1,015 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 1,841 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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The panel's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) to bar prisoner lawsuits for mental or emotional injury suffered during prior, unrelated arrests is an unjustified expansion of the statute. This interpretation conflicts with the PLRA's purpose, legislative history, and prior ci
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The court found that the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to establish state action by Carlton Fields, a private entity, and therefore could not proceed with their Section 1983 claim against them. Motions related to Partyka were denied as moot due to a settlement.
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The court held that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to state a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment against individual defendants and that ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims were not duplicative. Therefore, the motions to dismiss were denied.
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The court held that the City Manager's employment agreement, as amended, allowed termination without cause, thus precluding a procedural due process claim. The court also declined supplemental jurisdiction over state law contract claims.
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The Sheriff, not being personally involved in the decision to withhold medical treatment, is entitled to qualified immunity. Private prison guards are not entitled to qualified immunity under Richardson v. McKnight.
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988 F. Supp. 1450·
S.D. Fla.·
1997-10-08
·cited 2×
The court held that the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct did not violate clearly established constitutional law.
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941 F. Supp. 1129·
N.D. Fla.·
1996-08-07
·cited 2×
The court held that the plaintiff has standing and the case is ripe for review, as the uncertainty surrounding the applicability of Chapter 154 of the Act to his habeas petition creates immediate hardship and a dilemma regarding compliance.
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The court held that the City is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the officials who terminated the plaintiff's employment did not possess final policy-making authority. Therefore, their actions could not be attributed to the City as official policy.
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A police department is not a 'person' amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if it is an integral part of the city government and not a separate legal entity.
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672 So. 2d 874·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1996-04-26
·cited 2×
Adams and Chow challenged Florida's vehicular impact fee statute as unconstitutional and sought attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Florida Supreme Court granted them relief under the state declaratory judgment statute but expressly declined to address § 1983 and implicit
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Andrea James, a tenant with four dependent children, sued the City of St. Petersburg after her water service was terminated without notice when the previous owner requested disconnection, unaware that James occupied the property. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's
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The court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action because a private citizen has no judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another, and alternatively, that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as he alleg
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999 F.2d 353·
8th Cir.·
1993-07-19
·cited 2×
The court held that the use of a stun gun did not violate the Eighth Amendment because the force was applied in a good-faith effort to restore discipline, not sadistically to cause harm.
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The court held that prison officials are not entitled to qualified immunity when they arbitrarily delay an inmate's release from administrative segregation after all criteria for release have been met and approved, as this violates clearly established law.
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995 F.2d 870·
8th Cir.·
1993-06-16
·cited 2×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, thus affirming the grant of summary judgment.
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The court held that the interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip regarding due process in punitive damages review is flexible and case-specific, not requiring states to adopt Alabama's exact procedures.
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The court held that a National Guard member's claim for reinstatement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is nonjusticiable, as it unduly interferes with military decision-making and discipline.
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Utah school districts are not arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes and are therefore not immune from suits in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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993 F.2d 374·
4th Cir.·
1993-05-07
·cited 2×
The court held that the total exclusion of plaintiff's expert witnesses was an abuse of discretion, and that the introduction of evidence regarding the arrestee's guilt and prior drug use was improper.
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The court held that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the arresting officers' use of excessive force, precluding summary judgment based on qualified immunity for them, but that the supervisor (Chief Boyett) was entitled to qualified immunity as there was no affirmat
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992 F.2d 147·
8th Cir.·
1993-04-22
·cited 2×
The court held that negligence in delaying a pretrial detainee's medication refill is insufficient to support a § 1983 claim, and a state statute without mandatory language does not create a protectable liberty interest against transfer.
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Summary judgment on federal claims is affirmed as no constitutional violation occurred, but summary judgment on state law claims is reversed and remanded due to genuine issues of material fact regarding the suicide affirmative defense.
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982 F.2d 931·
5th Cir.·
1993-02-11
·cited 2×
The court held that a termination based on perceived disloyalty or incompatibility, without evidence of political motivation, does not violate the First Amendment, and thus summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate.
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The court held that for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, the "judgment finally obtained" must include pre-offer costs and attorney's fees when comparing it to the offer of judgment, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing an amended attorn
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The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment, holding that prison officials did not violate the inmate's constitutional rights by restricting his legal mail, denying his wife's in-person testimony, or limiting his contact with his attorney under the circumstances.
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985 F.2d 707·
3d Cir.·
1993-01-29
·cited 2×
The court held that the school bus driver, bus company president, and bus company were not liable under § 1983 because they were independent contractors and not state actors. The superintendent and school district were also not liable for failing to exhibit the 'deliberate indiff
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The court held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to amend the complaint or in granting summary judgment for the defendants, affirming the lower court's decision.
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984 F.2d 890·
8th Cir.·
1992-12-14
·cited 2×
A terminated inmate law clerk lacks standing to assert a client's right of access to the courts when the client can perceive and address the loss of assistance themselves.
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980 F.2d 850·
2d Cir.·
1992-11-27
·cited 2×
A dismissal pursuant to Connecticut's accelerated pretrial rehabilitation program is not a termination in favor of the accused for purposes of a section 1983 suit, and such a program's disposition does not permit claims for false imprisonment or false arrest.
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979 F.2d 661·
8th Cir.·
1992-11-11
·cited 2×
The court held that a zero award for pain and suffering damages was shocking and unreasonable given the facts.
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978 F.2d 446·
8th Cir.·
1992-10-30
·cited 2×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint and that the inmate's claims regarding inadequate recreation, unsanitary conditions, contaminated food, and denial of educational opportunities did not violate the Eighth o
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The dissent argues that qualified immunity, not absolute judicial immunity, is the appropriate standard for state medical licensing boards under Section 1983.
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Prosecutors are not absolutely immune from suit for failing to disclose exculpatory evidence discovered after conviction and while direct appeals were pending, as this conduct falls outside the scope of their prosecutorial functions.
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The court held that the majority erred in reversing the preliminary injunction based on a de novo review of the facts and blurring the distinction between preliminary and permanent injunctions.
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The court held that the summary judgment record was insufficient to determine as a matter of law whether a constitutional right was violated or if the official's actions were objectively reasonable.
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The court held that the defendants did not violate the Constitution by continuing to detain the plaintiff because there was no evidence they knew of the writ of habeas corpus or intended to violate his rights, and state law violations are not actionable under § 1983.
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The court held that federal defendants did not act under color of state law and thus could not be liable for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and that the state defendant also could not be liable as plaintiffs were not prevailing parties.
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967 F.2d 181·
5th Cir.·
1992-08-05
·cited 2×
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict against the sheriff and county for violating the plaintiff's due process rights.
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972 F.2d 274·
9th Cir.·
1992-08-05
·cited 2×
The court held that the district court erred in denying attorneys fees solely on the lack of a causal link to the merits decision, as the pendency of the § 1983 action itself may have served as a catalyst for the Board's non-enforcement agreement.
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968 F.2d 453·
5th Cir.·
1992-08-03
·cited 2×
The Tax Injunction Act bars federal district courts from entertaining claims challenging state tax systems when a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy exists in state courts.
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The court held that the jury's verdict for the plaintiff on her § 1983 claim was supported by sufficient evidence of a pattern or practice of gender discrimination within the NYPD, and that the plaintiff's Title VII claim should also succeed.
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969 F.2d 228·
6th Cir.·
1992-07-17
·cited 2×
Incarcerated juveniles possess a constitutional right of access to the courts, which necessitates state provision of attorney access for claims related to their incarceration and constitutional rights, but not for purely state law matters.
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967 F.2d 1418·
9th Cir.·
1992-06-26
·cited 2×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by imposing Rule 11 sanctions on defense counsel, vacating the order.
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The court held that Deputy Lolling's due process claims were barred because his suspension was a random and unauthorized act for which the state provided adequate post-deprivation remedies, and his retaliation claim was barred by res judicata as he had a full and fair opportunity
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972 F.2d 300·
10th Cir.·
1992-06-19
·cited 2×
Parole board members are entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken in their official duties, but parole officers are entitled only to qualified immunity for such actions.
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The court held that the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) is not a 'person' under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but its official, Reyes, can be sued in his individual capacity for violating a clearly established right to travel. The judgment against the CNMI was reversed, w
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965 F.2d 1262·
3d Cir.·
1992-06-03
·cited 2×
The court held that Pennsylvania Bar Admission Rule 203(a)(2)(ii) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it is rationally related to Pennsylvania's legitimate interest in securing mutual treatment for its attorneys seeking admission to other states' bars.
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The court held that the state's statute is constitutionally infirm for failing to provide for the release of voluntarily admitted patients upon request, but reversed this finding due to lack of a case or controversy. It affirmed that the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard of pr
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A district court's dismissal of a complaint for repeated and deliberate defiance of court orders is an appropriate sanction, and appellate courts must give deference to the district court's exercise of discretion.
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The court held that the petition for a writ of mandamus was moot due to subsequent events, including the Supreme Court's ruling and the expiration of the temporary restraining order.