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421 F.2d 1196·
2d Cir.·
1970-02-06
·cited 150×
The court held that defects in search warrants did not require exclusion of evidence under F.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and that the denial of a pre-trial lineup was not an abuse of discretion.
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299 F.2d 711·
9th Cir.·
1961-11-21
·cited 84×
The court held that the trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction regarding the defendant's wife's failure to testify, while potentially an error, was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence.
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781 F.2d 238·
2d Cir.·
1986-01-09
·cited 51×
The court held that the Sixth Amendment concerns regarding attorney disqualification are significant and require the government to show a demonstrable need for the attorney's testimony beyond mere relevance or probative value.
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497 F.2d 730·
9th Cir.·
1974-05-13
·cited 40×
The court held that knowledge that the victim was a federal law enforcement officer is an element of the offense defined by 18 U.S.C. § 111.
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455 F.2d 392·
5th Cir.·
1972-01-25
·cited 40×
Evidence of subsequent corrective measures and subsequent failures of the same apparatus is admissible to negate a shipowner's defense of unseaworthiness, particularly when offered to show the operational cause of the incident rather than an admission of negligence.
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683 F.2d 1201·
8th Cir.·
1982-08-02
·cited 29×
The court held that the district court did not err in its rulings regarding attorney-client privilege, proximate cause, damages, or the illegal payment, and affirmed the judgment.
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515 F.2d 449·
2d Cir.·
1975-04-30
·cited 26×
The dissenting judge held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain rebuttal testimony, and even if it did, the error was harmless.
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502 F.2d 110·
1st Cir.·
1974-08-14
·cited 26×
The court held that the husband-wife privilege did not excuse Gary Snoonian from testifying before the grand jury, given the government's assurances that his wife was not a target and her testimony would not be used against her.
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427 F.2d 987·
10th Cir.·
1970-06-18
·cited 26×
The court held that evidence of a prior incident involving gasoline was admissible to prove scheme and design, and that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.
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253 F.2d 658·
5th Cir.·
1958-04-01
·cited 26×
The court held that admitting evidence of a prior nolo contendere plea for impeachment purposes was improper and required reversal.
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499 F.2d 1011·
D.C. Cir.·
1974-05-07
·cited 25×
The court held that the trial court did not err in determining the witness was unavailable, and therefore the admission of her prior testimony was proper.
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398 F.2d 757·
D.C. Cir.·
1968-06-11
·cited 25×
The court held that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting extensive evidence of events subsequent to the last mailing named in the indictment, and that one defendant's participation evidence was sufficient.
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772 F.2d 1314·
7th Cir.·
1985-09-03
·cited 24×
The court held that a defendant cannot be both the 'person' and the 'enterprise' under RICO section 1962(c), requiring reversal of the RICO conviction. The court also held that the admission of a witness's prior grand jury testimony, despite claiming total amnesia, was permissibl
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446 F.2d 410·
10th Cir.·
1971-08-16
·cited 24×
The court held that improper references to a "mug book" containing photographs of suspects, while not ideal, did not constitute plain error and did not deny the defendant due process, nor was his trial counsel ineffective.
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216 F.2d 1·
5th Cir.·
1954-09-03
·cited 24×
The court held that the exclusion of a letter containing the defendant's instructions for filing a tax return was reversible error, and that the district court could take judicial notice of proceedings before a commissioner if properly transmitted.
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536 F.2d 1142·
6th Cir.·
1976-06-23
·cited 22×
The court held that testimony concerning similar acts was properly admitted to show the defendant's intent, and the failure to give a cautionary instruction was not plain error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
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490 F.2d 661·
7th Cir.·
1973-12-28
·cited 22×
The court held that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for severance, as the joinder of the extortion and false declaration counts created undue prejudice.
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522 F.2d 448·
1st Cir.·
1975-06-18
·cited 20×
The admission of a codefendant's out-of-court statement, admissible under the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule, did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation clause rights. Prejudicial publicity did not violate the defendant's Fourteenth Amendme
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485 F.2d 328·
5th Cir.·
1973-09-24
·cited 18×
The court held that the jury's findings of contributory negligence and the award of damages and maintenance were supported by the evidence, and that the jury instructions regarding the avoidance of double recovery for lost wages and maintenance were not erroneous.
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273 F.2d 843·
2d Cir.·
1960-01-18
·cited 18×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing cross-examination of character witnesses regarding disparaging rumors, and that sentencing under the subornation of perjury statute was proper.
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237 F.2d 657·
5th Cir.·
1956-10-10
·cited 18×
The court held that the appellant was entitled to a jury trial for contempt charges that also constituted criminal offenses.
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236 F.2d 708·
D.C. Cir.·
1956-06-28
·cited 18×
The dissenting judge believes Green cannot be tried again for first-degree murder because his prior appeal only concerned the second-degree murder conviction, and thus did not waive his double jeopardy rights.
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330 F.2d 937·
2d Cir.·
1964-03-24
·cited 16×
The court held that contraband seized from the appellant's automobile and a dwelling house was admissible into evidence, and the use of photographs of co-conspirators was also permissible.
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483 F.2d 263·
1st Cir.·
1973-04-24
·cited 14×
The court held that the trial court did not err in limiting the impeachment of an expert witness, nor was there material prejudice to the plaintiff.
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363 F.2d 159·
9th Cir.·
1966-07-08
·cited 14×
The court held that the attempted impeachment of the defendant by the prosecution was improper and prejudicial, requiring reversal of the conviction.
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673 F.2d 688·
3d Cir.·
1982-03-09
·cited 12×
The court did not reach the issue of court-awarded use-fruits immunity because it was not raised by the parties.
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480 F.2d 504·
6th Cir.·
1973-06-15
·cited 12×
The court held that the Brooks decision, extending Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination, should be applied prospectively, meaning it applies to critical stages occurring after the Brooks decision.
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345 F.2d 434·
D.C. Cir.·
1965-03-04
·cited 12×
The court reversed the judgment, finding that the trial judge's exclusion of certain evidence was potentially erroneous and that the admissibility of other evidence, including motion pictures and character evidence, should be left to the trial court's discretion.
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188 F.2d 969·
9th Cir.·
1951-02-26
·cited 10×
The dissenting judge believes the judgment should be reversed due to improper jury instructions and pressure.
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492 F.2d 943·
8th Cir.·
1974-02-25
·cited 8×
The court held that the exclusion of testimony regarding the victim's reputation for truth and veracity improperly restricted the defendant's opportunity to present an adequate defense.
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348 F.2d 661·
2d Cir.·
1965-07-22
·cited 8×
The court held that even if the identification testimony was hearsay, it was admissible because no proper objection was made at trial, and there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.
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234 F.2d 140·
6th Cir.·
1956-05-18
·cited 6×
A party who voluntarily testifies in their own behalf in a civil proceeding waives their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination regarding relevant cross-examination questions.
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475 So. 2d 1274·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1985-09-04
·cited 4×
A mother and daughter appealed a jury verdict against them in a slip-and-fall case on school grounds. The trial court excluded the mother's testimony about statements made by a school custodian regarding failure to post warning signs, and the appellate court reversed, holding tha
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291 F.2d 864·
2d Cir.·
1961-06-26
·cited 4×
The court held that admitting irrelevant and highly prejudicial testimony from a congressional hearing transcript into evidence was error, requiring reversal and a new trial.
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549 F.2d 1364·
10th Cir.·
1977-02-22
·cited 2×
The court held that while late notice creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the insurer, the trial court erred by rigidly applying this presumption without allowing the insured to present sufficient evidence to overcome it, especially in a simple accident case.
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409 F.2d 319·
9th Cir.·
1969-03-27
·cited 2×
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603 F.2d 587·
6th Cir.·
1979-08-16
The court held that compelling a defendant to testify about prior convictions and denying the right to closing argument in a habitual criminal trial violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, respectively, and such violations are not subject to harmless error analysis.
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516 F.2d 390·
2d Cir.·
1975-05-01
The court held that despite some judicial misconduct and an erroneous ruling on grand jury minutes, the trial was not rendered unfair, and the conviction should be affirmed.
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226 F.2d 251·
D.C. Cir.·
1955-06-30
The court held that evidence of prior similar acts is admissible to show the defendant's design or plan, not merely to prove disposition or similar offenses.