1,015 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 1,841 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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The court held that a high-speed police pursuit of a traffic offender does not constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, nor does it violate the Fourteenth or Eighth Amendments. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the defendants.
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The court held that a municipality's adherence to a state judge's illegal bail schedule, even if blatantly illegal, does not constitute a municipal policy for Monell liability purposes.
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A § 1983 action will not lie against police supervisory officers for failure to prevent misconduct absent a showing of direct responsibility.
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The court held that intercepting and disclosing a prison inmate's telephone conversation without consent, even using prison equipment, violates federal and state wiretapping statutes, and that a good faith belief that the interception was legal does not constitute a defense witho
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599 F.2d 863·
8th Cir.·
1979-06-11
·cited 17×
The court held that a police officer testifying in a judicial proceeding is not acting under color of law and that witnesses are absolutely immune from civil suits for their testimony, even if perjured.
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The court held that municipalities can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations implementing official policy, and vacated a back pay award for reconsideration in light of Monell.
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The court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim against the county under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that the defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity due to insufficient factual allegations.
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A death-row inmate filed a § 1983 lawsuit two days before his scheduled execution, challenging lethal injection as cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdict
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The Third District Court of Appeal reversed a damages judgment against the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles and Trooper Jacqueline Gipson for false arrest and civil rights violations arising from an allegedly improper DUI arrest. The court held that the Dep
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The court held that the complaint sufficiently pleaded a violation of a clearly established constitutional right to survive a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity.
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The court held that the municipality and police chief were not liable under § 1983 for the detainee's suicide, as their actions did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference, and a minor child cannot assert a claim for loss of familial association when the state action was
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948 F.2d 1380·
3d Cir.·
1991-11-07
·cited 16×
The court held that the plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief regarding visitation policies was not moot, and the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act's "reasonable efforts" clause creates enforceable rights, though a specific minimum visitation period was not establish
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The court held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for the Personnel Board and the County, and that its findings regarding the Sheriff's promotion decisions were not clearly erroneous.
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A local governmental entity cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a custom of failing to investigate or train unless there is a widespread pattern of misconduct and the entity had notice, which was not shown here.
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The court held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the denial of summary judgment because the resolution of the qualified immunity defense turned on disputed issues of fact.
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A county can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the actions of its sheriff if the sheriff is the final policymaker for law enforcement and abuses that authority, even without proof of an official county policy or custom.
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The court held that a prisoner's claims of excessive force and denial of medical treatment lacked an arguable legal basis, even though the magistrate improperly made credibility determinations.
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896 F.2d 1347·
11th Cir.·
1990-03-22
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court erred in its calculation of damages for a temporary regulatory taking, and awarded a specific amount based on the market rate return on the lost development value.
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A municipality can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs, even if medical care is subcontracted, if the failure to supervise or the ratification of unconstitutional acts amounts to an official policy or custom.
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878 F.2d 351·
10th Cir.·
1989-07-07
·cited 16×
The court held that while district courts have broad discretion to impose restrictions on vexatious litigants, such restrictions must be accompanied by clear guidelines for obtaining permission to file and the litigant must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard.
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The court held that a new trial should be granted on the First Amendment claim, and that the denial of judgment n.o.v. on the Eighth Amendment claim should be reversed.
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Judges and prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for damages for acts intimately connected with the judicial and parole-granting processes, and the plaintiff failed to state a claim for injunctive relief.
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The court held that the Secretary of Education was not liable for the janitor's termination because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a causal link between the Secretary's actions and the alleged harm. The court affirmed the jury's verdict for the clerical employees.
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A jury could find that the use of a nightstick on a handcuffed, non-resisting arrestee constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, even without proof of serious injury.
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The acts of a municipal judge in discharging a court clerk are attributable to the City for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability, as the judge possesses final policymaking authority in employment matters concerning court clerks under state law.
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The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as the plaintiff's claims were either properly exhausted or reasonably related to her EEOC charge, and the section 1983 claim did not require such exhaus
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The City of Dallas cannot be held liable under the Sherman Act or section 1983 for issuing notices of zoning violations because these notices lacked legal finality and did not constitute a final determination causing concrete injury.
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The court held that the County's ratification of its subordinates' actions in acquiring improper deeds and incorporating roads without valid rights-of-way constituted reckless disregard for plaintiffs' constitutional rights, making the County liable under § 1983. The court also h
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The court held that the plaintiff raised genuine issues of material fact regarding retaliation for exercising his right of access to the courts, warranting reversal of summary judgment on that claim.
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The court held that the law requiring protection of personal security for inmates was clearly established at the time of the inmate's death, thus denying qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage.
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830 F.2d 1487·
8th Cir.·
1987-10-08
·cited 16×
The court held that the South Dakota attachment statute, as applied, violated clearly established due process rights, and therefore the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.
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829 F.2d 1370·
6th Cir.·
1987-09-29
·cited 16×
The court held that by failing to object to the magistrate's recommendation that individual plaintiffs not be liable for attorney fees, the defendant waived that argument on appeal. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to assess at
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The court held that the plaintiffs' claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was too remote a consequence of the defendants' actions to establish liability, as the Lents were members of the general public and not in a special relationship with the county officials.
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Summary judgment for the school district and supervisors was proper, but summary judgment for the bus driver was not, as genuine issues of material fact exist regarding his liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for callous indifference.
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813 F.2d 782·
6th Cir.·
1987-03-13
·cited 16×
The court held that the officers' use of deadly force did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment because the decedent was not physically restrained, and the use of firearms was not the proximate cause of his death.
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The court held that merely filing a state court action, even if retaliatory, does not constitute "under color of state law" for a Section 1983 claim, and thus the plaintiff failed to state a claim for injunctive relief.
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794 F.2d 279·
7th Cir.·
1986-06-23
·cited 16×
The court affirmed the jury's verdict, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support findings of political retaliation, improper evidentiary rulings did not deny a fair trial, and damages were properly calculated.
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The court held that the ordinance is facially and substantially overbroad, violating the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech, and thus is unconstitutional.
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789 F.2d 463·
7th Cir.·
1986-04-16
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing defendants because the plaintiff's section 1983 action was not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
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The court held that prison officials are not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for placing inmates in protective custody without due process because the law regarding prisoners' procedural rights was not clearly established at the time of the conduct.
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A Texas county is liable for its Treasurer's unconstitutional firing of an employee, but reinstatement is not appropriate when a new Treasurer with appointment power has been elected; attorney fees were improperly calculated.
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The court held that principles of comity and the Tax Injunction Act bar federal court review of state tax assessment disputes when adequate state remedies exist. The taxpayer objection procedure in Illinois is considered such a remedy.
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767 F.2d 252·
5th Cir.·
1985-08-08
·cited 16×
The court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a pro se litigant's untimely jury trial demand based on ignorance of procedural rules, and that the harmless error analysis could not be applied without resolving the liberty interest issue.
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762 F.2d 635·
8th Cir.·
1985-05-16
·cited 16×
The court held that the evidence presented was sufficient to allow a jury to find that Dewey Tindle was deliberately indifferent to a pervasive risk of harm to inmate Porm, but not that Superintendent Carl White was deliberately indifferent.
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Federal courts should not abstain from hearing a § 1983 claim challenging state attachment procedures when state remedies are inadequate or uncertain.
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The court held that plaintiffs' second amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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The court affirmed the district court's rulings, finding no abuse of discretion in excluding expert testimony, granting directed verdicts on negligence claims, denying a new trial for inadequate damages, and dismissing counterclaims.
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The majority opinion creates a circuit split by holding that in civil cases, the admission of prior felony convictions for impeachment of any witness is mandatory, outside the discretion of Rule 403.
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The court held that jury verdicts were not inconsistent and that the jury instruction regarding the burden of proof for defenses was not erroneous.
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724 F.2d 484·
5th Cir.·
1984-02-06
·cited 16×
The court held that a post-judgment motion for attorney's fees is not a Rule 59(e) motion, thus not triggering the need for a new notice of appeal. The court also held that a directed verdict was inappropriate where credibility determinations were necessary.