1,055 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 2,310 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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834 F.2d 583·
6th Cir.·
1987-11-25
·cited 8×
The dissenting judge would affirm the district court's judgment, arguing that the majority misinterprets Wygant and that Michigan's affirmative action program is constitutional.
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827 F.2d 648·
10th Cir.·
1987-08-17
·cited 8×
The court held that the hospital's revocation of staff privileges constituted state action as a matter of law, and the trial court erred in submitting this issue to the jury. However, the court could not determine if the staff privileges constituted a protected property interest
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818 F.2d 4·
2d Cir.·
1987-05-08
·cited 8×
The court held that while the claim for declaratory relief was moot due to a stipulation, the claim for damages under section 1983 was not moot and should not have been dismissed.
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The court held that the trial court did not err in its findings of fact, allocation of burdens of proof, or in denying a fair trial, affirming the dismissal of most claims.
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The court held that while the trial court erred in seating an alternate juror by lot, the error was harmless. It also held that the state court's suppression ruling did not have preclusive effect and that the evidentiary rulings were not abuses of discretion.
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A plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages for a civil rights violation even without proof of actual injury, and the court modified the judgment to award one dollar in nominal damages.
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The court held that alleged procedural errors in an administrative hearing, where state remedies exist, do not constitute a federal due process violation. However, a conclusory equal protection claim may survive dismissal.
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The court held that the plaintiff's section 1983 claim was time-barred because the April 8, 1982 letter, combined with the city's silence, provided sufficient notice that his transfer request had been denied.
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804 F.2d 1066·
8th Cir.·
1986-11-14
·cited 8×
The court held that the denial of a merchant's license, when zoning permitted the business and the denial was arbitrary and capricious, violated substantive due process, and that the damages awarded were not excessive.
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The court held that while abstention under Younger v. Harris was proper for injunctive relief due to pending state prosecutions, it did not require dismissal of the § 1983 claims for monetary damages.
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802 F.2d 790·
5th Cir.·
1986-10-17
·cited 8×
The court held that the inmates' federal claims were not immaterial or frivolous, thus the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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644 F. Supp. 1417·
S.D. Fla.·
1986-09-22
·cited 8×
The court held that Officer Perez was entitled to qualified immunity because the law regarding the use of deadly force against fleeing felons was not clearly established in 1979, and his actions did not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory law.
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The court held that the Loudermill decision should be applied retroactively and that the record was insufficient to determine if the plaintiff received constitutionally adequate pretermination procedures.
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798 F.2d 419·
10th Cir.·
1986-08-14
·cited 8×
The court held that the plaintiff received adequate procedural and substantive due process, and that the decisions affecting his enrollment were academic rather than disciplinary.
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798 F.2d 1147·
8th Cir.·
1986-08-13
·cited 8×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, nor in dismissing the First Amendment and Section 1985 claims, and that res judicata properly barred certain due process claims.
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798 F.2d 297·
8th Cir.·
1986-08-11
·cited 8×
A prisoner's complaint alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
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The court held that appellants' federal claims were properly dismissed because they failed to avail themselves of adequate state remedies and because mere violations of state statutes or contracts do not constitute a deprivation of due process under § 1983.
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The court held that the district court clearly erred in finding that the appellants were not subject to intentional discrimination and that the termination standards were applied correctly. The court reversed the judgment for Griffin and remanded for further consideration of McWh
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The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) mandates that North Carolina use the "$6,000/6% rule" as a methodology for determining Medicaid eligibility because it is part of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility criteria.
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The court held that the plaintiffs' due process claim must be dismissed because they have an adequate postdeprivation remedy under state law, specifically an action for inverse condemnation.
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The court held that probable cause for the arrest was established as a matter of law, and therefore the trial court did not err in granting a directed verdict for the defendants.
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774 F.2d 224·
8th Cir.·
1985-09-25
·cited 8×
The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that any errors in dismissing damage claims or striking the jury demand were harmless because the university could have properly directed a verdict against the professor on all his claims.
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The court held that Kentucky campaign finance statutes do not grant exclusive investigative jurisdiction to the Registry of Election Finance, nor do they create a protected liberty interest that requires due process before law enforcement can investigate alleged violations.
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Prisoner Review Board members are absolutely immune from damages for denying access to parole files, and the mere presence of newspaper articles in a parole file does not violate due process.
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The court held that a pro se prisoner's § 1983 complaint alleging seizure of property pursuant to established institutional policy, without a meaningful post-deprivation hearing, sufficiently states a claim under Parratt v. Taylor.
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The court held that a federal court must give preclusive effect to a prior state court judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, if the state proceedings afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim, even if the claim involves a federal due
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Summary judgment for the prosecutor on civil rights claims was proper due to absolute immunity for grand jury presentation, but the denial of attorney's fees must be reconsidered.
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746 F.2d 271·
5th Cir.·
1984-11-12
·cited 8×
The court held that students who moved out of a school district were not entitled to a due process hearing before being required to withdraw, as they had no protected property interest in attending the former district's school tuition-free.
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745 F.2d 730·
1st Cir.·
1984-10-12
·cited 8×
The court held that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged due process and taking clause violations arising from a planning board's unreasonable denial of subdivision applications, as state law provided an adequate remedy and the board a
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The court held that the district court correctly applied collateral estoppel to bar the relitigation of claims that were fully and fairly litigated in state court, and that any procedural errors were harmless.
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The District Court erred in dismissing the landlords' claims based on exclusive jurisdiction and the principle of comity (Younger abstention).
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The court held that a prison official's post-hoc affidavit citing security concerns does not resolve the material fact issue of whether the inmate's witness request was arbitrarily denied at the time of the disciplinary hearing.
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The court held that a prior state court action seeking coercive relief, not merely declaratory relief, has the same claim preclusive effect as a full judgment on the merits, barring a subsequent federal § 1983 damages action.
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The court held that plaintiffs failed to establish a constitutionally protected property interest in the Waiver of Liability (WOL) presumption and that the NLMRA, as a federal entity, could not be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for state action.
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737 F.2d 399·
4th Cir.·
1984-06-18
·cited 8×
The court held that the plaintiffs' claims failed because there was insufficient state or federal action, no evidence of Title VI discrimination, lack of standing for the statutory claim, and failure to meet preconditions for the whistleblowing statute.
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The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict for actual and punitive damages, and that the district court did not err in denying summary judgment.
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The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, finding no private cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment and upholding the immunity of the Board members acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. Attorney fees were denied as the plaintiff's claims were not deemed frivolous.
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The court held that the district court, not the court of appeals, is the proper forum to initially address applications for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, even for appellate services.
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The court held that Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 217, which precludes review of bar examination results but allows unlimited retakes, satisfies the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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The court held that the notice provided to Mr. McKee before the sale of his car was insufficient to satisfy due process requirements, and that summary judgment for defendant Heggy was improperly granted.
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The court held that the plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is time-barred because the most analogous state statute of limitations is two years, applicable to defamation and 'false light' invasion of privacy claims. The court affirmed the dismissal of the action.
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The court affirmed the denial of a new trial, holding that the jury's verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on malicious prosecution.
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A section 1983 claim is stated if a plaintiff alleges that a state-provided remedy for property deprivation is constitutionally insufficient due to indigence and inability to access counsel.
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Judicial officers are not immune from attorney fee awards under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 when prospective relief is properly granted against them. The awarded fees were reasonable.
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691 F.2d 297·
7th Cir.·
1982-09-16
·cited 8×
The dissent argues that the 25% signature requirement and the three-question limit are unconstitutional burdens on the right to place advisory questions on the ballot, and that the lower court erred in upholding them.
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685 F.2d 982·
5th Cir.·
1982-09-16
·cited 8×
The court held that the nursing home's decision to discharge a patient was a private action, not state action, and thus did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment or § 1983, and that compliance with the consent decree satisfied related claims.
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The court held that the appellant failed to assert a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest in his continued employment sufficient to invoke due process safeguards.
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Principles of preclusion prevent a federal court from entertaining a § 1983 complaint if the issues have already been finally resolved against the complainant in a state court of competent jurisdiction.
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The court held that Nebraska's legislative prayer practice, involving a paid chaplain of a single denomination and the publication of prayers, violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.