J.W.B., IV, A CHILD
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
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The appellate court reversed a juvenile's commitment to a high-risk program, finding the trial court failed to provide sufficient legal justification for deviating from the Department of Juvenile Justice's recommendation. This ruling clarifies the requirements for trial courts when disregarding DJJ recommendations.
No, the trial court failed to provide a legally sufficient foundation for its departure from the DJJ's recommendation. The court's generalized conclusions were insufficient to disregard the DJJ's recommendation.
[1] A trial court must provide a legally sufficient foundation, identifying specific information overlooked, not sufficiently considered, or misconstrued by the Department of…
[2] Generalized conclusions are insufficient to disregard a restrictiveness recommendation made by the Department of Juvenile Justice.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of section 985.433(7)(b), Florida Statutes, as interpreted in E.A.R. v. State, 4 So. 3d 614 (Fla. 2009), when it departed from the recommendation of the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for a moderate-risk program.”
This quote states the core legal issue and the basis for the appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court committed a juvenile, J.W.B., IV, to a high-risk program, departing from the Department of Juvenile Justice's (DJJ) recommendation for…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, J.W.B., challenges the trial court's order committing him to a high-risk program. Appellant argues, and we agree, that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of section 985.433(7)(b), Florida Statutes, as interpreted in E.A.R. v. State, 4 So. 3d 614 (Fla. 2009), when it departed from the recommendation of the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for a moderate-risk program.
Here, the trial court did not provide a “legally sufficient foundation" for disregarding the DJJ's recommendation “by identifying significant information that the DJJ has overlooked, failed to sufficiently consider, or misconstrued” with regard to Appellant's needs and the risks he poses to the public. E.A.R., 4 So. 3d at 638. Instead, the trial court merely concluded that the DJJ misconstrued the time Appellant needs for rehabilitation and the risk he poses, without identifying any information the DJJ supposedly misconstrued, overlooked, or failed to sufficiently consider. For this reason, the trial court's generalized conclusions are insufficient to disregard the restrictiveness recommendation by the DJJ. See M.H. v. State, 69 So. 3d 325, 328 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“In order to deviate lawfully, a trial court must do more than place generalized reasons on the record; it must engage in a wellreasoned and complete analysis of the [predisposition report] and the type of facility to which the trial court intends to send the child.").
Accordingly, we reverse and remand the disposition order so that the trial court may provide sufficient reasons for deviating from the DJJ's recommendation or, in the alternative, impose the DJJ's recommendation. State v. J. J., 359 So. 3d 863, 869 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023); C.M.H. v. State, 25 So. 3d 678, 680 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
ROBERTS, RAY, and TREADWELL, JJ., concur. Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Jasmine R. Dixon, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Heather F. Ross, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
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Citator
Cited By
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J.W.B., IV v. State (Fla. 1st DCA 2026)
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K.K.J. v. State (Fla. 1st DCA 2026)
Authorities Cited
- E.A.R. v. State, 4 So. 3d 614 (Fla. 2009)
- M.H. v. State, 69 So. 3d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)
- C.M.H. v. State, 25 So. 3d 678 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
- J.W.B., IV v. State (Fla. 1st DCA 2026)