1,055 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 2,310 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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The court held that the district court abused its discretion by imposing severe sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37, which led to a grant of partial summary judgment, and that the plaintiff's fugitive status precludes him from seeking a new trial.
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The court held that attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 can be awarded for work done on a state-law issue certified to a state supreme court, even if the federal § 1983 claim is dismissed as moot, and that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar such an award.
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785 F.2d 557·
6th Cir.·
1986-03-11
·cited 20×
The court held that the parole board's actions were too remote from the victim's death to establish a constitutional deprivation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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A person injured in an automobile accident caused by a police officer's negligent operation of a vehicle does not have a section 1983 cause of action for violation of a federal right, as such negligence does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation.
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The court held that the jury improperly apportioned indivisible actual damages among defendants, requiring vacation of the award and remand for a new trial on actual damages.
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The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying attorney's fees because the plaintiffs were prevailing parties, as their lawsuit was causally linked to the defendants' stipulation not to enforce the sign ordinance.
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783 F.2d 114·
8th Cir.·
1986-01-29
·cited 20×
The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment sua sponte and on issues not properly raised, and that plaintiffs' substantive due process and equal protection claims are not barred by the adequacy of state remedies.
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The court held that the school board and its members in their official capacities are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and that the actual malice standard applies to defamation claims brought by public officials against non-media defendants.
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The court held that the plaintiff received all constitutionally required process before termination, and therefore, her civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was properly dismissed.
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Plaintiffs who achieve a significant benefit through their lawsuit, even without a formal judgment or settlement, can be considered prevailing parties for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if the suit acted as a catalyst for the defendants' actions.
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The court held that dismissing a plaintiff's case with prejudice due to counsel's repeated failures to comply with court orders, without considering alternative sanctions, constituted an abuse of discretion.
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A plaintiff who loses on a Section 1983 claim, even if successful on a pendent state law claim, is not a prevailing party entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
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The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish that the injury resulted from an official policy, custom, or practice of the school district, thus reversing the district court on the section 1983 claim.
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A plaintiff may challenge a pardon or parole decision on equal protection grounds even if they lack a liberty interest for a due process claim.
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A state probation officer is entitled to absolute immunity from civil damages when preparing and submitting a presentence report.
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The court held that the magistrate erred in enjoining the use of Parathion and awarding damages, as the prison officials were immune from liability and their actions did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
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The court held that a parole candidate's claim of denial of access to documents considered by the parole board is cognizable under § 1983 and that the board's own rule mandates such access, implementing due process requirements.
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The court held that a summary judgment rendered without proper notice and opportunity to be heard violates procedural rules and must be vacated.
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The court held that the plaintiff did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment and that private threats made by the mayor did not violate his liberty interest. However, the court remanded for a determination of his First Amendment claim regarding
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The court held that sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that the officer used excessive force, and therefore affirmed the award of compensatory damages.
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The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the claim that prison officials violated a prior injunction requiring careful vetting of trusty shooters, as this injunction established a clearly defined constitutional right. However, summary judgment
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648 F.2d 1104·
7th Cir.·
1981-05-06
·cited 20×
A violation of Title IX requires allegations of intentional discrimination, not merely disparate impact, and the plaintiff failed to allege such intent.
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636 F.2d 283·
10th Cir.·
1980-12-15
·cited 20×
The court held that the Sheriff is an agent of the County for Title VII purposes, and therefore the County is subject to Title VII liability even if the Sheriff's department itself has fewer than 15 employees.
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The court held that neither a court-appointed physician nor an attorney acting in such capacity can be considered state actors for purposes of a § 1983 claim.
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The dissenting judge argues that a public defender, representing an indigent defendant, does not operate under color of state law for the purposes of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. The judge also believes public defenders should have absolute immunity.
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623 F.2d 248·
2d Cir.·
1980-06-02
·cited 20×
A Title VI violation can occur based on discriminatory effect, not solely intent, as established in Lau v. Nichols.
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A party is not entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 unless they are a prevailing party who has essentially succeeded on a claim.
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601 F.2d 914·
6th Cir.·
1979-06-25
·cited 20×
The court held that the district court had the authority under the consent decree to suspend the 'rule of three' to effectuate the decree's affirmative action goals, and did not abuse its discretion in doing so.
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The court held that the panel erred in applying a two-year statute of limitations to § 1983 actions without regard to state survivability rules.
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The court held that the defendants were entitled to have their good faith defense submitted to the jury, as their reliance on an unwritten parole authority policy regarding bond forfeitures was not unreasonable as a matter of law.
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The court held that the trial court erred in failing to make specific findings on the issue of mitigation of damages, requiring remand. The denial of attorney fees was affirmed.
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508 F.2d 1224·
2d Cir.·
1974-12-04
·cited 20×
The court held that the factual allegations in the complaint, taken as true, state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to prisoners' medical needs.
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The court held that allegations of performing surgery without consent and denying necessary pain relief for five days after surgery are sufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and thus summary judgment was improperly granted.
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The dissenting judge would apply Iowa's five-year general statute of limitations to the civil rights action.
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474 F.2d 395·
4th Cir.·
1973-01-15
·cited 20×
The court held that a school district's mandatory maternity leave policy, requiring teachers to cease work five months before expected childbirth, constituted sex discrimination and denied equal protection.
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465 F.2d 1169·
5th Cir.·
1972-09-06
·cited 20×
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The court held that the Kentucky five-year statute of limitations for actions upon a liability created by statute applies to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when no physical injury is involved.
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445 F.2d 412·
7th Cir.·
1971-07-13
·cited 20×
The court held that the expulsion of students from a private parochial school did not constitute state action, and therefore the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply.
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436 F.2d 728·
5th Cir.·
1971-01-14
·cited 20×
The court held that school officials cannot prohibit students from wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War if the protest does not substantially disrupt school discipline, as such armbands are akin to pure speech protected by the First Amendment.
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The court held that the pro se complaint, alleging cruel and unusual punishment for 50.5 hours without food, stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the dismissal was premature.
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A city police officer's tenure rights, derived solely from state law, cannot be vindicated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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Procedural due process claims in zoning matters are not always subject to finality requirements for ripeness.
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The court affirmed the award of compensatory damages but reversed the dismissal of the punitive damages claim, remanding for further proceedings on that issue.
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The court held that a police officer's stop and arrest of an individual for making obscene gestures and yelling profanities, which constituted protected speech, was unlawful and violated clearly established constitutional rights, thus denying qualified immunity. The court also fo
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888 F.2d 899·
1st Cir.·
1989-05-30
·cited 19×
The court held that the arresting officer was not entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiff's right not to be arrested for refusing to answer questions was clearly established and the officer's belief that the arrest was lawful was unreasonable. The court also held tha
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The court held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment, as probable cause existed for the arrest and no duty to investigate further was constitutionally required.
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844 F.2d 1435·
10th Cir.·
1988-04-25
·cited 19×
The court held that the plaintiffs did not possess a property interest in their employment and their liberty interests were not violated, but a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether their First Amendment freedom of association was violated by their discharge bas
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The court held that the statute of limitations for a section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury, and that continuing incarceration is an effect, not a continuing tort.
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838 F.2d 1147·
11th Cir.·
1988-02-29
·cited 19×
The court held that the prisoner had no protected liberty interest in obtaining work-release under the Due Process Clause, and the work-release regulation did not constitute an ex post facto law.
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The court held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for the translator's First Amendment claim, but the issue of qualified immunity for the due process claims of four trust employees should be reconsidered by the district court, and affirmed the denial of qualified