FIDELITY & CASUALTY COMPANY OF NEW YORK, APPELLANT,
v.
PASCUAL PALOMINO, APPELLEE
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The appellate court held that the trial court's subsequent order attempting to clarify coverage after a final judgment was entered was legally ineffective, but the original final judgment remained valid.
Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York appealed an order that clarified coverage after a default judgment had already been entered against them. The …
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PER CURIAM.
This appeal by Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York is from an order entitled Amended Order and Summary Judgment in which the Court held that Fidelity’s policy extended coverage to the collision which was the subject of the suit. The order was entered nine months after a regularly entered final judgment against Fidelity, which was pursuant to a regularly entered default. The final judgment was not appealed. We hold that the order appealed was without legal effect, but that the final judgment entered on May 25,1979 for Pascual Palomino and against Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York is binding and in full force and effect.
The confusion on this matter arose because the counsel for Fidelity urged and the trial judge was persuaded after the entry of the default that Fidelity could still contest the issue of coverage. Nevertheless, the judge denied Fidelity’s motion to set aside the default and thereafter entered final judgment on the default.
The final judgment settled all the issues which were raised by the pleadings between the parties. A trial court has no authority to modify, amend or vacate a final order except in the manner and within the time provided by rule or statute. Kippy Corporation v. Colburn, 177 So. 2d 193 (Fla.1965); Board of Public Instruction of Dade County v. Dinkines, 278 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Hardin v. Wilkinson, 371 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). The trial judge recognized and followed this principle in his order of January 9, 1980 where he stated that the final judgment of May 25, 1979 was in full force and effect. His subsequent order, which is now appealed, attempted to clarify the matter by entering a “summary judgment”. While this order was unnecessary, it did correctly define the status of the parties as to the coverage issue. Therefore, it is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Francisco v. Victoria Marine Shipping, Inc., 486 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…on of the final judgment2 is limited [*1389] to the time and manner provided by rule or statute. Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pearson, 236 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1970); Kippy Corp. v. Colburn, 177 So. 2d 193 (Fla.1965); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Palomino, 394 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 402 So. 2d 609 (Fla.1981). Under the present rules, after the rendition of the final judgment, the trial court retains jurisdiction for the ten-day period during which a motion for rehearing may be filed and, if filed, un…
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Maresca v. Olivo, 819 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…r rendition of the final judgment is limited to the time and manner provided by rule or statute. Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pearson, 236 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1970); Kippy Corp. v. Colburn, 177 So. 2d 193 (Fla.1965); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Palomino, 394 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 402 So. 2d 609 (Fla.1981). Under the present rules, after the rendition of the final judgment, the trial court retains jurisdiction for the ten-day period during which a motion for rehearing may be filed and, if filed, un…
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The Pub. Health Tr. OF Dade Cnty. v. Kempster, 439 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…the trial court, accordingly, had no authority to enter said order. Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. of Shelby, Ohio v. Pearson, 236 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1970); Kippy Corp. v. Colburn, 177 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1965); Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Palomino, 394 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 3d DCA), pet. for review denied, 402 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1981); Al Springer Roofing Co. v. Flagler Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Miami, 357 So. 2d 478, 479 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Reversed and remanded with directions to vacate the order under re…
Authorities Cited
- The Kippy Corp. v. Sherwood Colburn, 177 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1965)
- The Bd. OF Pub. Instruction OF Dade Cnty. v. Dinkines, 278 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Hardin v. Archibald Wilkinson and Gwendolyn J. Wilkinson, 371 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)