521 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 1,043 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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213 F.R.D. 166·
S.D. Fla.·
2008-05-09
The court granted in part and denied in part the motion for supervision, finding one communication potentially abusive while another was not.
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The court held that the officers' conduct during interrogation did not shock the conscience, and probable cause existed for the arrest, thus granting summary judgment for the defendants on federal claims.
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The court held that the officer is not entitled to qualified immunity because a jury could find his use of force violated clearly established law, as defined by controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent.
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475 F. Supp. 2d 1270·
S.D. Fla.·
2007-02-27
The court held that a voter's claim for injunctive relief was moot, and claims regarding lack of notice and the mental capacity checkbox failed to state a claim, but the claim regarding the lack of a grace period for registration deficiencies was allowed to proceed.
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The court held that disputed facts regarding probable cause precluded summary judgment for Deputy Klein on the false arrest and imprisonment claims, but granted summary judgment for other defendants on those claims. Summary judgment was granted for all defendants on the unconstit
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The court denied the defendants' motion for a new trial or remittitur, finding the jury's verdict was supported by the weight of the evidence and the damages awarded were reasonable.
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941 So. 2d 447·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2006-10-25
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss based on absolute sovereign immunity for county fire rescue personnel sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court held that county employees, unlike state agencies, do not enjoy absolute sovereig
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The court held that the plaintiff could not prove a procedural due process claim because the City's moratorium ordinance was a legislative act, and thus summary judgment was granted on that count.
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The court held that the defendant county was not liable for excessive force under § 1983 because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a municipal policy or custom of permitting such force, nor did the county exhibit deliberate indifference to the officer's alleged racism or reckle
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The court held that disclosure of the confidential informant's identity or an in camera examination is not required because the plaintiff failed to establish its necessity and the government's interest in protecting the informant outweighs the plaintiff's speculative claims.
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The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish an objectively substantial risk of serious harm or deliberate indifference by the county, thus granting summary judgment for the defendants.
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Federal prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for prosecutorial functions, including preparing and filing charging documents, making representations to the court, and retaining experts, even if the allegations suggest misconduct.
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A reasonable jury could find that the officer's use of deadly force violated the Fourth Amendment, and the officer is not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage because the law was clearly established.
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The court held that Officer Stephens was entitled to qualified immunity because he had arguable probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for falsely reporting a crime, and even if he lacked arguable probable cause, the law was not clearly established that his actions were unlawful.
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The court held that the United States' motion to withdraw its admission regarding timely notice of an attorney charging lien should be granted because withdrawal would subserve the presentation of the merits and the opposing party failed to show prejudice.
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Robert and Anthony Caruso, Italian American police officers employed by the City of Cocoa, Florida, filed suit alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights, First Amendment freedom of association, and Title VII employment discrimination based on race and national origin.
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837 So. 2d 1049·
Fla. 3d DCA·
2002-12-26
Miami-Dade County appeals a judgment for Arthur Walker in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on alleged failure to train police officers in dealing with the mentally ill. The court reverses, holding that Walker failed to establish both deliberate indifference and
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61 F. Supp. 2d 1245·
M.D. Fla.·
1998-12-23
The court held that Officer Marshall's actions were objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, thus granting summary judgment on the federal claims and dismissing the state law claims.
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The court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under federal law against the School Board and that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, warranting dismissal of the federal claims.
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The Florida Supreme Court held that children do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in family companionship under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause that would support a Section 1983 cause of action when their parent is wrongfully imprisoned. The Cou
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898 F. Supp. 852·
M.D. Fla.·
1995-05-15
The court held that the school board had no constitutional duty to protect the student from suicide and that the failure to train staff did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference required for municipal liability under Section 1983.
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880 F. Supp. 1542·
M.D. Fla.·
1995-01-25
The court held that plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the traffic stops were pretextual and motivated by race or national origin, or that a municipal policy of targeting minorities existed without an underlying constitut
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The court reversed a trial court's dismissal of an amended complaint alleging excessive force by Hialeah police officers and their chief in apprehending a minor through a police dog. The decision clarifies that claims for excessive force in arrest, including state tort and federa
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850 F. Supp. 984·
M.D. Fla.·
1994-04-28
A private corporation contracting with the government to perform a public service is entitled to raise qualified immunity as a defense, distinguishing it from private defendants acting for personal interests or municipal corporations.
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A plaintiff acting as an agent has standing to sue on behalf of the principal, and a local government agency is not immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment for § 1983 claims.
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999 F.2d 788·
4th Cir.·
1993-07-26
Governmental social service boards and departments are state entities immune from federal suit under the Eleventh Amendment if their liability would be paid from state funds, and a county is not liable under § 1983 for personnel decisions of such a board if the board lacks indepe
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The court held that a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity when, in the course of an arrest attempt, the suspect's actions created a severe threat of physical harm, making the officer's use of deadly force reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
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996 F.2d 745·
5th Cir.·
1993-07-20
The court held that the school district's transfer of a teacher accused of sexual abuse, despite prior allegations and a formal policy, did not demonstrate deliberate indifference to students' constitutional rights, and thus reversed the jury's verdict. The court also found that
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The court held that instructing the jury that a "significant injury" was required to prove a federal excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was reversible error, as it conflicted with Supreme Court precedent requiring focus on the maliciousness of the force used, not the ex
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994 F.2d 1113·
5th Cir.·
1993-06-25
Private defendants sued under § 1983 for invoking a state statute are not entitled to qualified immunity but may be liable only if they acted in bad faith, meaning they knew or should have known the statute was unconstitutional.
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The court held that while the plaintiff cannot obtain relief based on an unconstitutional search if it was not pursuant to official policy, he may still be entitled to equitable relief based on a due process violation related to his termination hearing.
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The court held that a prisoner's due process rights may be violated by disciplinary segregation imposed without adequate notice or opportunity to call witnesses, and by punishment for praying in Arabic under an overly broad English-only rule. Qualified immunity may not apply if a
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The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding witness testimony, admitting a videotape, or admitting conduct violation reports, and that any error in refusing a jury instruction regarding missing evidence was harmless.
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989 F.2d 885·
6th Cir.·
1993-04-01
A county is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional deprivations resulting from a municipality's custom, policy, or practice when the county has contracted with the municipality to operate a jail, as long as the county did not demonstrate deliberate indifference and
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The court's majority opinion, which this concurrence agrees with regarding the judgment, applied a rational basis test to a governmental scheme, finding it permissible. The concurring judge believes a reasonableness test is more appropriate for substantive due process claims.
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The court affirmed the district court's grant of a new trial, finding that the district court properly weighed the evidence and did not abuse its discretion.
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The court held that the trial court's erroneous jury instruction on 'deliberate indifference' did not constitute plain error, and the admission of evidence regarding alcohol consumption was not an abuse of discretion.
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978 F.2d 1047·
8th Cir.·
1992-11-02
Special prosecutors are absolutely immune from § 1983 liability for assisting a grand jury in drafting an official report permitted by state law, as this function is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.
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970 F.2d 82·
5th Cir.·
1992-09-01
The court held that the district court did not err in finding that the City acted in bad faith and with intent to harass, thus justifying federal intervention despite pending state proceedings, and that the City could be held liable as its officers acted pursuant to official poli
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The court held that the deputy sheriff's letter was protected speech under the First Amendment and that the sheriff's decision to fire him was a substantial or motivating factor, supporting the jury's verdict. The court also affirmed the county's liability and rejected the sherif
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972 F.2d 920·
8th Cir.·
1992-08-13
The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the magistrate judge did not err in granting summary judgment to supervisors, admitting impeachment testimony, or awarding attorney's fees, and that the nominal damages award was not a plain injustice.
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973 F.2d 70·
2d Cir.·
1992-08-10
A municipality is not entitled to absolute or qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for actions taken in a legislative capacity.
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The court held that the officer's actions did not constitute deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs, as his conduct was not wanton or a reckless disregard for the inmate's rights.
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973 F.2d 1271·
6th Cir.·
1992-06-09
The court held that it was plain and prejudicial error to require plaintiffs to prove proximate cause for nominal damages in a malicious libel case, and that the prior remand necessitated further consideration of whether a new trial on § 1983 liability was required due to Monell
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The court held that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the City of Greenwood had a constitutionally deficient training program for its police officers regarding warrantless searches, and thus, the jury's verdict imposing municipal liability was not supported.
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965 F.2d 235·
7th Cir.·
1992-05-28
The court held that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of a City policy or custom causing the alleged constitutional violation, thus affirming the grant of summary judgment.
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The court held that the district court did not err in its rulings regarding fraud on the court, autopsy photographs, or the admission of evidence concerning prior convictions and weapons, and that the jury verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.