PRINCE C. FERGUSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Prince Ferguson appeals the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence imposed pursuant to a guilty plea to second degree murder. The court reversed, holding that the trial court was required to enhance the offense to a life felony due to Ferguson's use of a firearm, and that an illegal sentence cannot be imposed even pursuant to a plea bargain.
The court held that the firearm enhancement was mandatory under section 775.087(1)(a), requiring enhancement of the second degree murder conviction to a life felony. The court further held that a trial court cannot impose an illegal sentence even pursuant to a plea bargain.
[1] A defendant cannot be bound by an agreement to accept an illegal sentence, even if the sentence was entered pursuant to a plea agreement.
[2] A sentence imposed under an unconstitutional statute is illegal and subject to challenge via a rule 3.800(a) motion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the degree of the felony offense had to be enhanced by the use of the firearm to a life felony, pursuant to section 775.087(l)(a) [...] and that such enhancement was mandatory.”
Establishes that firearm enhancement to life felony was mandatory and that the trial court erred in failing to apply it.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFerguson was charged with first degree murder on June 1, 1991, and entered a guilty plea to second degree murder. He was sentenced to 45 years in pris…
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PER CURIAM.
Prince C. Ferguson (Appellant) appeals an order summarily denying his motion to correct illegal sentence. The trial court denied the motion without explanation or record attachments. We reverse.
According to his motion, Appellant was charged with first degree murder committed on June 1, 1991, and entered a plea of guilty to second degree murder. He was sentenced pursuant to his negotiated plea to forty-five years in prison with a three-year mandatory minimum for possession of a firearm pursuant to section 775.087(2). There were no other offenses at conviction to which the firearm minimum mandatory could have pertained. The judgment re- fleeted that the offense of second degree murder was a first degree felony punishable by life.
Appellant argued in his motion that the degree of the felony offense had to be enhanced by the use of the firearm to a life felony, pursuant to section 775.087(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991) (requiring enhancement of felony when defendant “carries, displays, uses, threatens, or attempts to use any weapon or firearm,” during the commission of the felony, unless the use of a weapon or firearm is an essential element of the felony), and that such enhancement was mandatory. Appellant is correct. See Wright v. State, 600 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (reversing sixty-year sentences for two first degree felonies that became life felonies due to the possession of a firearm, which could be punished by life or a term not exceeding forty years); Stevens v. State, 619 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (holding that sentence of thirty-five years in prison followed by fifteen years probation is illegal sentence where statute allowed statutory maximum term of forty years or life sentence).
Due to a statutory anomaly at the time the offense was committed, a first degree felony punishable by life could be punished by any term of years not exceeding life in prison, see, e.g., Mills v. State, 642 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), while a life felony was punishable by either life in prison or a term of years not exceeding forty. See § 775.082(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991); see Sterling v.. State, 584 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA) (pointing out anomaly in limiting term of years for life felony to forty years while there is no comparable limitation on term that may be imposed on first degree felony for which a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment is provided), rev. denied, 592 So. 2d 682 (Fla.1991). The sentencing anomaly was corrected for life felonies committed on or after July 1, 1995, making those offenses also punishable by a term of years not exceeding life. See ch. 95-184, § 16, at 1707, Laws of Fla.1
A trial court cannot impose an illegal sentence even pursuant to a plea bargain. See Williams v. State, 500 So. 2d 501, 502 (Fla.1986), receded from on other grounds by Quarterman v. State, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla.1988). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
DELL, WARNER and SHAHOOD, JJ„ concur. . However, that session law has been held unconstitutional based on violation of the single subject rule. See Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla.2000).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Benny Arzola Martinez v. State, 216 So. 3d 734 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017)…some combination of concurrent and consecutive legal sentences. The dissent asserts that a defendant cannot agree to an illegal sentence, even under a plea agreement, citing Williams v. State, 500 So. 2d 501, 502 (Fla. 1986) and Ferguson v. State, 804 So. 2d 411, 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). That principle is pertinent to the threshold determination of whether a sentence is illegal. However, it is important to note that Williams and Ferguson granted rule 3.800(a) relief in situations in which there would have b…1 / 2
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McDUFFIE v. State, 946 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)…ot exceeding 40 years.” Therefore, McDuffie’s forty-five-year prison sentence exceeds the forty-year statutory maximum under section 775.082(3)(a). “A trial court cannot impose an illegal sentence even pursuant to a plea bargain.” Ferguson v. State, 804 So. 2d 411, 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Consequently, McDuffie’s forty-five-year prison sentence is illegal and must be reversed. See Ramos v. State, 931 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (holding that fifty-year sentence for life felony was illegal where section 77…
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Parks v. State, 223 So. 3d 380 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)…ay be illegal even if a defendant agreed to it as part of a negotiated plea. See McDuffie v. State, 946 So. 2d 99, 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (“A trial court cannot impose an illegal sentence even pursuant to a plea bargain.” (quoting Ferguson v. State, 804 So. 2d 411, 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001))). Citing Dominguez v. State, 98 So. 3d 198, 200 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), and Nedd v. State, 855 So. 2d 664, 665 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), the postconviction court found that Parks’ motion was more properly considered under rule 3.850…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000)
- THE Florida BAR v. Mullins, 527 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1988)
- Williams v. State, 500 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1986)
- Kip Sterling v. State, 584 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Mills v. State, 642 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Mel T. Wright v. State, 600 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
- Stevens v. State, 619 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Miller v. State, 619 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)