THE BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, A BODY CORPORATE AND POLITIC UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
WESLEY DINKINES AND ROSE DINKINES, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
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This case concerns whether a party can seek relief from a final judgment based on fraud upon the court outside the one-year time limit specified in Rule 1.540(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellate court held that while the rule's one-year limit applies to fraud generally, an independent action can be filed at any time to address fraud upon the court.
The trial court erred in denying the motion to strike the appellees' petition. While Rule 1.540(b) allows relief from judgment for fraud within one year, it does not preclude an independent action for fraud upon the court, which has no specified time limit. Therefore, the motion under Rule 1.540(b) was procedurally improper.
[1] A court may entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment obtained by fraud upon the court, without a specified time limit.
[2] A motion filed under Rule 1.540(b) seeking relief from a judgment due to fraud must be made within a reasonable time, and for fraud, not more than one year after the judg…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, decree, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment or decree for fraud upon the court.”
Highlights the exception for fraud upon the court, which is not subject to the one-year time limit of the rule.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellees (defendants in the original eminent domain case) sought to set aside a final judgment of condemnation, alleging actual and legal fraud. They…
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This is an interlocutory appeal from an order entered after final judgment in a proceeding in eminent domain. The order appealed is in pertinent portion as follows:
“THIS CAUSE coming on to be heard before me on petitioner’s motion to strike or dismiss defendants’ sworn petition to set aside final judgment and verdict incorporated therein, for actual and legal fraud on the above-styled court and on the defendants, and the Court considering said sworn petition and arguments of counsel for both parties, and considering legal citations cited by the attorney for petitioner, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, it is
“ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that said motion to strike or dismiss defendants’ petition, be, and the same is hereby denied, . . .”.
The determination of the points involved rests upon the application of Rule 1.540(b), RCP, 31 F.S.A. It reads as follows:
“On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, decree, order or proceeding for the following reasons: . . .
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic) *664The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, decree, order or proceeding was entered or taken . . . This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, decree, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment or decree for fraud upon the court.” (Emphasis supplied)
The factual background stated in the petition may be summarized for the purposes of this opinion: (1) The appellees (petitioners in the trial court) were the defendants in a condemnation action filed by the Dade County School Board. A final judgment was entered for the condemning authority and the appellees’ land was taken. (2) Prior to the action, third parties had attempted to purchase the property for their own use. (3) Also prior to the action, one of the third parties had attempted “to force” the appellees to dedicate a right of way for a highway to serve a corporate development. The appellees refused to sell or dedicate the right of way and Dade County condemned the necessary land for road-widening purposes. (4) After the same party unsuccessfully tried to purchase land from the appellees for widening a canal, the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District condemned the necessary land. (S) The same party had plans for the use of the remainder of the appel-lees’ property for a marina. (6) The remainder of the appellees’ property was condemned under a declaration that it was necessary for public school purposes. (7) Evidence was introduced at the last condemnation proceeding with the connivance of the third party which depressed the award that the appellees received for their property. (8) After the taking, the appellees learned that the land was not in fact owned by the Dade County School Board but had been deeded to Dade County. (9) The appellees believe that the land is now being developed as a marina. (10) The appellees conclude their petition to set aside the final judgment in condemnation with a statement that the facts alleged show an actual fraud on the court and the appellees.
The appellant School Board responded to the petition to set aside final judgment by moving to strike or dismiss the petition on the ground that the petition having been brought almost two years after the entry of judgment and not by independent action, the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The trial court denied the School Board’s motion to strike. This appeal is from that order.
Rule 1.540(b), RCP, quoted earlier in this opinion, provides that on motion filed within one year of entry of a final judgment a court may relieve a party from that judgment if there is fraud, whether intrinsic or extrinsic. The rule further provides that when fraud upon the court is involved, the court may entertain an independent action, and no time limit is' specified for bringing this independent action. See Corrigan v. Corrigan, Fla.App. 1966, 184 So.2d 664. Therefore, in the instant case, since the judgment was recorded March 31, 1970, and the appellees’ motion for relief was not filed until January 24, 1972, the applicable one-year requirement was not met.
A litigant is entitled to know that a judgment determining his rights is final and will not be disturbed, except on appeal, or under the conditions prescribed by a rule. For this reason, if the litigant does not seek to correct error within the time and in the manner provided, the court involved has no authority to act as far as that action is concerned; the matters decided are finally ended. Kippy Corporation v. Colburn, Fla.1965, 177 So.2d 193.
The inherent authority of every court to remedy injustice done by fraud upon that court exists without time limit. But such authority and appropriate relief must, under our rules, be invoked by an independent action. Therefore, we reverse the order denying the appellant’s ’motion to strike the *665appellees’ petition for relief pursuant to Rule 1.540(b), RCP, and remand the cause to the trial court with directions to dismiss the motion without prejudice to the filing of an independent action by the appellees.
Reversed and remanded.
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Martinez v. Martinez, 573 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…e of finality is necessary because “[a] litigant is entitled to know that a judgment determining his rights is final and will not be disturbed, except on appeal, or under the conditions prescribed by a rule.” Board of Public Instruction v. Dinkines, 278 So. 2d 663, 664 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). Orders providing for temporary custody or temporary primary residential care are appropriate to enter while the case is pending before the entry of final judgment. See, e.g., Bowles v. Bowles, 384 So. 2d 299, 300-301 (Fla. 4…
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Arthur v. Josette A. Arthur, 54 So. 3d 454 (Fla. 2010)…se “a litigant is entitled to know that a judgment determining his rights is final and will not be disturbed, except on appeal, or under the conditions prescribed by a rule.” Id. at 40 (quoting Board of Public Instruction of Dade County v. Dinkines, 278 So. 2d 663, 664 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)). Further, the court stated: [W]hen a cause involving child custody is presented to the trial court at the final hearing and there is evidence from which the trial court can conclude that [*458] the children’s best interests…
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Brown v. Brown, 432 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…esent independent action. See, e.g., Miami Super Cold Co. v. Giffin Industries, Inc., 178 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965); City of Boca Baton v. Sharp, 107 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958). See also Board of Public Instruction of Dade County v. Dinkines, 278 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) (recognizing that independent action to set aside judgment available notwithstanding that motion under Rule 1.540(b) precluded because not brought within a year of entry of judgment); Scales v. Scales, 237 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 3d DCA 1…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- The Kippy Corp. v. Sherwood Colburn, 177 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1965)
- King v. State, 184 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)