3,807 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 3,026 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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The court held that the prisoner's claims of deprivations in maximum security did not rise to constitutional dimensions and were therefore not actionable.
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The court held that the district court abused its discretion by enjoining all federal funds for the Model Cities Program to pressure unrelated entities, ignoring the program's innocent beneficiaries.
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450 F.2d 449·
8th Cir.·
1971-11-04
·cited 24×
The court held that both the malicious prosecution and civil rights claims were barred by Minnesota's two-year statute of limitations.
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The court held that a state prisoner's malpractice claim against his appointed counsel is not cognizable under the Civil Rights Act, and a perjury claim was properly dismissed.
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391 F.2d 596·
3d Cir.·
1968-03-18
·cited 24×
The court held that the Pennsylvania one-year statute of limitations for false arrest applies to actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the facts alleged constitute false arrest, even if they also describe false imprisonment.
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The court held that the city ordinance created an arbitrary classification violating the Equal Protection Clause and that municipalities are not liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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The court held that arrests made without probable cause, under the circumstances described, could constitute a deprivation of constitutional rights actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, creating a jury question.
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The court held that 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and § 1985 do not provide relief for the plaintiff's alleged injuries, as the statutes were intended to protect against state action and not individual invasions of rights, and have been narrowly interpreted.
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929 F.2d 618·
11th Cir.·
1991-04-23
·cited 23×
The law of the case doctrine does not preclude the district court from considering the abstention doctrine when the issue was not explicitly decided or implicitly resolved in prior appellate proceedings.
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928 F.2d 973·
10th Cir.·
1991-03-25
·cited 23×
The court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not provide a remedy for discriminatory discharge claims, and that the plaintiff failed to prove disparate treatment under Title VII.
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955 F.2d 1214·
9th Cir.·
1990-11-20
·cited 23×
The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and Unruh Act claims, finding that the district court erred in its application of pleading rules and California law. The court affirmed the dismissal of the § 1985 and § 1986
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The court held that the district court erred in dismissing official-capacity claims and applying collateral estoppel without proper notice, and that the police officers were not in privity with the state for collateral estoppel purposes under Georgia law.
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A child witnessing a police officer's violent arrest of their father does not have a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for emotional distress, as the officer's conduct was not directed at the child with the requisite intent to violate their rights.
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The court held that the evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to find that Officer Gardner used excessive force, thus reversing the directed verdict against him. However, the court affirmed the directed verdict for the County on the § 1983 claim due to lack of evidence of a mun
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A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity if it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their actions did not violate the plaintiff's rights, and the warrant application was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
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The court held that state caseworkers' conduct in failing to inform a juvenile offender of potentially exculpatory information was not, as a matter of law, intentional or reckless, and thus not actionable under section 1983 for denial of due process.
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The court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under section 1983 because her allegations did not establish a municipal policy or custom of discrimination and retaliation, and that her appeal regarding the Title VII dismissal was moot.
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The court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because a dispute of material fact existed regarding the proportionality of force used by officers.
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837 F.2d 587·
2d Cir.·
1988-01-25
·cited 23×
The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by precluding eyewitness testimony due to a discovery violation and by admitting evidence of prior lawsuits, which was unduly prejudicial.
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825 F.2d 772·
4th Cir.·
1987-08-10
·cited 23×
The court held that the officer is entitled to qualified immunity because the Fourth Amendment principles he allegedly violated were not clearly established at the time of his actions.
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505 So. 2d 489·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1987-03-18
·cited 23×
Southern Alliance Corporation appealed the dismissal of its complaint against the City of Winter Haven and its employees for alleged constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, as well as tortious interference. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the § 1
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799 F.2d 183·
5th Cir.·
1986-09-08
·cited 23×
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state agencies and officials sued in their official capacities in federal court, and the proper disposition for such a dismissal is for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, not on the merits.
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795 F.2d 1344·
7th Cir.·
1986-07-15
·cited 23×
A private party's execution of a state court's ex parte order authorizing property repossession constitutes state action for purposes of a § 1983 claim, and Wisconsin's replevin statute, which allows for ex parte orders secured by a bond and provides for a prompt post-deprivation
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The district court erred in dismissing the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims under § 1983, as the Parratt analysis is inapplicable to Fourth Amendment claims and due process claims challenging established policies, and in dismissing supervisory officials when liability was a
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The dissenting judge argues that the majority erred in excusing deficient pleadings and the failure to seek leave to amend, asserting that civil rights claims require specific factual allegations tying defendants to the alleged deprivations.
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The court held that while some counts of the complaint were too broad and conclusory to provide adequate notice, others, particularly those alleging specific instances of discriminatory discipline and sexual harassment, were sufficiently specific to proceed. The court vacated the
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770 F.2d 896·
10th Cir.·
1985-08-19
·cited 23×
The court held that plaintiffs failed to present specific evidence of a policy for summary judgment, but that the trial court erred in directing a verdict on the First Amendment claim due to sufficient circumstantial evidence of official knowledge and participation.
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731 F.2d 655·
10th Cir.·
1984-03-30
·cited 23×
The court held that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the district court did not err in denying attorney's fees to the defendants.
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714 F.2d 813·
8th Cir.·
1983-08-16
·cited 23×
A city ordinance prohibiting door-to-door canvassing after 6:00 p.m. is not narrowly tailored to serve legitimate governmental objectives and thus violates the First Amendment rights of organizations like ACORN.
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The court held that a hospital employee guidebook can create a property interest in continued employment, and that procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to rebut charges, but the specific application varies by individual circumstances.
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698 F.2d 286·
6th Cir.·
1983-01-26
·cited 23×
The court held that the constitutional right of access to the courts does not require payment of witness fees for indigent litigants, nor does 28 U.S.C. § 1915 mandate such payment.
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The court held that a private corporation cannot be held liable under § 1983 based solely on respondeat superior; liability requires proof of an impermissible policy. The court also found that erroneous jury instructions regarding municipal liability and strip search reasonablene
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689 F.2d 281·
1st Cir.·
1982-09-22
·cited 23×
The court held that Freda Smith lacked standing to sue as next friend for LSS residents, but the Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Center (DDAC) did have standing to assert its First Amendment organizational rights regarding communication with residents. The case is remanded fo
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The court held that the sheriff's liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful incarceration by subordinates requires personal involvement or a causal connection, not mere vicarious liability. Sheriff's liability under Texas common law for deputies' acts requires further factual
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620 F.2d 1201·
7th Cir.·
1980-04-28
·cited 23×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a Fourth Amendment claim due to a lack of demonstrated expectation of privacy and that procedural due process was satisfied by the notices provided.
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615 F.2d 628·
5th Cir.·
1980-04-14
·cited 23×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the suit and awarding attorney's fees for failure to disclose union membership lists, as such disclosure could infringe on First Amendment rights.
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The court held that a pro se prisoner's claims that the parole board's refusal to allow access to files and consideration of the offense violated due process and double jeopardy were properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
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589 F.2d 438·
9th Cir.·
1978-12-13
·cited 23×
The court held that the defendant officials were entitled to qualified executive immunity and absolute judicial immunity, respectively, and that the plaintiff failed to present material facts creating a genuine issue for trial.
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A direct cause of action exists against municipalities to recover damages for a taking of private property for public use without just compensation, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the controversy over the taking is resolved.
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545 F.2d 980·
5th Cir.·
1977-01-24
·cited 23×
A Section 1983 action instituted by a plaintiff prior to death survives in favor of the estate as a matter of federal common law, even if state law would cause abatement.
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The court held that the segregation of inmates in a special housing unit did not violate their Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment rights, and the procedures used satisfied due process requirements.
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The Due Process Clause requires that a decision to terminate a Section 8 housing voucher be supported by 'some evidence,' and the evidence presented here met that standard.
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127 F.3d 993·
11th Cir.·
1997-11-06
·cited 22×
The dissenting judge would hold that the Medicaid statute and its implementing regulation confer an enforceable right to transportation, actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This right exists whether analyzed under the established Wilder test or the majority's newly articulated fra
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The court held that the officer's use of deadly force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, even if the suspect was surrounded, because the suspect posed a significant threat of serious physical harm to others.
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940 F.2d 243·
7th Cir.·
1991-08-09
·cited 22×
A prison regulation granting officials discretion to act for any reason except discipline does not create a liberty or property interest for due process purposes. Liberty and property interests depend on substantive rules governing entitlements, not merely on rules addressing mot
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State prisoners working in prison industries are not employees under the FLSA, and federal courts lack jurisdiction over state law claims against the state due to the Eleventh Amendment.
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927 F.2d 1473·
9th Cir.·
1991-03-12
·cited 22×
The court held that the sheriff is not the final policymaker for deputy training under Washington law, and the jury instructions on municipal liability did not meet the deliberate indifference standard required by Canton v. Harris.
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Jailers are entitled to qualified immunity if their preventive measures against inmate suicide, while perhaps negligent, were not deliberately indifferent to a known risk.
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The court held that Rule 11 sanctions can be imposed after a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2), and that the attorneys violated Rule 11 by failing to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts and law, and by filing the complaint for an improper purpose.
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The court held that while the Due Process Clause imposes an affirmative duty of care on the state for individuals in its custody, the evidence was insufficient to establish that Baltimore County's failure to train its officers in suicide prevention was the proximate cause of the