1,015 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 1,841 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
-
The court held that a union member's challenge to a non-Communist affidavit requirement for candidacy, even if framed as a free speech issue, falls under Title IV of the LMRDA and must be pursued through the Secretary of Labor, not a private suit under Title I. Furthermore, the u
-
Prison regulations must not unreasonably invade a prisoner's access to the courts without persuasive governmental justification.
-
The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.
-
A 30-day school suspension, in addition to an initial 10-day suspension, requires the "rudiments of an adversary hearing" to satisfy due process. An informal meeting to explain a decision already made is insufficient.
-
The court held that conclusory assertions of discrimination, unsupported by specific facts, are insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment when faced with an affidavit denying such claims.
-
323 F.2d 333·
5th Cir.·
1963-07-12
·cited 28×
The court granted an injunction pending appeal regarding desegregation efforts.
-
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony and did not err in granting summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
-
883 F.2d 842·
10th Cir.·
1989-10-31
·cited 27×
The court held that the plaintiff's termination for insubordination, after refusing to answer questions in an internal investigation without an attorney, did not violate his First Amendment rights, but the punitive damages against the Chief of Police were reversed.
-
The court affirmed the denial of the JNOV motion, the denial of summary judgment, and the jury verdict, finding that the defendants waived sufficiency of evidence arguments by failing to move for a directed verdict. The court also affirmed the attorneys' fees award, finding no ab
-
849 F.2d 863·
4th Cir.·
1988-06-17
·cited 27×
The court held that the use of a loaded shotgun through a car windshield, causing fear, constituted an unreasonable use of force violating the Fourth Amendment, entitling the victim to damages.
-
The court held that the plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate a constitutional violation under section 1983, as the teacher's actions did not rise to the level of excessive force or abuse of power, and the injuries were unexpected and unintended.
-
The court held that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the officers' seizure of the plaintiff's automobile violated his Fourth Amendment rights and whether such conduct was within the scope of qualified immunity, thus affirming the denial of the officers' mot
-
A state prisoner's civil rights action challenging the deprivation of good time credits, which directly impacts the duration of confinement, must be brought as a habeas corpus petition requiring exhaustion of state remedies, even if seeking damages.
-
763 F.2d 282·
7th Cir.·
1985-05-22
·cited 27×
The court held that a district court's grant of relief under Rule 60(b)(6) to revive a lost right to appeal was improper when the sole asserted reason was the failure to receive notice of the judgment's entry, and the appellant demonstrated insufficient diligence.
-
A plaintiff can be considered a "prevailing party" for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if their lawsuit was causally related to the relief obtained and had a minimum basis in law, even if the relief was secured through a settlement in a separate proceeding.
-
The court held that any error in jury instructions regarding Moore's liability for negligence was harmless, and that Chanclor was not entitled to a new trial due to alleged prejudicial questioning.
-
Dontrell Stephens was shot four times by Deputy Sheriff Adams Lin during a traffic stop in September 2013, resulting in permanent paralysis. A jury awarded Stephens $23,148,100 in damages for excessive force. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment dismissing Stephens' Mon
-
The court held that at the time of the deputies' firings, it was not clearly established that they were protected from patronage dismissals, and political considerations are appropriate for determining qualifications for deputy sheriff positions.
-
The court held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits governmental litigants from using peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on race in civil cases, and that the City's refusal to justify its strikes required vacating the judgment for a Batson hearing.
-
A federal court must stay a prisoner's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim challenging the duration of confinement, rather than dismiss it, to allow exhaustion of state remedies via habeas corpus.
-
The court held that Gwin's equal protection claims challenging the Board's parole procedures and denial of compassionate leave are properly brought under section 1983 and do not require exhaustion of state remedies, reversing the district court's dismissal of these claims.
-
849 F.2d 1117·
8th Cir.·
1988-06-21
·cited 26×
Government officials are not entitled to qualified immunity if their conduct violates clearly established constitutional rights, even if the specific factual scenario is not identical to prior precedent.
-
Texas child protective service workers are entitled to qualified immunity for their decision to remove children from a home without a prior court order, as their actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances and did not violate clearly established law.
-
845 F.2d 763·
8th Cir.·
1988-04-27
·cited 26×
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the jury's verdict awarding the plaintiff $10,000 on his section 1983 claim, finding sufficient evidence that prison officials acted with reckless disregard of the plaintiff's right to protection from sexual assault. The court also affirmed the award o
-
Qualified immunity does not shield defendants from suit for gross negligence and recklessness regarding patient safety.
-
817 F.2d 891·
1st Cir.·
1987-04-24
·cited 26×
The dissenting judge disagrees with the majority's characterization of the appellee's job functions as policy-making, confidential, or official communicative tasks, and questions the interlocutory appellate jurisdiction.
-
789 F.2d 1328·
9th Cir.·
1986-07-03
·cited 26×
The court held that an order denying a request for counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is not immediately appealable, but the district court should have granted leave to amend the complaint to add a defendant and conduct discovery.
-
A state that waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity is a "person" suable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but liability requires proof of a state policy or custom causing the deprivation, not just respondeat superior.
-
The court held that the district court properly denied judgment n.o.v. for three defendants but erred in granting directed verdicts for four supervisory officials, requiring a new trial for those officials.
-
The Attorney General is absolutely immune from damages liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when acting in a quasi-judicial capacity to review state contracts for legality and form. Therefore, the district court's award of damages and attorney fees against the Attorney General is rev
-
A judge is absolutely immune from liability for judicial acts performed within their jurisdiction, even if those acts are malicious or procedurally flawed. Claims for injunctive and declaratory relief require a live case or controversy, which is absent when the plaintiff has alre
-
766 F.2d 1391·
10th Cir.·
1985-06-26
·cited 26×
The court held that plaintiffs must prove actual damages resulting from the deprivation of their First Amendment rights, and absent such proof, they are entitled to nominal damages only.
-
763 F.2d 757·
6th Cir.·
1985-05-22
·cited 26×
Orders denying motions for appointment of counsel in Title VII and § 1983 actions are not immediately appealable "final decisions" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
-
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the inmates' civil rights action, finding that their beliefs may be religious in nature and thus protected by the First Amendment, and that the censorship of their mail and denial of religious practice opportunities requi
-
747 F.2d 55·
1st Cir.·
1984-11-02
·cited 26×
The court held that the plaintiff's claims constitute a nonjusticiable military controversy because the balance of factors, particularly interference with military function and the exercise of military expertise, weighs against judicial review.
-
The court held that the trial court erred in finding that the use of mace in the Adjustment Center violated constitutional rights, as the evidence showed it was used reasonably to maintain discipline and safety after inmates refused lawful orders.
-
740 F.2d 447·
6th Cir.·
1984-08-02
·cited 26×
The court held that the hospital's restriction of a physician's privileges was not "state action" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as there was insufficient nexus between the state and the hospital's decision, which was based on professional medical judgments.
-
The court held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a particularized need for the state grand jury materials, and therefore, disclosure was not warranted.
-
722 F.2d 714·
11th Cir.·
1984-01-12
·cited 26×
A public employee's grievance is protected by the First Amendment only if it relates to a matter of public concern, not merely personal interest.
-
The court held that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a county policy or custom of mistreating inmates who challenged their convictions, thus the county could not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
-
720 F.2d 1416·
5th Cir.·
1983-12-12
·cited 26×
A guilty plea does not preclude a subsequent Section 1983 action for Fourth Amendment violations that were not litigated in the state proceedings, and dismissal of claims regarding warrantless conversation interception was proper.
-
714 F.2d 901·
9th Cir.·
1983-08-30
·cited 26×
The court held that the federal appellees' environmental assessment and programmatic environmental impact statement were insufficient to comply with NEPA for the South Salem spraying program, but that the program did not violate FIFRA's label restrictions.
-
The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that there was insufficient evidence to establish a causal link between the Police Chief's actions and the alleged misconduct, and that the jury instructions, while imperfect, did not constitute plain error.
-
The court held that the termination of employment was neither federal nor state action, as the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the decision was attributable to a governmental policy or rule, despite the agency's governmental funding and the presence of public officials on it
-
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial based on insufficient evidence of personal involvement or presence during the alleged assault, and that denying post-trial motions after the second trial was also proper.
-
The court held that the jury's verdicts of race discrimination for four individual plaintiffs were supported by sufficient evidence and should be reinstated, but the jury's verdict for class-wide discrimination was not supported by adequate evidence and was properly set aside.
-
The court held that the appellant's failure to file a motion for an extension of time to file the notice of appeal rendered any implicit finding of excusable neglect ineffectual.
-
665 F.2d 680·
5th Cir.·
1982-01-11
·cited 26×
The court held that Tomlin's claims were barred by res judicata, Smith's claims required exhaustion of state remedies, and Bradford's claims were properly dismissed due to performance and lack of reputational harm actionable under § 1983.
-
668 F.2d 380·
8th Cir.·
1981-12-30
·cited 26×
The court held that a county ordinance creating procedural rights for employee termination is valid and enforceable under state law, and that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required for section 1983 claims.
-
A judge is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a clerk's actions under respondeat superior, but a clerk's claim for denial of access to courts requires further factual development regarding qualified immunity.