3,807 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 3,026 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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The court held that summary judgment was improperly granted because a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether prison officials had knowledge of the risk of harm to the inmate and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent it.
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The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support claims of sex discrimination and substantive due process violations against the defendants, and that judicial intervention in academic tenure decisions is generally inappropriate.
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851 F.2d 752·
5th Cir.·
1988-08-10
·cited 30×
A public official is entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer would have believed their actions met constitutional standards, and the law was not clearly established at the time of the action. A public employer cannot fire an employee for political activity if it do
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Prosecutors Wade and Isenberg are entitled to absolute immunity for actions within the judicial phase of prosecution, and Geter's defamation claim does not implicate a constitutional right. Officer Kuhn is not entitled to immunity if he procured false identification by unlawful m
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The court held that a letter designating the record on appeal, sent within the time limit, satisfied the notice of appeal requirement, and that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the plaintiff's procedural due process claim.
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838 F.2d 1483·
7th Cir.·
1988-01-27
·cited 30×
The court held that the district court had jurisdiction to enforce judgments against a municipality and its insurer under supplementary and pendent jurisdiction, and that Illinois' § 9-102 makes a local public entity directly liable for employee tort judgments.
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The court held that federal common law of preclusion does not require application of state claim preclusion rules to unreviewed state administrative decisions in Section 1983 suits.
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A corporation's contract to supply services to the state does not create a constitutionally protected property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, even if the contract contains provisions for termination only 'for cause'.
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820 F.2d 923·
8th Cir.·
1987-06-03
·cited 30×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the defendants did not violate any affirmative duties under Arkansas law, no special relationship existed, the plaintiff did not suffer a loss of a constitutionally protected interest, and th
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818 F.2d 513·
6th Cir.·
1987-05-06
·cited 30×
The court held that the plaintiff's complaint stated a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
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805 F.2d 558·
5th Cir.·
1986-12-09
·cited 30×
An arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity when there is no clearly established constitutional duty to discover a prisoner's suicidal tendencies or prevent their suicide.
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798 F.2d 607·
2d Cir.·
1986-08-19
·cited 30×
The court held that Connecticut's statute, as interpreted by its state supreme court, does not unequivocally waive the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court.
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The court held that a prior state court decision denying unemployment benefits based on 'just cause' for discharge does not collaterally estop a subsequent federal discrimination claim, as the issues are not identical. The court also reversed a finding of retaliatory discharge du
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The court should reverse the district court's dismissal of the First Amendment claims, as the distinction between government servants and independent contractors is irrelevant to First Amendment protections against compelled political association and expression. The state's inter
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789 F.2d 554·
7th Cir.·
1986-04-24
·cited 30×
The district court erred in dismissing the federal civil rights suit under the Younger doctrine because there were no pending state court proceedings in which the plaintiff could vindicate his rights.
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785 F.2d 781·
9th Cir.·
1986-03-25
·cited 30×
The court held that res judicata barred claims arising from conduct prior to the state court judgment, but not claims arising from subsequent conduct.
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Public officials are absolutely immune from defamation claims for statements made within the scope of their duties, and state agencies are immune from § 1983 actions unless immunity is waived.
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781 F.2d 155·
9th Cir.·
1985-12-10
·cited 30×
Probation officers preparing presentencing reports are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from personal damage actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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The plaintiff prisoner's fear of assault due to unlocked cells does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.
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775 F.2d 1551·
11th Cir.·
1985-11-15
·cited 30×
Denial of qualified immunity is an appealable collateral order, and the complaint failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the alleged injuries did not violate clearly established federal rights.
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The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that four defendants were aware of a strong likelihood of an attack on the plaintiff, but that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the fifth defendant, Steele, had such knowledge. The court
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The jury's special verdict answers were irreconcilably contradictory, requiring reversal of the judgment and a new trial.
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Transfers of property by a prisoner in custody to a law enforcement officer violate public policy and are void. The district court abused its discretion in denying sanctions for discovery violations.
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The majority opinion holds that the dismissal of road-graders is not excepted from the Elrod-Branti rule as a matter of law due to insufficient evidence to raise a factual issue.
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764 F.2d 1466·
11th Cir.·
1985-07-09
·cited 30×
The court held that it had jurisdiction to review the interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and exercised pendent jurisdiction over related summary judgment issues. The grant of partial summary judgment and dissolution of a preliminary restraint were vacated, while the
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762 F.2d 815·
9th Cir.·
1985-06-10
·cited 30×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing defendants because the plaintiff's civil rights action was not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
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The court affirmed the jury's award of damages, holding that the exclusion of documents was not an abuse of discretion, the plaintiff's refusal to take other job assignments did not constitute a failure to mitigate damages as a matter of law, the compensatory damages award was no
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A prisoner's failure to move for a directed verdict on certain claims at trial precludes him from raising the sufficiency of the evidence for those claims on appeal, and jury verdicts will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.
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729 F.2d 903·
2d Cir.·
1984-02-28
·cited 30×
The court held that a conflict of interest arising from joint representation of a police officer and the municipality by the same county attorney prejudiced the officer, requiring a new trial. It also held that federal claims against Angela Pfeiffer were insubstantial, divesting
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Assuming probable cause for arrest, a constable's financial incentive under a fee system does not violate constitutional rights, as arrest is executive action not requiring judicial impartiality.
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The court held that summary judgment was improperly granted for Dixon, Kelley, and Latham, as genuine issues of material fact existed regarding state action and qualified immunity. However, Floyd, the clerk, was entitled to absolute judicial immunity.
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719 F.2d 1317·
7th Cir.·
1983-09-26
·cited 30×
The court held that the jury's finding that the plaintiff's article was a substantial motivating factor in his termination was supported by substantial evidence, and that the admission of certain statements by an employment analyst was proper.
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713 F.2d 292·
7th Cir.·
1983-07-22
·cited 30×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the county's motion to modify the consent decree to allow double-bunking and in ordering the release of low-bond pretrial detainees to comply with the population cap.
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The court held that a prison guard's unauthorized beating of an inmate can violate the Eighth Amendment if it involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and that a prisoner's claim must allege intent to harm, excessive force, and resulting severe pain or lasting inju
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The court held that an inmate who obtained a temporary restraining order preventing his transfer to a dangerous prison, and whose case later became moot due to parole, was a prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
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The court held that while the trial court erred in failing to balance the probative value against the prejudicial effect of admitting prior convictions for impeachment, the error was harmless given other impeachment evidence. The court also found no abuse of discretion in excludi
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681 F.2d 965·
5th Cir.·
1982-08-02
·cited 30×
The court held that school policies regulating literature distribution (KIA and KIB) were unconstitutional both facially and as applied due to vagueness and overbreadth, but policies regulating visitors (KM and GBRBB) were not facially unconstitutional.
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670 F.2d 507·
5th Cir.·
1982-03-15
·cited 30×
The court held that a physician's medical staff privileges, when established by contract and hospital by-laws, constitute a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, requiring procedural due process before termination.
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672 F.2d 990·
1st Cir.·
1982-03-05
·cited 30×
The federal 'essential person' provision in the SSI statute was intended to ensure the federal government, not the state, covers the cost of 'essential person' allowances for recipients who received them in 1973, and does not implicitly require states to pass through these federa
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The court held that defendants' objections regarding potential double recovery were not properly preserved for appeal because they failed to make specific objections to the jury instructions or verdict forms as required by Rule 51.
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660 F.2d 111·
4th Cir.·
1981-10-02
·cited 30×
Summary judgment for the county and its boards was improper because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether their policies or customs, or lack thereof, caused the plaintiff's constitutional deprivation.
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641 F.2d 488·
7th Cir.·
1981-02-19
·cited 30×
The court held that the conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees, specifically prolonged periods in small cells without sufficient out-of-cell time, amounted to punishment and violated their due process rights. The court also found certain instances of tear gas use uncons
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The court held that the district court correctly applied the 'special efforts' standard under the UMT Act, but erred in limiting the Section 504 claims to review of the administrative record, remanding for further consideration of those claims.
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630 F.2d 674·
9th Cir.·
1980-09-24
·cited 30×
The court held that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts, and that attorney fees should be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, regardless of the source of counsel's funding.
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The court held that a village is a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 following Monell, and that while a justice has absolute immunity for damages, other officials have only qualified immunity, making dismissal premature if bad faith is alleged.
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The court held that black physicians seeking to represent a class have standing, and their claims were improperly dismissed, but other plaintiffs and claims were correctly dismissed. The court also found that the Mississippi State Medical Association is the only proper defendant
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The court held that the § 1983 claim was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel, and that federal habeas corpus jurisdiction does not extend to state child custody disputes.
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575 F.2d 321·
1st Cir.·
1978-05-10
·cited 30×
The court held that an employee's attorney's letters demanding reinstatement, without seeking monetary damages, did not toll the statute of limitations under Puerto Rico law for a § 1983 claim.