1,055 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 2,310 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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845 F.2d 61·
4th Cir.·
1988-01-19
·cited 6×
The court held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff's due process claim was not a substantial federal question, as legislative bodies have the authority to abolish public offices.
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Police officers testifying before a grand jury are absolutely immune from liability for their testimony, and municipalities cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.
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835 F.2d 980·
2d Cir.·
1987-12-22
·cited 6×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint at the pleading stage without considering the college's justifications for denying recognition to the alumni association.
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The court held that a public school teacher's college transcript is not protected by FERPA, and the public's interest in evaluating teacher competence outweighs the teacher's privacy interest in the transcript.
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830 F.2d 900·
8th Cir.·
1987-10-05
·cited 6×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to show constitutionally protected conduct was a motivating factor in his firing, and that the evidence of financial reasons for the layoff was unrebutted.
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The court held that the prison disciplinary board's decision to revoke good time credits was not supported by sufficient evidence, violating the plaintiff's due process rights.
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The court held that general damages are appropriate in § 1983 actions for First Amendment violations when harm is likely but difficult to prove, and attorney fees were reasonable.
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The court held that the Fourth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment, governs claims arising from investigatory stops, and the reasonableness of the seizure is a jury question.
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The court held that the Medical Staff Administrative Committee's (MSAC) consideration of charges previously addressed in disciplinary proceedings was not barred by administrative res judicata, and that the MSAC hearing did not violate plaintiff's procedural due process rights.
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A public employee's expectation of continued employment, derived from a state statute requiring termination only 'for cause,' creates a constitutionally protected property interest, even if the stated reason for termination is lack of funds or work.
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The court held that the inmate's pro se complaint sufficiently stated claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that these claims were not barred by the requirement to exhaust state remedies via habeas corpus.
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The court held that the inmate failed to prove an Eighth Amendment violation because the injury was accidental and the emotional harm was de minimis.
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The court should not have overruled the district court's decision regarding probable cause for arrest.
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The court held that Illinois' blanket denial of bail to arrested parole violators pending their final revocation hearing likely violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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The court held that the jury verdicts were inconsistent and that the evidence supported a finding for the plaintiff on both federal excessive force and state assault and battery claims, requiring a new trial.
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The appeal of the denial of a preliminary injunction is dismissed as moot because the challenged ordinance was amended during the pendency of the appeal.
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804 F.2d 20·
2d Cir.·
1986-10-23
·cited 6×
The court held that the appellants' constitutional claims regarding TLC's administration of limousine licensing requirements were without merit and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment.
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A waiver of a section 1983 claim is valid if voluntary, deliberate, and informed; here, the settlement agreement was entered into voluntarily despite allegations of duress and coercion.
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The Tax Injunction Act and the doctrine of comity deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over actions challenging state tax collection, even when framed as civil rights claims, provided adequate state remedies exist.
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The court should not have dismissed the case for failure to state a claim, as the plaintiff's allegations of gross negligence could constitute deliberate indifference.
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The dissent argues that New York res judicata law does not preclude the plaintiff's section 1983 claim, and that the majority erred in considering the good-faith immunity defense.
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788 F.2d 1091·
5th Cir.·
1986-05-02
·cited 6×
The court held that the temporary suspension of a warehouse license, followed by a prompt post-deprivation hearing and other procedural safeguards, satisfied the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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The court held that while implicit exhaustion requirements can exist for § 1983 claims, the Medicaid Act does not contain such a requirement, and exhaustion of state judicial remedies is generally not required.
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786 F.2d 550·
2d Cir.·
1986-03-21
·cited 6×
A prior state unemployment insurance determination that an employee was terminated for misconduct does not collaterally estop the employee from pursuing a federal discrimination claim if the discrimination issue was not fully litigated in the prior proceeding.
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The court should dismiss the action for want of a case or controversy under Article III of the Constitution.
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The court held that while the officer's stop of the truck may have lacked reasonable suspicion, he was entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established at the time, and the officer acted in good faith.
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780 F.2d 367·
3d Cir.·
1986-01-03
·cited 6×
The court held that a plaintiff can be a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 even without formal monetary or injunctive relief, if their lawsuit vindicates constitutional rights or acts as a catalyst for positive change.
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The court held that the district court did not err in dismissing the pro se § 1983 suit as frivolous and in awarding attorneys' fees to the defendants.
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779 F.2d 1267·
7th Cir.·
1985-12-16
·cited 6×
Summary judgment was improperly granted because the plaintiff's pro se allegations, including those in his affidavit, raised genuine issues of material fact regarding whether his segregation constituted unconstitutional punishment.
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The court held that a prisoner's due process rights are not violated by a state's administrative calculation of parole eligibility based on prior convictions, as long as a procedural avenue exists for the prisoner to challenge the accuracy of those convictions.
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The court held that principles of issue preclusion, derived from the prior state court judgment, required dismissal of the appellant's federal civil rights action.
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Prison officials' directive restricting the use of white prayer robes to the prison chapel is a permissible exercise of discretion and does not violate inmates' First Amendment rights, as it is justified by legitimate security concerns.
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The court held that the executive secretary of the Board on Judicial Standards was entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiff's allegations did not establish a violation of clearly established constitutional rights to privacy.
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A federal court is precluded from hearing a civil rights claim that could have been raised in a prior state court proceeding if state law would bar such a claim.
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The district court improperly dismissed the pro se complaint with prejudice without first determining if the incompetent person's interests were adequately protected.
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The court held that the school boards and districts are arms of the state and thus immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
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A state university's denial of official recognition to a gay student organization based on its message or perceived association with illegal conduct violates the First Amendment.
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The court held that the district court correctly applied collateral estoppel to preclude litigation of pre-confession beatings and did not err in directing a verdict for the Board of Police Commissioners due to lack of evidence of a pattern of misconduct.
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736 F.2d 1036·
5th Cir.·
1984-07-19
·cited 6×
The court held that a delay in a tenured teacher's due process hearing does not violate constitutional rights if the delay is caused by the teacher or if the teacher suffers no prejudice from the delay.
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Prevailing defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 are entitled to attorney's fees only when the plaintiff's action is objectively frivolous, vexatious, or brought in bad faith.
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730 F.2d 1110·
8th Cir.·
1984-03-26
·cited 6×
Modification of a consent decree requires a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions, not merely a bad bargain or foreseeable difficulties.
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728 F.2d 1055·
8th Cir.·
1984-02-24
·cited 6×
The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, finding the injunction specific enough and that the plaintiffs received all requested relief.
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A school principal without tenure does not have a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment based solely on a series of one-year contracts, nor was a liberty interest impaired by the non-renewal decision.
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726 F.2d 1015·
4th Cir.·
1984-02-10
·cited 6×
State prison regulations can create a liberty interest triggering due process protections if they use explicitly mandatory language and substantive predicates, overruling prior precedent that held otherwise.
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723 F.2d 45·
8th Cir.·
1983-12-19
·cited 6×
Specific fund-raising activities by an organization representing a prevailing civil rights plaintiff are irrelevant to the availability or amount of attorneys' fees awarded under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976.
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The court held that the Georgia Parole Board's unfettered discretion in clemency proceedings means no constitutional right to procedural due process or Eighth Amendment protection against arbitrary application of the death penalty at this stage.
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The court held that the prisoner's constitutional rights were not violated by the disciplinary punishment or the conditions of his administrative and punitive lockdown.
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A hospital director's position, based on an oral contract terminable at will, does not create a protectible property interest for due process purposes. Termination of such a directorship does not constitute a reduction or termination of staff privileges unless the privileges them
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713 F.2d 153·
5th Cir.·
1983-09-02
·cited 6×
The court held that the civil rights statutes at issue do not create a right of action against successors-in-title to a deceased wrongdoer.
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The court held that while Hinton was properly joined as a defendant, the procedure used violated his due process rights, requiring a new trial.