-
786 F.2d 504·
2d Cir.·
1986-03-17
·cited 189×
The court held that visual electronic surveillance of private premises can be authorized under Rule 41 and 57(b) if it meets constitutional standards, and that RICO does not require proof of specific knowledge of usurious interest rates for conviction.
-
560 F.2d 507·
2d Cir.·
1977-07-28
·cited 176×
-
561 F.2d 1160·
5th Cir.·
1977-10-26
·cited 154×
The court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the arrest was valid, the search was a permissible security sweep, and the defendant was not denied a speedy trial.
-
663 F.2d 1173·
2d Cir.·
1981-10-30
·cited 118×
Improper prosecutorial statements in summation do not warrant reversal if they do not cause substantial prejudice to the defendant, especially when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming.
-
315 F.2d 584·
2d Cir.·
1963-03-21
·cited 116×
The court held that knowledge of a conspiracy does not equate to participation, and reversed the conviction of one appellant due to insufficient evidence of his involvement. It also reversed another's conviction due to the improper admission of hearsay evidence without limiting i
-
887 F.2d 1141·
2d Cir.·
1989-10-11
·cited 99×
The court held that the length and complexity of the trial, spillover prejudice, and publicity did not substantially prejudice the defendants, and thus severance was not required.
-
550 F.2d 435·
9th Cir.·
1976-12-23
·cited 88×
The court held that a fugitive's appeal is subject to dismissal and that various evidentiary and procedural rulings by the trial court did not constitute reversible error.
-
846 F.2d 1384·
D.C. Cir.·
1988-04-12
·cited 82×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish a single chain conspiracy for distributing cocaine and laundering its proceeds, and that the appellants' actions were in furtherance of this overarching objective. The court affirmed convictions except for one sentencin
-
697 F.2d 421·
D.C. Cir.·
1983-01-07
·cited 81×
The Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) must file petitions for judicial review of arbitrator decisions within 30 days of notice, and is not required to seek reconsideration first. Judicial review of such decisions is discretionary and limited to exceptional case
-
634 F.2d 248·
5th Cir.·
1981-01-15
·cited 80×
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) did not err in treating the petitioner's motion to reopen as a new application for adjustment of status because his new investment was made after his original application was denied and after a period of no investment.
-
883 F.2d 1125·
2d Cir.·
1989-06-29
·cited 71×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Larca, the denial of severance motions was not an abuse of discretion, the use of an anonymous jury was justified and properly managed, expert testimony was admissible, redacted statements were admissible under Bruton, an
-
903 F.2d 91·
2d Cir.·
1990-05-07
·cited 62×
The court affirmed the convictions, finding no reversible error in the sufficiency of the evidence, prosecutorial summation, or jury deliberation procedures.
-
658 F.2d 835·
D.C. Cir.·
1981-06-17
·cited 60×
The admission of a statement made by Lockheed's counsel during a hearing on third-party claims as an evidentiary admission of injury in the main action was prejudicial error requiring reversal and new trials in Schneider and Marchetti.
-
336 So. 2d 71·
Fla.·
1976-05-26
·cited 57×
Florida Supreme Court affirmed that an automobile insurance carrier may deny coverage based on an insured's material breach of a cooperation clause, even in light of modern insurance mandates and no-fault reforms. The court held that insurers may avoid liability when the insured
-
874 F.2d 1255·
9th Cir.·
1989-04-25
·cited 56×
The court held that the admission of detailed polygraph examination testimony was an abuse of discretion and prejudicial, requiring reversal of the conviction.
-
612 F.2d 1182·
9th Cir.·
1980-01-31
·cited 55×
The court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by government intrusion into his attorney-client relationship because the intrusion did not substantially prejudice him, and no binding agreement for dismissal of charges was reached.
-
449 So. 2d 350·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1984-04-03
·cited 53×
Florida Aviation Academy and related defendants appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to set aside a default judgment entered against them for allegedly owing Charter Air Center $88,844.75 plus interest and costs. The appellate court reversed, holding that the defenda
-
566 F.2d 1377·
9th Cir.·
1978-01-13
·cited 52×
The dissenting judge argues that the majority erred in finding no actual prejudice from the delay, asserting that the district court's finding of substantial prejudice should be affirmed.
-
550 F.2d 1159·
9th Cir.·
1977-02-11
·cited 50×
The court held that repeating the Allen charge under the circumstances was not reversible error, as it did not constitute an unwarranted intrusion into trial court discretion or coerce the jury.
-
556 F.2d 1179·
5th Cir.·
1977-05-18
·cited 46×
The court held that pre-indictment delay did not violate due process, FBI computer printouts were properly admitted as summaries, and the prosecutor's improper closing argument was harmless error.
-
523 F.2d 1099·
D.C. Cir.·
1975-11-28
·cited 44×
The court affirmed all convictions, finding that the arguments raised by the appellants lacked substantial merit.
-
704 F.2d 1325·
5th Cir.·
1983-05-16
·cited 43×
The court held that the petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, both at the guilt and sentencing phases, were without merit because the alleged deficiencies did not demonstrate actual, substantial prejudice to the defense.
-
345 So. 2d 648·
Fla.·
1977-03-03
·cited 41×
United Telephone Company challenged a Florida Public Service Commission order setting its rate of return at 9.10% overall (11.28% return on equity), granting only partial rate relief. The Supreme Court upheld the Commission's decision, finding no deviation from the essential requ
-
692 F.2d 354·
5th Cir.·
1982-11-29
·cited 39×
The court held that while the prosecution's failure to disclose evidence was troubling, it did not rise to the level of reversible error due to lack of substantial prejudice or harmless error. However, the trial court erred in denying a competency hearing based on unrebutted psyc
-
641 F.2d 218·
5th Cir.·
1981-03-30
·cited 38×
The court held that a protest return containing constitutional objections instead of financial information does not constitute a valid tax return and does not justify a Fifth Amendment claim against prosecution for willful failure to file.
-
137 F.2d 995·
2d Cir.·
1943-05-28
·cited 36×
The dissenting judge argues that the conviction of defendants other than Liss and Conte should be reversed due to a fundamentally unfair trial. The judge contends that the jury was likely confused by a misleading indictment charging one conspiracy when evidence showed three disti
-
504 F.2d 1345·
9th Cir.·
1974-10-03
·cited 33×
The court held that the denial of investigative funds did not violate due process or equal protection because the defendant failed to demonstrate substantial prejudice by clear and convincing evidence.
-
283 F.2d 407·
5th Cir.·
1960-11-09
·cited 33×
The court held that while the district court erred in refusing to compel the defendant to answer interrogatories, this error did not affect the substantial rights of the parties and thus did not warrant reversal.
-
506 F.2d 455·
2d Cir.·
1974-11-08
·cited 32×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support convictions for a single, wide-ranging narcotics conspiracy and substantive violations, and that various procedural and constitutional claims raised by the appellants lacked merit.
-
531 F.2d 196·
4th Cir.·
1976-01-23
·cited 30×
The Sixth Amendment speedy trial guarantee is not triggered by military proceedings that do not amount to a formal arrest or indictment.
-
825 F.2d 320·
11th Cir.·
1987-08-21
·cited 29×
The court held that the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice from the admission of his immigration file, and thus his conviction stands.
-
689 F.2d 21·
2d Cir.·
1982-09-20
·cited 26×
The court held that the government's conduct in the ABSCAM operation, as it related to Carpentier, was not so outrageous as to violate his due process rights, and his entrapment and severance claims were without merit.
-
665 So. 2d 244·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1995-10-05
·cited 25×
A Florida appellate court reversed a trial court's enforcement of a 29-year-old child support arrearage, holding that the husband successfully established the affirmative defense of laches. The wife's 30-year delay in seeking enforcement, combined with the husband's substantial r
-
599 F.2d 1149·
2d Cir.·
1979-04-30
·cited 25×
The court held that the government had a sufficient prosecutorial interest in delaying the unsealing of an indictment to avoid tipping off other defendants, and that the defendant did not suffer substantial actual prejudice from this delay.
-
777 F.2d 1200·
7th Cir.·
1985-11-18
·cited 24×
The court held that prosecutorial misconduct did not warrant dismissal of the indictment and that there was sufficient evidence for admitting extrajudicial statements.
-
646 F.2d 1033·
5th Cir.·
1981-06-01
·cited 24×
The court held that punitive damages and attorneys' fees are not recoverable under Rule 10b-5, but may be available under pendent state claims, and affirmed the jury's findings regarding due diligence and the applicability of the Florida Blue Sky Law.
-
121 F.2d 927·
3d Cir.·
1941-06-23
·cited 24×
The court held that the prosecutor's persistent questioning about a prior conviction, which the defendant denied and which was not proven, was prejudicial error requiring reversal.
-
741 F.2d 1434·
D.C. Cir.·
1984-08-24
·cited 22×
The court held that the prosecutor's repeated comments on the defendant's silence, particularly in a case with a questionable witness, constituted reversible error because they were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
-
453 F.2d 1328·
3d Cir.·
1972-01-10
·cited 22×
The court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and F.R.Crim.P. 48(b) do not apply to pre-indictment, pre-arrest delay, and that Fifth Amendment due process requires substantial prejudice to prove a violation from such delay.
-
855 F.2d 652·
9th Cir.·
1988-08-31
·cited 21×
The court held that ordering reassignment of a case to a different judge, even to preserve the appearance of justice, can be punitive and unjust if the judge is deemed capable of trying the case fairly.
-
821 F.2d 1498·
11th Cir.·
1987-06-30
·cited 21×
The court held that the government violated the Speedy Trial Act by improperly extending the indictment period and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing reprosecution without prejudice.
-
803 F.2d 804·
5th Cir.·
1986-05-28
·cited 18×
The court held that proceeding with a deportation hearing in absentia does not violate due process if the alien had a reasonable opportunity to attend and failed to show reasonable cause for absence or substantial prejudice.
-
221 F.2d 351·
5th Cir.·
1955-04-15
·cited 18×
The court held that the indictment was not duplicitous and the proof did not show a material variance, affirming the convictions because any potential errors did not substantially prejudice the appellants.
-
748 F.2d 1077·
5th Cir.·
1984-12-21
·cited 16×
The court held that the student received adequate procedural due process for both his short-term suspension and subsequent expulsion, and that the district court did not err in denying injunctive relief.
-
384 So. 2d 904·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1980-06-03
·cited 16×
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company appeals a trial court judgment finding insurance coverage for an incident in which the insured defendant fired a gun, killing a person. The court affirms, holding that the insured's lack of intent to kill, her conviction for second-degree
-
546 So. 2d 1143·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1989-07-25
·cited 15×
The court reversed a jury verdict for an insurance company, finding that the insurer's counsel improperly prejudiced the jury by suggesting the insured was involved in drug trafficking. This prejudice likely impacted the close case, warranting a new trial.
-
814 F.2d 134·
3d Cir.·
1987-03-19
·cited 14×
The court held that the trial judge's inquiry into juror prejudice was sufficient, and the defendant failed to demonstrate substantial prejudice, thus a new trial was not warranted.
-
550 F.2d 115·
3d Cir.·
1977-01-12
·cited 14×
The court held that the trial judge's private conference with the jury foreman, which conveyed the impression that a verdict was required, coerced the jury and necessitates reversal of the convictions.
-
853 F.2d 1103·
3d Cir.·
1988-08-04
·cited 13×
The court held that the admission of Agent Farrell's testimony, which interpreted recorded conversations as referring to 'phony' documents when the transcripts did not explicitly state this, was improper and substantially prejudiced the appellant.
-
794 F.2d 1285·
8th Cir.·
1986-06-20
·cited 13×
The court should not have affirmed the lower court's decision because the government's excessive preindictment delay caused substantial prejudice to the defendant's ability to present a defense.