3,807 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 3,026 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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The court held that the plaintiff received adequate procedural and substantive due process, and that the decisions affecting his enrollment were academic rather than disciplinary.
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798 F.2d 1147·
8th Cir.·
1986-08-13
·cited 8×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, nor in dismissing the First Amendment and Section 1985 claims, and that res judicata properly barred certain due process claims.
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798 F.2d 297·
8th Cir.·
1986-08-11
·cited 8×
A prisoner's complaint alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
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794 F.2d 12·
1st Cir.·
1986-06-26
·cited 8×
The court held that appellants' federal claims were properly dismissed because they failed to avail themselves of adequate state remedies and because mere violations of state statutes or contracts do not constitute a deprivation of due process under § 1983.
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The Montana statute creates a protected liberty interest in parole eligibility because it uses mandatory language requiring release unless specific negative criteria are met.
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792 F.2d 76·
7th Cir.·
1986-06-02
·cited 8×
A state agency is immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment, and a tenured teacher's due process claim fails when the administrative process provided an adequate remedy, even if the teacher did not utilize it.
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788 F.2d 504·
8th Cir.·
1986-04-10
·cited 8×
The court affirmed the district court's decisions, finding no error in the granting of summary judgment on due process claims, the dismissal of Title VII claims for failure to establish a prima facie case, and the rejection of civil rights claims due to lack of proof of disparate
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783 F.2d 1567·
11th Cir.·
1986-03-13
·cited 8×
Federal courts should not entertain Section 1983 actions challenging state tax systems when plain, adequate, and complete state remedies are available, due to the principle of comity.
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The court held that the district court clearly erred in finding that the appellants were not subject to intentional discrimination and that the termination standards were applied correctly. The court reversed the judgment for Griffin and remanded for further consideration of McWh
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783 F.2d 1000·
11th Cir.·
1986-03-03
·cited 8×
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784 F.2d 149·
2d Cir.·
1986-02-20
·cited 8×
The court held that claims regarding the prison mail directive 4422 should be remanded for further proceedings, while Jones's claims against O'Connor and Smith were affirmed as dismissed.
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782 F.2d 1229·
5th Cir.·
1986-02-14
·cited 8×
The court held that a substantial part of the plaintiff's case was barred by the statute of limitations and that there was insufficient evidence to prove a deprivation of constitutional rights caused by the defendants.
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The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) mandates that North Carolina use the "$6,000/6% rule" as a methodology for determining Medicaid eligibility because it is part of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility criteria.
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The court held that the plaintiff's complaint against the city was improperly dismissed for failure to state a claim and that the lawsuit was not time-barred under the retroactively applied Wilson v. Garcia decision.
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782 F.2d 1182·
4th Cir.·
1986-02-03
·cited 8×
The court held that the plaintiffs' due process claim must be dismissed because they have an adequate postdeprivation remedy under state law, specifically an action for inverse condemnation.
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781 F.2d 1028·
4th Cir.·
1986-01-16
·cited 8×
The magistrate's order requiring a summary of expected witness testimony and a sworn statement of agreement was a reasonable procedural regulation, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in affirming it.
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782 F.2d 106·
8th Cir.·
1986-01-07
·cited 8×
The court affirmed the denial of preliminary relief but remanded the denial of appointed counsel for further consideration.
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The court held that probable cause for the arrest was established as a matter of law, and therefore the trial court did not err in granting a directed verdict for the defendants.
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The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that any errors in dismissing damage claims or striking the jury demand were harmless because the university could have properly directed a verdict against the professor on all his claims.
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773 F.2d 692·
6th Cir.·
1985-09-23
·cited 8×
The court held that Kentucky campaign finance statutes do not grant exclusive investigative jurisdiction to the Registry of Election Finance, nor do they create a protected liberty interest that requires due process before law enforcement can investigate alleged violations.
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771 F.2d 358·
8th Cir.·
1985-08-19
·cited 8×
The court held that the Paschall cost-assessment rule should not be applied when defendants prevail, due to the chilling effect on litigation rights.
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768 F.2d 737·
5th Cir.·
1985-08-19
·cited 8×
The court held that the clerk of court was not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because there was no evidence of direct participation or causal connection between her actions and the plaintiff's arrest.
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Prisoner Review Board members are absolutely immune from damages for denying access to parole files, and the mere presence of newspaper articles in a parole file does not violate due process.
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The court held that a pro se prisoner's § 1983 complaint alleging seizure of property pursuant to established institutional policy, without a meaningful post-deprivation hearing, sufficiently states a claim under Parratt v. Taylor.
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The court held that a federal court must give preclusive effect to a prior state court judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, if the state proceedings afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim, even if the claim involves a federal due
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765 F.2d 75·
6th Cir.·
1985-06-18
·cited 8×
The court held that disputed issues of fact regarding the burden on plaintiffs' free exercise of religion and the state's compelling interest precluded summary judgment.
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762 F.2d 30·
4th Cir.·
1985-05-10
·cited 8×
The court held that the plaintiff's claims, based on a search and arrest, constituted state torts, not violations of constitutional magnitude actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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760 F.2d 46·
3d Cir.·
1985-04-19
·cited 8×
Section 366 of the Bankruptcy Code does not preempt state public utility regulations requiring an opportunity to amortize post-petition arrearages before termination of service in a Chapter 7 proceeding.
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The court held that students who moved out of a school district were not entitled to a due process hearing before being required to withdraw, as they had no protected property interest in attending the former district's school tuition-free.
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The court held that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged due process and taking clause violations arising from a planning board's unreasonable denial of subdivision applications, as state law provided an adequate remedy and the board a
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The court held that the district court correctly applied collateral estoppel to bar the relitigation of claims that were fully and fairly litigated in state court, and that any procedural errors were harmless.
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743 F.2d 21·
D.C. Cir.·
1984-09-07
·cited 8×
The District Court erred in dismissing the landlords' claims based on exclusive jurisdiction and the principle of comity (Younger abstention).
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742 F.2d 823·
4th Cir.·
1984-08-28
·cited 8×
The court held that a pro se prisoner's complaint alleging forced medication, when read liberally, states a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and dismissal was improper.
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The court held that a prior state court action seeking coercive relief, not merely declaratory relief, has the same claim preclusive effect as a full judgment on the merits, barring a subsequent federal § 1983 damages action.
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738 F.2d 973·
8th Cir.·
1984-07-18
·cited 8×
Appellants were not 'prevailing parties' under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because the TRO granted did not resolve the merits of the case.
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735 F.2d 168·
5th Cir.·
1984-06-28
·cited 8×
The court held that plaintiffs failed to establish a constitutionally protected property interest in the Waiver of Liability (WOL) presumption and that the NLMRA, as a federal entity, could not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for state action.
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744 F.2d 244·
2d Cir.·
1984-06-26
·cited 8×
The dissenting judge would affirm the award of attorney's fees, finding the appellees to be prevailing parties who succeeded on a significant issue through settlement, and that The Gan became a state actor by actively defending the suit.
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The court held that the plaintiffs' claims failed because there was insufficient state or federal action, no evidence of Title VI discrimination, lack of standing for the statutory claim, and failure to meet preconditions for the whistleblowing statute.
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736 F.2d 933·
4th Cir.·
1984-06-06
·cited 8×
The court held that the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) as amended in 1980 establishes a minimum pension offset requirement, and states are permitted to broaden the scope of their pension offset provisions beyond the federal mandate.
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The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict for actual and punitive damages, and that the district court did not err in denying summary judgment.
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730 F.2d 149·
4th Cir.·
1984-03-21
·cited 8×
A prior state court judgment dismissing a breach of contract claim based on sovereign immunity has claim preclusive effect on a subsequent federal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, even if the federal claims involve different legal theories or parties in privity.
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The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, finding no private cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment and upholding the immunity of the Board members acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. Attorney fees were denied as the plaintiff's claims were not deemed frivolous.
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The court held that the district court, not the court of appeals, is the proper forum to initially address applications for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, even for appellate services.
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726 F.2d 82·
2d Cir.·
1984-01-27
·cited 8×
The court held that plaintiffs' failure to present specific facts or controvert defendants' assertions in opposition to a summary judgment motion, as required by federal and local rules, warranted dismissal.
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724 F.2d 1098·
4th Cir.·
1984-01-12
·cited 8×
The dissenting judge would reverse and remand the case to investigate factual alternatives presented to the prisoner.
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722 F.2d 23·
2d Cir.·
1983-11-25
·cited 8×
The court held that the district court had discretion to consider either Northern or Southern District rates when calculating attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, even though the case was transferred due to improper venue.
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719 F.2d 954·
8th Cir.·
1983-10-28
·cited 8×
The court held that the district court properly dismissed the claims because Miner's defamation claim is not actionable under § 1983 and Simmons's claim improperly sought federal intervention in a pending state court conviction.
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The court held that Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 217, which precludes review of bar examination results but allows unlimited retakes, satisfies the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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The court held that the notice provided to Mr. McKee before the sale of his car was insufficient to satisfy due process requirements, and that summary judgment for defendant Heggy was improperly granted.
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The court held that the plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is time-barred because the most analogous state statute of limitations is two years, applicable to defamation and 'false light' invasion of privacy claims. The court affirmed the dismissal of the action.