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Fla. 4th DCA·
decided 2026-07-22
The trial court erred in denying summary judgment because the settlement agreement was not ambiguous in a manner requiring jury resolution; the plain language of the contract, read as a whole and in context, required the City to provide only medical, dental, and vision insurance, not supplemental benefits. The court must determine whether an ambiguity exists by exhausting ordinary rules of textual interpretation applied to the entire contract, and only if a true ambiguity remains that depends on disputed extrinsic evidence may the jury resolve it as a factual matter. Because the City undispute
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Fla. 3d DCA·
decided 2026-07-22
The trial court abused its discretion by awarding the Wife entitlement to attorney's fees and costs without conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine need and ability to pay, as required by section 61.16, Florida Statutes. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Wife's motion for continuance filed one month before trial, as she failed to demonstrate diligence, good faith, or that the requested discovery was material to her claims. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying alimony to the Wife, as it properly rejected her expert testimony regarding her inab
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Fla. 2d DCA·
decided 2026-07-22
Under section 83.232(5), Florida Statutes, a tenant's failure to deposit rent into the court registry in strict compliance with a court order requiring payment on a specific date constitutes an absolute waiver of all defenses, entitling the landlord to an immediate default judgment for possession without further hearing. Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.514(a)'s Sunday extension applies only to periods of time, not to specific calendar dates.
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Fla. 1st DCA·
decided 2026-07-22
Ordinance No. 3058, which defined "change of ownership" to include stock transfers in a corporation owning a sexually oriented business, did not trigger the notice requirements of Florida Statutes § 166.041(3)(c) because it did not change the actual list of permitted uses or the actual zoning map designation. The court affirmed that under the plain language of the Municipal Code since 1997, a change in corporate stock ownership does not constitute a "change of ownership" of the sexually oriented business itself.