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517 F.2d 826·
5th Cir.·
1975-08-18
·cited 219×
The court held that intervention as of right was not conferred by Congress in this 'pattern or practice' action under Title VII § 707, and thus NOW's appeal for organizational intervention was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
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720 F.2d 1511·
11th Cir.·
1983-12-12
·cited 192×
The court held that the Birmingham Firefighters Association members' motion to intervene was untimely and dismissed their appeal, and affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction to white male firefighters due to a failure to demonstrate irreparable harm.
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427 F.2d 1118·
5th Cir.·
1970-03-02
·cited 127×
The court held that the default judgment entered as a sanction for failure to appear for deposition was a proper and appealable collateral order, and that the government's intervention to assert a tax lien was also proper.
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473 F.2d 118·
D.C. Cir.·
1972-11-13
·cited 92×
Members of a union are entitled to intervene as a matter of right in a suit brought by the Secretary of Labor challenging unlawful trusteeships, even after the litigation has progressed significantly, if their interests are not adequately represented and intervention is timely.
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642 F.2d 1285·
D.C. Cir.·
1980-09-16
·cited 88×
The court held that MCI should have been allowed to intervene as of right to appeal the discovery order, and that the discovery order itself is appealable under the collateral order doctrine.
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430 F.2d 1065·
5th Cir.·
1970-07-31
·cited 77×
The court held that a motion to intervene filed one day after judgment, for the sole purpose of asserting a subrogation interest in an undistributed fund, was timely under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the denial of such motion constituted an abuse of discr
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579 F.2d 188·
2d Cir.·
1978-06-07
·cited 58×
The dissenting judge holds that the National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC) should have been permitted to intervene as of right in the litigation. The judge would reverse the judgment denying intervention.
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420 F.2d 1103·
5th Cir.·
1970-01-07
·cited 58×
The court held that the Ryan doctrine of implied indemnity does not apply to non-maritime, land-based accidents, and that Mississippi's Workmen's Compensation Act bars a third-party tortfeasor from seeking indemnity from the employer.
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486 F.2d 1134·
4th Cir.·
1973-10-15
·cited 56×
The court held that while a municipal corporation cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for equitable relief, the district court's decree remains effective against individual officers and commissions, and the appeals were otherwise lacking in merit.
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630 F.2d 15·
1st Cir.·
1980-09-08
·cited 55×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the labor unions' petitions to intervene, as the petitions were untimely.
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278 F.2d 104·
8th Cir.·
1960-04-26
·cited 55×
The court held that the appellants were entitled to intervene as a matter of right because their interests might be inadequately represented by the existing parties and they might be bound by the judgment, and that their intervention did not divest the court of jurisdiction.
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543 F.2d 224·
D.C. Cir.·
1976-05-06
·cited 54×
An employer seeking to intervene in a class action settlement must demonstrate a timely and legally sufficient interest that is not adequately represented by existing parties, and such intervention may be denied if it risks undoing a hard-won settlement.
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803 F.2d 1135·
11th Cir.·
1986-11-10
·cited 51×
The court affirmed the finding of illegal discrimination and most damages, but vacated punitive damages against some officials and reduced back pay. The court also affirmed the denial of punitive damages against the City and the directed verdict on the Section 1983 claim.
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537 F.2d 915·
7th Cir.·
1976-07-01
·cited 51×
The denial of a motion to intervene as untimely was not an abuse of discretion, as the petitioner delayed unreasonably in seeking to join the litigation.
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203 F.2d 463·
9th Cir.·
1953-04-01
·cited 48×
A stockholder may intervene to appeal a judgment against the corporation if the corporation fails to diligently prosecute the action, even after final judgment.
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144 F.2d 505·
D.C. Cir.·
1944-06-19
·cited 48×
Adjoining property owners have a right to intervene in a suit to enjoin a zoning order if their interests may be inadequately represented by existing parties and their application is timely.
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561 F.2d 904·
D.C. Cir.·
1977-06-15
·cited 44×
Companies seeking to intervene in an environmental settlement agreement oversight proceeding should be allowed to do so as of right because their interests may be impaired and are not adequately represented by existing parties.
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705 F.2d 1502·
9th Cir.·
1983-05-20
·cited 42×
The court held that the retroactive application of the withdrawal liability provision of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act violates employers' due process rights.
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632 F.2d 1045·
3d Cir.·
1980-08-25
·cited 40×
The court held that plaintiffs, who were in privity with parties in prior litigation and failed to intervene timely, were precluded from collaterally attacking a consent decree.
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616 F.2d 1342·
5th Cir.·
1980-05-15
·cited 37×
The court held that the district court had jurisdiction, that the employee was unlawfully discharged, and affirmed the judgment on liability and reinstatement, but modified the damages awarded for back pay and attorney's fees.
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546 F.2d 768·
8th Cir.·
1976-12-13
·cited 36×
The court held that the district court erred in denying the appellants' motion to intervene because their application was timely given the interlocutory nature of the consent decree and the ongoing development of a desegregation plan.
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511 F.2d 303·
8th Cir.·
1975-03-03
·cited 36×
The court held that the denial of the appellants' motion to intervene was not an abuse of discretion because the motion was not timely filed.
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500 F.2d 349·
9th Cir.·
1974-06-21
·cited 36×
The court held that the district court applied an erroneous legal standard by not requiring proof of intent to segregate, and that parents of Chinese ancestry should have been permitted to intervene.
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672 F.2d 381·
4th Cir.·
1982-03-01
·cited 35×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention.
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572 F.2d 657·
9th Cir.·
1978-02-01
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to intervene as untimely after a consent decree had been entered.
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505 F.2d 912·
5th Cir.·
1975-01-02
·cited 32×
Appeals from a three-judge district court's denial of intervention and attorney's fees lie exclusively with the Supreme Court, not the circuit court of appeals.
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747 F.2d 1360·
11th Cir.·
1984-12-04
·cited 31×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification, but did abuse its discretion by failing to consider all four factors for timeliness when denying a motion to intervene.
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697 F.2d 452·
1st Cir.·
1983-01-10
·cited 31×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the applicants' motion to intervene as untimely, affirming the lower court's decision.
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578 F.2d 912·
3d Cir.·
1978-04-17
·cited 30×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the McDonald class's motion to intervene as untimely, and that the McDonald class was not adequately represented by the State or FOP.
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667 F.2d 420·
4th Cir.·
1981-11-05
·cited 29×
The court held that one plaintiff had standing to represent an employee benefit fund and that post-judgment intervention should have been allowed for another fund, while also requiring greater monetary relief including prejudgment interest.
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641 F.2d 317·
5th Cir.·
1981-04-02
·cited 29×
The court held that the district court erred in allowing Windward to intervene because its cross-claim against Tracor lacked a sufficient connection to the main action, failing to meet the requirements for either intervention of right or permissive intervention.
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548 F.2d 1232·
5th Cir.·
1977-03-18
·cited 29×
The court held that the Union's motion to intervene was untimely and dismissed its appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and affirmed the EPA's denial of the Governor's untimely request for postponement.
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403 F.2d 2·
10th Cir.·
1968-10-22
·cited 28×
The court affirmed the trial court's rulings, finding no abuse of discretion in denying intervention, no error in dismissing a cross-complaint, and no reversible error in the trial of the judgment action against the surety.
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657 F.2d 102·
6th Cir.·
1981-08-21
·cited 26×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the labor union's application to intervene as untimely.
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550 F.2d 1115·
8th Cir.·
1977-03-09
·cited 26×
The court held that the plaintiff could not maintain his separate 1975 suit and that his remedy was to intervene in the prior 1973 suit, but affirmed the denial of intervention due to a procedural error.
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520 F.2d 352·
2d Cir.·
1975-06-24
·cited 26×
The court held that white union members were not entitled to intervene as of right in a post-judgment Title VII action because they lacked a significantly protectable interest related to the subject of the litigation.
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929 F.2d 591·
11th Cir.·
1991-02-15
·cited 24×
The court held that the appeal must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was insufficient and intervention was properly denied. The court also refused to sanction the appellant for raising additional claims.
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589 F.2d 300·
7th Cir.·
1978-12-15
·cited 24×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by ordering immediate implementation of specific shower and recreation requirements in the context of a dangerous post-riot prison environment.
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553 F.2d 451·
5th Cir.·
1977-06-06
·cited 24×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to intervene as untimely.
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515 F.2d 946·
7th Cir.·
1975-05-12
·cited 24×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to intervene as untimely, considering the delay in filing and potential prejudice to the original parties.
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418 F.2d 874·
4th Cir.·
1969-11-25
·cited 24×
The court held that parents of pupils have standing to intervene in a school desegregation case, even if the original plaintiff lacked standing.
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799 F.2d 535·
9th Cir.·
1986-09-09
·cited 23×
The court held that the City of Irvine's motions to intervene, both as a matter of right and permissively, were untimely and therefore properly denied by the district court.
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759 F.2d 610·
7th Cir.·
1985-04-08
·cited 23×
The court held that an inmate could intervene as a third-party beneficiary to enforce a consent decree, but erred in voiding the decree's two-year limitation period.
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618 F.2d 48·
9th Cir.·
1980-04-10
·cited 22×
The court held that the district court applied the incorrect legal standard for timeliness and adequacy of representation when denying the Chamber's second motion to intervene, and that a discovery order was not final or appealable.
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495 F.2d 1095·
3d Cir.·
1974-04-18
·cited 22×
The court held that the petitions to intervene were untimely and therefore properly denied, meaning the school districts are not parties and cannot appeal the district court's judgment.
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918 F.2d 763·
9th Cir.·
1990-11-02
·cited 21×
The court held that a claim of intentional vote dilution under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not require proof that the minority group could have constituted a majority in a single-member district at the time of districting. The court affirmed the district court's findi
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782 F.2d 956·
11th Cir.·
1986-02-20
·cited 21×
The majority erred in allowing intervention because the intervenors failed to demonstrate a sufficient interest and likelihood of prejudice.
-
699 F.2d 943·
8th Cir.·
1983-02-02
·cited 21×
The court held that appellants Greyhound Leasing & Financial Corporation and Joyce Rubin were entitled to intervene as of right in the SEC enforcement action under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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889 F.2d 1441·
5th Cir.·
1989-11-29
·cited 20×
The court held that FSLIC Corporate should have been allowed to intervene to defend the notes and liens using defenses available to the original party, but not to assert new federal defenses unique to its status.
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735 F.2d 923·
5th Cir.·
1984-07-09
·cited 20×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Phillips' motion to intervene as untimely, given the long history of the litigation and her awareness of her interests.