, as a matter of law, intentional or reckless, and thus not actionable under section 1983 for denial of due process.
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854 F.2d 179·
7th Cir.·
1988-07-28
·cited 23×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under section 1983 because her allegations did not establish a municipal policy or custom of discrimination and retaliation, and that her appeal regarding the Title VII dismissal was moot.
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794 F.2d 478·
9th Cir.·
1986-07-14
·cited 23×
The district court erred in dismissing the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims under § 1983, as the Parratt analysis is inapplicable to Fourth Amendment claims and due process claims challenging established policies, and in dismissing supervisory officials when liability was a
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The dissenting judge argues that the majority erred in excusing deficient pleadings and the failure to seek leave to amend, asserting that civil rights claims require specific factual allegations tying defendants to the alleged deprivations.
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The court held that plaintiffs failed to present specific evidence of a policy for summary judgment, but that the trial court erred in directing a verdict on the First Amendment claim due to sufficient circumstantial evidence of official knowledge and participation.
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690 F.2d 126·
7th Cir.·
1982-10-05
·cited 23×
The court held that a private corporation cannot be held liable under § 1983 based solely on respondeat superior; liability requires proof of an impermissible policy. The court also found that erroneous jury instructions regarding municipal liability and strip search reasonablene
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641 F.2d 345·
5th Cir.·
1981-04-03
·cited 23×
The court held that the sheriff's liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful incarceration by subordinates requires personal involvement or a causal connection, not mere vicarious liability. Sheriff's liability under Texas common law for deputies' acts requires further factual
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The court held that the segregation of inmates in a special housing unit did not violate their Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment rights, and the procedures used satisfied due process requirements.
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The court held that the officer's use of deadly force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, even if the suspect was surrounded, because the suspect posed a significant threat of serious physical harm to others.
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The court held that the sheriff is not the final policymaker for deputy training under Washington law, and the jury instructions on municipal liability did not meet the deliberate indifference standard required by Canton v. Harris.
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913 F.2d 113·
4th Cir.·
1990-07-31
·cited 22×
The court held that while the Due Process Clause imposes an affirmative duty of care on the state for individuals in its custody, the evidence was insufficient to establish that Baltimore County's failure to train its officers in suicide prevention was the proximate cause of the
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The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting protective orders, that summary judgment for the city and police chief was appropriate, but that directed verdicts for one officer on claims of false arrest, imprisonment, and civil rights violations
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885 F.2d 1099·
3d Cir.·
1989-09-12
·cited 22×
The court held that a prisoner held beyond his sentence term may recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a prison official acted with deliberate indifference to the unjustified deprivation of liberty, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in estopping defendants from
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881 F.2d 1336·
5th Cir.·
1989-08-31
·cited 22×
The court held that a plaintiff must be given an opportunity to prove that a municipality's policymakers absolutely delegated final policymaking authority to a subordinate official, even if positive law suggests otherwise, by demonstrating a custom or usage of abdicating review p
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The court held that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on her § 1983 claim against the City for a policy of providing less protection to domestic violence victims, but affirmed summary judgment on her sex-based discrimination claim.
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853 F.2d 1111·
3d Cir.·
1988-08-10
·cited 22×
The court held that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for claims against Detective Balliet and the municipal defendants, as they sufficiently alleged reckless indifference to a detainee's suicidal tendencies.
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A district court cannot reduce a statutory attorney fee award below the lodestar amount based on the existence of a contingent-fee agreement or the simplicity of the case's issues.
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The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment for prison officials, as the plaintiff failed to demonstrate deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs or punitive conditions of confinement.
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825 F.2d 1453·
10th Cir.·
1987-08-07
·cited 22×
The court held that a jury could reasonably find that an officer's use of excessive force, while constituting a battery, did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, particularly when the force was a spontaneous reaction rather than malicious.
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A federal court should not dismiss a § 1983 damages claim brought concurrently with a habeas corpus petition, even if state remedies for confinement have not been exhausted.
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The court held that state administrative proceedings did not bar the deputy sheriff's federal First Amendment claim, submitting the protected speech issue to the jury was not plain error, and the damages awarded were not excessive.
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786 F.2d 516·
2d Cir.·
1986-03-19
·cited 22×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying discovery and improperly granting summary judgment on the sexual assault claim, but correctly dismissed the wrongful confinement claim.
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773 F.2d 605·
5th Cir.·
1985-08-05
·cited 22×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim, as the plaintiff's allegations, if true, could establish a violation of his constitutional rights. However, the dismissal for failure to state a claim is affirmed, but the case
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The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion because it overlooked a timely filed affidavit that raised a material issue of fact regarding excessive force.
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The court held that a sheriff and county can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a prisoner's injuries resulting from excessive force if such injuries were inflicted pursuant to an official policy or custom of failing to train, discipline, or investigate misconduct.
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The court held that the statute of limitations did not bar the malicious prosecution claim, and that the dismissal of claims against the Martabanos, Bano Buick, and Vincent Cerbone in his individual capacity should be reversed, while affirming dismissals against the Village of Mo
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748 F.2d 715·
1st Cir.·
1984-11-19
·cited 22×
The court held that the magistrate's authorization does not cure an officer's objectively unreasonable belief in probable cause, and such conduct can lead to personal liability.
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737 F.2d 771·
8th Cir.·
1984-06-29
·cited 22×
The court held that the district court's finding of personal liability for supervisors was clearly erroneous, as there was no evidence of their direct involvement or deliberate indifference to the prisoner's medical needs.
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Post-deprivation processes can satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirement for liberty interests, and detention beyond a lawful term is not automatically cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
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A prisoner's civil rights suit that results in a consent decree granting relief only available in habeas corpus is functionally a habeas corpus proceeding, and thus attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 are not available.
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641 F.2d 729·
10th Cir.·
1981-05-12
·cited 22×
The court held that confining a pretrial detainee in extreme conditions for an excessive period constitutes punishment, violating due process rights.
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The court held that the federal regulation prohibiting states from waiving recoupment of overpayments was invalid as exceeding the Secretary's statutory authority and conflicting with congressional intent to apply state law. The court also held that plaintiffs stated a claim unde
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The court held that police officers lacked probable cause for warrantless arrests, making the good faith defense unavailable under § 1983, and that Goldblatt's mere provision of information to police did not constitute actionable participation in the arrests under either federal