Notable Florida Decisions

A settlement agreement between a local government and a property owner under the Bert Harris Act is not a "development order" subject to Chapter 163 review merely because it may affect future development, as a development order must result from an application for a development permit, not from a negotiated settlement of a property rights dispute. Judicial review of a Bert Harris Act settlement agreement under section 70.001(4)(d)1 is permissible, though not mandatory, because the statutory presumption that such agreements protect the public interest is rebuttable and the Legislature granted ci

A trial court may permit amendment of a pleading to add a punitive damages claim only if there is a reasonable evidentiary basis in the record or proffered by the claimant that, if proven, would support recovery. An individual defendant with no involvement in the alleged misconduct cannot be subject to a punitive damages claim.

A contractual provision limiting attorney's fees to those incurred "in enforcement" of an agreement is not broad enough to encompass fees for litigating the amount of fees to be awarded. Contractual fee provisions must be strictly construed, and "fees for fees" are permitted only in limited contexts when the contract language is sufficiently broad.

A trial court lacks discretion to deny a plaintiff's request to file its first amended complaint before a responsive pleading is served, as a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading and the right to amend once as a matter of course is automatic and absolute.

The trial court's judgment is affirmed because the appellant failed to provide a complete trial transcript, and without it, the appellate court cannot review factual determinations that underlie the lease interpretation dispute.

A trial court does not depart from the essential requirements of law when it denies indigency status where the applicant owns real property and fails to provide sufficient evidence to overcome the statutory presumption of non-indigency despite two hearings.

A trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence controls over written sentencing documents in determining the conditions of probation, and the appellant's probation was properly revoked based on the oral pronouncement requiring electronic monitoring compliance.

The Florida Supreme Court adopted amendments to Florida Probate Rules 5.025, 5.425, and 5.530 to conform the rules to statutory changes enacted in chapter 2026-57, Laws of Florida, effective immediately.

The trial court violated the separation of powers doctrine by applying a mistakenly filed administrative death penalty waiver—directed only at a 2013 indictment—to a 2019 superseding indictment, thereby impermissibly usurping the State Attorney's exclusive prosecutorial discretion to decide whether to seek the death penalty. The decision to charge and prosecute, including whether to seek the death penalty, is an exclusively executive function committed to the State Attorney, and the judiciary has no constitutional or statutory authority to interfere with that discretion. A death penalty waiver

When determining whether a crime qualifies as a sexually violent offense under section 394.912(9)(h) of the Jimmy Ryce Act, the trial court must apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, not the clear and convincing evidence standard. Summary judgment is an appropriate procedure in Jimmy Ryce proceedings and does not violate a respondent's right to a jury trial or due process, provided the trial court applies the correct burden of proof and no genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding whether the crime was committed for sexual gratification.

When a written sentence conflicts with the trial court's oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement controls, except when the oral pronouncement erroneously omits a mandatory sentencing term. A $50 public defender application fee is mandatory under Florida Statutes sections 27.52 and 938.29 and cannot be waived by the trial court.

Venue was proper in Osceola County under section 910.15(2) because the defendant facilitated his crime via email communication made through the Internet, which is deemed made in every county within the state. The availability of an alternative venue under section 910.15(1) does not preclude prosecution under section 910.15(2).

A genuine dispute of material fact exists on the constructive notice element of a slip-and-fall claim when evidence shows a large puddle, a leaking source, water drops in the aisle, and an employee in the immediate vicinity, such that a jury could reasonably infer the dangerous condition existed long enough for the business to have known of it.

A recanting witness's testimony is timely discovered when the witness chooses to recant, regardless of whether the defendant was aware of prior inconsistencies. However, when a prosecution witness recants, the defendant must establish that the recanted testimony is truthful, and the trial court's credibility determinations are reviewed for competent, substantial evidence with great deference to the trial judge's assessment of demeanor. Even if a recanting witness's testimony were credible, newly discovered evidence in a capital penalty phase case must probably yield a less severe sentence, con

The non-unanimous jury recommendation for death under amended Florida law does not violate the Sixth or Eighth Amendments or the Florida Constitution, and the amended statute properly applied prospectively to McDowell's penalty phase without violating ex post facto principles. Victim impact evidence is constitutionally permissible when limited to showing the victim's uniqueness as an individual and the loss to the community, and does not constitute unauthorized non-statutory aggravation. Florida's death penalty scheme, including the elimination of comparative proportionality review and the rem

The postconviction court's credibility determination that the witness Henderson was not coerced into testifying falsely was supported by competent, substantial evidence, and therefore Foster failed to establish Brady and Giglio violations. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the polygraph report, as polygraph evidence is generally inadmissible in Florida, and any error was harmless given that the substance of the report was addressed through an admitted letter.

Graham v. Florida's requirement that juvenile nonhomicide offenders receive a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation does not apply to juvenile homicide offenders; instead, Miller v. Alabama and Jones v. Mississippi control, requiring only that a sentencing court exercise discretion and consider the offender's youth and attendant characteristics before imposing a life-without-parole sentence.

A shareholders' agreement containing a choice-of-law provision and jurisdiction clause meets the statutory requirements of sections 685.101 and 685.102 when the contract involves consideration of at least $250,000 and the claims arise from or are sufficiently related to the agreement, thereby conferring personal jurisdiction over a party to the contract under section 48.193(1)(a)9. A non-party to a contract cannot be bound by the contract's jurisdiction clause based on the plain language of sections 685.101 and 685.102, which require that the person or entity seeking to be bound must be a part

A trial court violates the separation of powers doctrine and departs from the essential requirements of law when it unilaterally applies a mistakenly filed administrative death penalty waiver to charges beyond those to which it was directed, thereby usurping the State Attorney's exclusive prosecutorial discretion to decide whether to seek the death penalty. The decision to charge and prosecute, including whether to seek capital punishment, is an exclusively executive function committed to the State Attorney, and courts have no constitutional or statutory authority to interfere with or enforce

A trial court errs when dismissing a public records complaint by looking beyond the four corners of the complaint to determine whether a statutory exemption applies, as the applicability of an exemption is an affirmative defense that the defendant must establish and cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss without considering evidence.

The Board of Medicine may revoke a physician's license for medical malpractice based on deviation from the standard of care without requiring proof of patient harm. A physician lacks standing to challenge the facial constitutionality of a statute when the record does not demonstrate that the challenged provision adversely affected the disciplinary action taken against him.

A trial court's modification of a parenting plan is affirmed where both parties alleged a substantial and material change in circumstances in their pleadings, binding them to that allegation, and the trial court made specific findings on each statutory best-interest factor. An award of attorney's fees to the non-contempt party for enforcement motions is authorized by statute and does not require application of the fee-shifting provisions that prohibit awards to noncompliant parties.

A facial challenge to Florida's lethal injection protocol is untimely when based on autopsy evidence that has been discoverable for years and was available during prior postconviction litigation. Florida's etomidate-based lethal injection protocol does not violate the Eighth Amendment and has been repeatedly upheld by Florida courts.

A trial court does not abuse its discretion by instructing a jury to specify which portions of witness testimony it wishes to hear during a read-back request, even when the jury has already identified the witnesses by name. Such instruction complies with the requirement to inform the jury that transcripts are unavailable but read-backs are permitted.

Claims against a healthcare provider for administrative failures in managing an answering service by nonmedical staff constitute ordinary negligence, not medical malpractice, and do not require compliance with Florida's Medical Malpractice Act presuit notice requirements under section 766.104.

A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the legal sufficiency of evidence, not its weight, and an appellate court cannot reweigh evidence or accept a party's preferred version of the facts.

Trial courts have discretionary authority under section 61.075 to award prejudgment interest as a remedy to achieve equity in distributing marital property, but such awards are not automatic entitlements and must be supported by facts or circumstances justifying the award. The statute's express authorization of remedies "available to a court to do equity between the parties" encompasses prejudgment interest as an equitable remedy. The negative-implication canon does not apply to infer that the Legislature's express authorization of postjudgment interest implies an intent to exclude prejudgment

A restaurant owner owes a duty of reasonable care to patrons to prevent an employee infected with a contagious disease from having contact with customers, and this duty is triggered by constructive knowledge that the employee has any contagious disease, not knowledge of a specific disease such as tuberculosis. Evidence that an employee suffered from a visible, heavy cough lasting nearly three months, appeared sickly to coworkers, and complained of illness creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the owner had constructive knowledge of a contagious disease and whether the owne

The trial court did not err in excluding evidence regarding whether the Department had lawful charge of the minor, as any error was harmless given ample evidence of danger to the minor and the defendant's tampering conduct. The trial court properly struck the defendant's motion to interview a juror for lack of sworn allegations and properly denied the amended motion as untimely filed outside the ten-day period required by rule 3.575.

Pre-insolvency attorney's fees and pre-judgment interest allocated in a settlement agreement between an insured and an insolvent insurer are not recoverable from FIGA as a substitute defendant because such fees do not result from FIGA's denial of a covered claim and do not constitute covered claims under Florida Statutes sections 627.428, 631.70, and 631.54(4).