Notable Florida Decisions

The State failed to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that Smith willfully and substantially violated his probation curfew condition because the evidence—consisting of a single knock on the front door and window, phone calls, and calling his name—was insufficient to establish that he was not at his approved residence. A probation violation must be both substantial and willful to justify revocation, and the State bears the burden of proving the violation by the greater weight of the evidence. Evidence of a probationer's failure to respond to knocking and phone calls is not legally suf

An arbitration clause covering disputes "arising out of the transaction, sale, contract, or closing" encompasses both a claim for declaratory relief challenging the validity of a corrective deed describing an easement and a claim for fraudulent concealment regarding the location of a drain field, as both have a direct relationship to the underlying real property transaction and the contractual duties created by the purchase agreement. A general reference to "the arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association" without specification of which practice area rules apply does not constitu

Future medical expenses are recoverable only when they are reasonably certain to be incurred, not merely possible or speculative. An expert's testimony that future medical treatments are included "within a reasonable degree of medical certainty" is not dispositive when the underlying basis for those opinions relies on conditional language such as "may," "could," and "if." The trial court erred by denying the directed verdict motion as to future medical expenses beyond medication costs, as no evidentiary basis supported the jury's award for speculative treatments.

Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for reconsideration of the trial court's order admitting limited ballistics evidence from a prior murder, for failing to hire a ballistics expert to rebut the State's expert, or for making reasonable strategic decisions regarding other evidentiary objections and penalty-phase mitigation evidence. Appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue that Riley murder evidence was inadmissible because any such error would have been harmless given the strength of the evidence supporting Smiley's conviction.

A party's demand for modified contract terms or statement of a preferred course of action does not constitute an unequivocal repudiation of the contract unless it amounts to a clear statement of intention not to perform except on conditions beyond the original contract.

Non-economic damages are not available under the Florida Public Whistleblower Act because the statute does not clearly and unequivocally waive sovereign immunity for such damages. Statutes waiving sovereign immunity must be strictly construed, and the Act's enumerated remedies do not expressly include pain and suffering or other non-economic damages.

A motion to disqualify a judge based on allegations that are contrary to the record, frivolous arguments, and AI-generated gibberish is legally insufficient and properly denied. An attorney filing documents with her signature represents that she has read the document, that there are good grounds to support it, and that it is not interposed for delay, and must exercise independent professional judgment rather than relying on AI-generated content without meaningful review. Emergency writ petitions seeking review of multiple unrelated rulings in a single proceeding, citing unpublished orders with

A trial court abuses its discretion when it adopts substantial portions of a party's closing argument verbatim without demonstrating independent analysis, particularly when the order incorporates both parties' distinct citation styles and contains findings unsupported by the record. An attorney's fees award must be supported by competent substantial evidence, and a trial court cannot reduce fees based on hours that appear nowhere in the record and were testified to by no witness. A trial court may disallow fees for duplicative work only when the opponent identifies with specificity the hours t

A plaintiff adequately alleges material misrepresentation under the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act when he alleges that a defendant represented the company would acquire an asset while knowing the defendant intended to acquire it personally, even if offering materials disclosed the acquisition was prospective and might not occur. Cautionary language does not render such misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law when the claim concerns the defendant's present intent rather than merely the future failure of a contemplated transaction.

A defendant establishes good cause to withdraw a plea before sentencing when counsel fails to advise of a viable motion to suppress incriminating statements, and the trial court must focus on whether the defendant acted in ignorance or misapprehension, not the likelihood of success of the suppression motion.

The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of an expired Florida Building Code provision as mandatory public statutory law, failing to provide procedural notice and opportunity to be heard, and admitting the provision without determining whether it applied to the case. The judgment was reversed and remanded for a new trial.

A conviction for felon in possession of a firearm under section 790.23(1) may rest on constructive possession, but the three-year mandatory minimum enhancement under section 775.087(2)(a)(1) requires proof of actual possession as defined in section 775.087(4)—either carrying the firearm on one's person or having it within immediate physical reach with ready access and intent to use it.

The court affirmed the postconviction court's denial of most ineffective-assistance claims but reversed the summary denial of a subclaim in ground four alleging counsel's failure to obtain evidence about a telephone call, requiring remand for amendment because the claim was legally insufficient as pleaded and the motion was timely filed with other sufficient claims.

When a defendant challenges prior convictions on a scoresheet via a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion, the State bears the burden of producing competent evidence that the prior convictions were correctly included. The trial court erred in including convictions from more than ten years before the primary offense without the State meeting its burden of proof, and the error was not harmless because the court imposed the lowest permissible sentence.

Summary judgment was improper on the issue of whether a tenancy by the entireties was created in the right to receive rents from a ground lease, as disputed issues of material fact existed regarding whether George intended to convey survivorship rights to Grace and whether all six unities necessary to create such a tenancy were present.

Although the trial court erred in permitting testimony about the nature of the defendant's five prior convictions, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to both the felon-in-possession and first-degree murder convictions because the defendant's guilt was clearly established through his own admissions and corroborating testimony regarding premeditation and knowledge of the firearm prohibition.

Although evidence of a prior shooting into the defendant's residence was properly excluded as reverse Williams rule evidence, the trial court erred by failing to separately consider whether the same evidence was independently admissible to explain the defendant's flight from the scene and support his defense theory of innocence.

A trial court abuses its discretion by excluding expert testimony or a party's testimony based solely on bias or financial interest, which go to credibility rather than admissibility. A personal representative is entitled to a full evidentiary hearing on compensation petitions and cannot be denied compensation without evidence and findings on the statutory factors in § 733.617.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying three motions for mistrial where the prosecutor's cross-examination of a defense witness addressed third-party communications rather than the defendant's silence, the prosecutor's statement about the illegality of firing from a vehicle was not presented as a substitute for proper jury instructions on justifiable use of deadly force, and the prosecutor's characterization of the defendant's conduct during closing argument was isolated and tied to evidence of motive and intent rather than an improper appeal to juror emotion.

A trial court has discretion to refuse a downward departure sentence even when mitigating circumstances are presented, and a defendant's claim that the court "should have" imposed a departure sentence does not constitute reversible error because there is no constitutional or statutory right to a particular sentence within a legally permissible range.

An insured who settles a third-party claim without the required consent and subrogation waiver from the underinsured motorist insurer can overcome the presumption of prejudice by demonstrating the tortfeasor's probable insolvency, measured by whether a reasonably prudent insurer would have approved the settlement or pursued collections at significant expense.

The trial court's award of $9,596 to Sarbu Construction for substantial performance of a change order is affirmed. However, the determination that Sarbu Construction was the prevailing party is reversed because the trial court applied an incorrect test; the proper test requires consideration of which party prevailed on the significant issues tried, not merely the net monetary award.

Once parental rights are terminated by final judgment, a parent permanently forfeits all rights to the child and has no legal basis for habeas relief, which can only be used to obtain custody of a child wrongfully withheld. A parent seeking to challenge a termination of parental rights must do so through proper appeal, not through subsequent extraordinary writs.

A belated appeal is granted to allow review of an order denying a defendant's claim that intellectual disability bars execution, with the claim properly characterized as a collateral attack under Rule 3.851 rather than a Rule 3.203 penalty phase motion, since the death sentence had become absolutely final.

A mandamus complaint seeking to compel a special magistrate to issue a written recommendation under FLUEDRA states a plausible claim for relief targeting a ministerial duty, as the statute's mandatory 'shall prepare and file' language imposes a non-discretionary obligation to issue the recommendation, even though the recommendation's substance remains within the magistrate's discretion. Where a mandamus petition and the respondent's answer to an alternative writ raise disputed factual issues—such as whether the parties agreed, expressly or by conduct, to extend the FLUEDRA process beyond 165 d

The Court unified all Florida family law forms under the designation "Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Forms" and amended Rule 12.015 to permit the Court to create, amend, or abrogate forms by order or opinion outside the rulemaking process, with the Advisory Workgroup on the Florida Supreme Court Approved Family Law Forms providing recommendations to the Court. The Court also amended Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 10-2.2 to remove references to rules forms and update references throughout the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure to reflect the new unified designation.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding retroactive child support, but it erred in calculating the amount by: (1) crediting Father with tax deductions he did not actually pay; (2) awarding Father overnight timesharing credit for visits to Mother's home where he was a guest; (3) incorrectly calculating Father's travel expense credits; (4) failing to make findings on Mother's nanny expenses; and (5) failing to credit Mother's daycare expenses.

A county code enforcement board misapplies an ordinance when it applies swimming pool maintenance requirements to a structure that is not currently intended for swimming or recreation bathing, even if the structure was originally designed as a swimming pool. The plain language of an ordinance's definition, including the present-tense verb "is intended," must be applied according to its ordinary meaning, and a circuit court errs when it defers to an administrative agency's interpretation of a local ordinance in violation of article V, section 21 of the Florida Constitution, which prohibits such

A visitor's status as a business invitee can change to that of an uninvited licensee or trespasser when the visitor crosses the boundaries of the invitation and goes to areas of the premises beyond the scope of the invitation. When a minor purchased a ticket to an amusement park event and subsequently climbed onto a professional circus trampoline on a performance stage to engage in horseplay, his status changed from business invitee to uninvited licensee or trespasser because access to the stage and trampoline were not part of the invitation and his presence thereon was not reasonably anticipa

A visitor's status as a business invitee extends only to those portions of premises included within the invitation and reasonably anticipated for the invitee's use; when a visitor crosses the boundaries of the invitation, his status changes to that of an uninvited licensee or trespasser, and the duty of care owed by the landowner is reduced to avoiding willful or wanton harm and warning of known dangers not open to ordinary observation. The trial court erred in determining as a matter of law that the child remained a business invitee when he went onto the performance stage and trampoline, whic