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710 F.2d 1040·
5th Cir.·
1983-07-13
·cited 20×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to intervene as untimely, and therefore, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction.
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529 F.2d 570·
9th Cir.·
1976-01-28
·cited 20×
The court held that the district court's amendment allocating 50% of the spring Chinook Salmon run to Indian treaty fishermen was a permissible definition of 'fair share' under the original decree. The court also dismissed appeals from interlocutory orders as moot or non-appealab
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905 F.2d 1424·
10th Cir.·
1990-06-15
·cited 19×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing intervenors access to discovery materials under a modified protective order for use in collateral litigation.
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344 F.2d 571·
2d Cir.·
1965-04-21
·cited 19×
The court held that the board of directors was unduly influenced by a major stockholder and did not adequately represent the interests of the applicants for intervention.
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764 F. Supp. 1495·
S.D. Fla.·
1991-05-21
·cited 18×
The court held that the trade association's lobbying interest was too nebulous to intervene as of right, but granted its motion to appear as amicus curiae.
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922 F.2d 303·
6th Cir.·
1990-12-13
·cited 18×
The court held that a delayed hearing on a motion to intervene is the practical equivalent of a denial, and that a strong likelihood of success on the merits justified granting a stay of the injunction.
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745 F.2d 550·
9th Cir.·
1984-10-16
·cited 18×
The court held that the State of Idaho's application to intervene was timely and should have been granted, as its interests were not adequately represented and no prejudice to existing parties was shown.
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724 F.2d 1224·
6th Cir.·
1984-01-16
·cited 18×
The court held that the inventor was entitled to intervene as of right to appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment invalidating his patents, as his representation by the original plaintiff became inadequate when the plaintiff decided not to appeal.
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647 F.2d 1005·
9th Cir.·
1981-06-12
·cited 18×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting disclosure of grand jury materials and denying intervention as untimely. The court also vacated a subsequent modification of the disclosure order.
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828 F.2d 1186·
6th Cir.·
1987-09-18
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to intervene, either as a matter of right or permissively.
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638 F.2d 753·
5th Cir.·
1981-03-02
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court's decertification of the class and dismissal of the case may work an injustice, and vacated the order to allow further determination of class status and representation.
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612 F.2d 131·
3d Cir.·
1979-12-13
·cited 16×
The court affirmed the denial of the motion to intervene, finding the district court's jurisdictional error harmless because the applicants' interests were adequately represented by other parties and they had other avenues to present their views.
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516 F.2d 1047·
1st Cir.·
1975-05-14
·cited 16×
The court held that the municipality's motion to intervene was untimely, and thus the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying it.
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210 F.2d 665·
10th Cir.·
1954-02-23
·cited 16×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the insurance company's second motions to intervene, and that Kelley remained liable as Wray's employer. The court also affirmed the judgments against Kelley, reduced by the compensation paid.
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747 F.2d 777·
D.C. Cir.·
1984-11-06
·cited 15×
The court held that Senator Helms lacked a legally protectable interest sufficient to confer standing for intervention, affirming the denial of his motion.
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614 F.2d 374·
4th Cir.·
1980-01-22
·cited 15×
The court held that LTIC was entitled to an equitable lien on the recovered funds under the doctrine of unjust enrichment, and affirmed the district court's determination of lien priorities, with a modification regarding architect fees.
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754 F.2d 965·
11th Cir.·
1985-03-08
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court erred in granting the motion to intervene because the application was untimely under the Stallworth factors.
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704 F.2d 389·
7th Cir.·
1983-04-07
·cited 14×
Taxpayers have an unconditional statutory right to intervene in IRS summons enforcement proceedings, and their motions were timely filed, entitling them to an opportunity to be heard.
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669 F.2d 314·
5th Cir.·
1982-03-05
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the NAACP's second motion to intervene as untimely.
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534 F.2d 113·
8th Cir.·
1976-04-16
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying motions to intervene, either as of right or permissively, in a government antitrust suit and consent decree approval process.
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500 F.2d 407·
4th Cir.·
1974-07-19
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to intervene as untimely because the underlying action had been terminated.
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791 F.2d 1481·
11th Cir.·
1986-06-23
·cited 13×
The court held that the intervenors' claim to intervention was not frivolous, and therefore attorney's fees should not be assessed against them on that ground.
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904 F.2d 336·
6th Cir.·
1990-05-21
·cited 12×
The court held that the proposed intervenors, as parties to the consent decree, had a significant legal interest in the litigation, their motion to intervene was timely, and their interests were not adequately represented by the existing parties.
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870 F.2d 343·
6th Cir.·
1989-03-17
·cited 12×
The dissenting judge believes the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying intervention, even under a bifurcated standard of review.
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798 F.2d 969·
7th Cir.·
1986-08-14
·cited 12×
The court held that the applicants' motion to intervene was untimely because they knew or should have known of their interest in the litigation when the 1979 Agreed-to Injunctive Order was entered, and their claimed interests were not protectable.
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765 F.2d 268·
1st Cir.·
1985-06-24
·cited 12×
The court held that the Supreme Court's decision in Firefighters Local No. 1784 v. Stotts does not invalidate the Culbreath consent decree, and therefore the plaintiffs' attempt to intervene and modify the decree was untimely.
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736 F.2d 1416·
10th Cir.·
1984-06-15
·cited 12×
Appellants were entitled to intervene as of right because the government's representation of their interests was potentially inadequate and their interest in the subject matter was sufficient to be impaired by the consent decree.
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672 F.2d 1133·
3d Cir.·
1982-02-01
·cited 12×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying Save Our Schools (SOS) leave to intervene, either as of right or permissively, because their interests were adequately represented by an existing party and intervention would be duplicative.
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431 F.2d 763·
9th Cir.·
1970-08-24
·cited 12×
The Court of Appeals held that the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe's motion to intervene was untimely and that the Tribe lacked the requisite interest in the Carson River waters that were the subject of the litigation.
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704 F.2d 206·
5th Cir.·
1983-05-06
·cited 11×
The court held that the appellant's motion to intervene and set aside the settlement was untimely.
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625 So. 2d 853·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1993-08-17
·cited 10×
In a post-divorce equitable distribution dispute, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's valuation and 50-50 distribution of marital assets, affirmed the denial of the current wife's motion to intervene, and affirmed attorney's fees to the former wife but reversed and rem
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890 F.2d 363·
11th Cir.·
1989-12-11
·cited 10×
The court held that the denial of intervention was appropriate regarding issues already decided but an abuse of discretion regarding issues not yet decided.
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821 F.2d 537·
10th Cir.·
1987-06-18
·cited 10×
The court held that Dome's motion to intervene was untimely and its independent action was properly dismissed due to the Tribe's indispensable status and immunity, and its motion to amend for a refund was barred by the Tucker Act.
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463 So. 2d 404·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1985-01-29
·cited 10×
The payee of a certified check should be permitted to intervene in an action brought by the purchaser against the bank to recover the amount of the check, even if the motion is filed after the litigation has commenced but before final judgment.
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695 F.2d 494·
3d Cir.·
1982-12-09
·cited 10×
The court held that the class certification order was unambiguous in excluding appellants, and their subsequent motions to join the class or intervene were untimely and lacked standing.
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558 F.2d 257·
5th Cir.·
1977-08-29
·cited 10×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the petitions for leave to intervene as untimely, reversing the denial.
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303 F.2d 118·
8th Cir.·
1962-05-16
·cited 10×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying intervention, denying the motion to add a party defendant, and dismissing the action for failure to prosecute.
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231 F.2d 583·
9th Cir.·
1955-12-08
·cited 10×
The dismissal of a petition for intervention was within the trial court's discretion because the petitioner had no legal interest in the property and the application was untimely.
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153 F.2d 715·
6th Cir.·
1946-02-04
·cited 10×
The court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to intervene and petition to reopen, as the appellant failed to establish timely creditor status and the motion was untimely filed after the final decree.
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883 F.2d 281·
4th Cir.·
1989-08-16
·cited 9×
Non-class members lack standing to object to a class action settlement under Rule 23(e), and their motion to intervene was untimely and lacked sufficient interest.
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736 F.2d 384·
7th Cir.·
1984-05-10
·cited 9×
The court held that Saelens' motion to intervene as a matter of right was properly denied because Saelens has adequate alternative forums to assert its claim and its interests are adequately represented by existing parties.
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612 F.2d 1051·
7th Cir.·
1980-01-14
·cited 9×
The court held that the wife's motion to intervene was untimely and she lacked the requisite interest in the bond proceeds, thus affirming the denial of her motion.
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957 F.2d 1199·
5th Cir.·
1992-03-27
·cited 8×
The court held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the employer's action to recover advance payments under the LHWCA, and that the Director should have been permitted to intervene.
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941 F.2d 501·
7th Cir.·
1991-08-20
·cited 8×
The court held that the female appellants and the fathers seeking to intervene lacked standing to appeal the consent decree, affirming the denial of intervention and dismissal of the appeal.
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921 F.2d 924·
9th Cir.·
1990-12-21
·cited 8×
The court held that the City of Chico has a protectable interest in the underlying action and that its interest is not adequately represented by the existing parties, thus entitling it to intervene as of right.
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897 F.2d 243·
7th Cir.·
1990-03-02
·cited 8×
The author concurs with the majority's observation regarding the decline of enthusiasm for quotas, but clarifies their historical necessity.
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878 F.2d 422·
D.C. Cir.·
1989-06-20
·cited 8×
The court held that the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) had alleged sufficient injury-in-fact to establish standing for summary judgment, and that ASARCO's motion to intervene was timely as to its Spanish Gulch claims.
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864 F.2d 796·
Temp. Emer. Ct. App.·
1988-10-14
·cited 8×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying intervention because the motion was untimely and the appellants' interests were adequately represented by existing parties.
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824 F.2d 531·
7th Cir.·
1987-06-19
·cited 8×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to intervene as untimely, considering the delay, prejudice to the original parties, minimal prejudice to the intervenor, and lack of unusual circumstances.
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642 F.2d 1155·
9th Cir.·
1981-03-23
·cited 8×
The court held that the union (ALPA) did not have a right to intervene in a former employee's wrongful discharge suit because its asserted interests were either not legally protectable or were adequately represented by the employer.