SHIRLEY HARDIN, AS THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF TINY N. WILKINSON, APPELLANT,
v.
ARCHIBALD WILKINSON AND GWENDOLYN J. WILKINSON, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
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The estate's personal representative appeals a post-judgment order that improperly amended a 1975 final judgment by extending the deadline for payment and granting relief to defendants who failed to comply with the original judgment's terms. The court holds that once a final judgment becomes final and non-appealable, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to amend it, and reverses the improper amendment.
A trial court lacks jurisdiction to amend or modify a final judgment after that judgment has become final and the period for appellate review has expired. Once a final judgment is entered and the appellate period passes, all judicial authority over the subject matter ceases except for enforcement of the judgment.
[1] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to amend the provisions of a final judgment after the time for appeal has expired, absent grounds such as mistake, inadvertence, or excus…
[2] Once a final judgment is entered and the time for appellate review has passed, the trial court's role is limited to enforcing the judgment, not amending its terms.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We hold that upon the entry of the final judgment on June 11, 1975, and the passing of time within which either party may have in due season exercised their privilege of appellate review, all judicial labor with reference to this subject matter came to an end except the enforcement of such final judgment.”
States the core holding that a trial court's jurisdiction terminates once a final judgment becomes non-appealable
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn June 11, 1975, a final judgment required Archibald and Gwendolyn Wilkinson to pay Tiny N. Wilkinson $2,400 plus interest and costs within 90 days, …
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MELVIN, Judge.
Appellant brings for review the post judgment order dated July 28, 1978, wherein the trial court, without jurisdiction so to do, attempted to amend the provisions of a final judgment entered in this cause on June 11,1975. The final judgment required that Archibald Wilkinson and Gwendolyn J. Wilkinson pay to Tiny N. Wilkinson the sum of $2,400 plus interest and costs as therein set forth within 90 days from the entry of such final judgment, and that upon failure to make such payment Archibald and Gwendolyn J. Wilkinson were ordered and directed to execute a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the subject property to Tiny N. Wilkinson free of encumbrances. Such final judgment then provided for adjustment between Tiny N. Wilkinson and Archibald and Gwendolyn J. Wilkinson of items relating to taxes and costs for improvements. No appeal was taken from such final judgment.
The requirement that said such sum of money be paid within 90 days was not complied with. Therefore, Tiny N. Wilkinson was under the terms of such final judgment entitled to have the property conveyed to her by warranty deed. No such conveyance was made. No delay in the offering of the required compensation is chargeable to Tiny N. Wilkinson or her personal representative, Shirley Hardin. No delay with reference to the execution and delivery of the warranty deed is chargeable to Tiny N. Wilkinson, or to her personal representative Shirley Hardin.
It does not appear from this record that there occurred any matter that would be recognized as mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect that would permit Archibald and Gwendolyn J. Wilkinson to seek refuge in the provisions of Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.540(b).
This record reflects that following the 90th day after the entry of the final judgment referred to there were filed several motions for and orders entered granting further extensions of time for payment. The paregoric therapeutic effect thereof lingered until the entry of the “final judgment in favor of defendants” dated July 28, 1978, purporting to extend again for some 36 hours the time within which Archibald and Gwendolyn J. Wilkinson could make payment of said sum of money to Shirley Hardin, as the personal representative of the estate of Tiny N. Wilkinson.
The rules of procedure are so designed that litigation, even though it may proceed with lead-footed pace, shall come to an end and the rights of parties be finally adjudicated.
We hold that upon the entry of the final judgment on June 11, 1975, and the passing of time within which either party may have in due season exercised their privilege of appellate review, all judicial labor with reference to this subject matter came to an end except the enforcement of such final judgment. It follows that the “final judgment in favor of the defendants” entered July 28, 1978, being a purported judgment amending the terms and provisions of the original final judgment was beyond the jurisdiction of the court to enter. The judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside. The trial court is directed forthwith to enter its order requiring compliance with its final judgment dated June 11, 1975. Reversed with directions to proceed in accordance with this opinion.
McCORD, C. J., and BOOTH, J., concur.
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Fid. & Cas. Co. OF NEW York v. Pascual Palomino, 394 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…inal order except in the manner and within the time provided by rule or statute. Kippy Corporation v. Colburn, 177 So. 2d 193 (Fla.1965); Board of Public Instruction of Dade County v. Dinkines, 278 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Hardin v. Wilkinson, 371 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). The trial judge recognized and followed this principle in his order of January 9, 1980 where he stated that the final judgment of May 25, 1979 was in full force and effect. His subsequent order, which is now appealed, attempted…
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Fadel Elbadramany v. Oceans Four Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 532 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)…o enforce the judgment as provided by the rules of procedure. Francisco v. Victoria Marine Shipping, Inc., 486 So. 2d 1386 (Fla.3d DCA), rev. den., 494 So. 2d 1153 (Fla.1986); Jared v. Jackson, 483 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Hardin v. Wilkinson, 371 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). A court does not have the power to impose upon a party a new duty not previously adjudicated in the final judgment. Superior Uniforms, Inc. v. Brown, 221 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969). In this case, Oceans Four’s right to an in…