UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
JUAN PEREZ ET AL., APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company appeals a trial court judgment finding insurance coverage for an incident in which the insured defendant fired a gun, killing a person. The court affirms, holding that the insured's lack of intent to kill, her conviction for second-degree murder based on recklessness, and her failure to cooperate with the insurer do not defeat coverage under the policy.
The court affirmed the judgment, holding that: (1) insurance coverage exists because the insured did not intend to harm the decedent but only to frighten him, and death resulted from accident, recklessness, and culpable negligence; (2) the conviction for second-degree murder does not defeat coverage, as Florida law recognizes that recklessly firing into a crowd constitutes second-degree murder even without intent to kill; (3) the insured's failure to cooperate did not substantially prejudice the insurer because the insured's testimony would have established negligence and thus supported coverage; and (4) the trial court properly admitted the insured's criminal testimony as relevant evidence on the prejudice issue, not for its truth.
[1] Insurance coverage exists for an incident where the insured's intent was to frighten, not harm, the victim, and the death was accidental, reckless, or due to culpable neg…
[2] A conviction for second-degree murder does not defeat insurance coverage when the killing resulted from recklessly firing a gun into a crowd without intent to hit or kill…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“There was insurance coverage for the incident sued upon under the subject insurance policy because it is properly inferable from this record that the insured defendant [Maria Otero] did not intend to harm the plaintiff's decedent [Johnny Perez], but only to frighten him, when she fired her gun and accidently, recklessly and through culpable negligence killed him”
Establishes that lack of intent to kill, combined with accidental death through recklessness and negligence, preserves insurance coverage.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMaria Otero, the insured defendant, fired a gun intending only to frighten Johnny Perez but accidentally killed him through reckless and culpably negl…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Substantial Prejudice cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The final judgment on insurance coverage, which was entered below after a non-jury trial and is now under review by this appeal, is affirmed upon a holding that:
1. There was insurance coverage for the incident sued upon under the subject insurance policy because it is properly inferable from this record that the insured defendant [Maria Otero] did not intend to harm the plaintiff’s decedent [Johnny Perez], but only to frighten him, when she fired her gun and accidently, recklessly and through culpable negligence killed him; Cuna Mutual Casualty Co. v. Adamides, 334 So. 2d 75, 76 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. Thomas, 301 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
2. The insured defendant’s conviction for second degree murder [§ 782.04(2), Fla.Stat. (1979)] based on the subject incident does not defeat the insurance coverage herein as the law is well-settled that recklessly firing a gun into a crowd of people constitutes second degree murder when a person is killed thereby even though, as here, the defendant has no intent to hit or kill anyone. Golding v. State, 26 Fla. 530, 8 So. 311 (1890); 16 Fla.Jur.2d “Criminal Law” § 1059 (1979); LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law 543 (1972).
3. The insured defendant’s failure to cooperate did not result in substantial prejudice to the defendant insurer [United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.] so as to defeat coverage under the subject insurance policy because the defendant insured’s testimony could not possibly have been beneficial to the said insurer; the record clearly demonstrates that such testimony would have established the insured defendant’s negligence in this cause and, accordingly, the presence of insurance coverage under the subject policy. Ramos v. Northwestern Mutual Insurance Co., 336 So. 2d 71, 75 (Fla.1976).
4. The defendant insured’s testimony given at the criminal proceedings herein was properly admitted at the non-jury trial by the trial court on the issue of whether the defendant insurer was prejudiced by the defendant insured’s non-cooperation as such evidence was relevant on the subject issue and was not otherwise inadmissible as hearsay; such testimony was not admitted to prove the truth of the matter stated, but only to show that such testimony was, in fact, the insured’s position in this cause. Pauline v. Lee, 147 So. 2d 359, 363 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962); § 90.801(l)(c), Fla.Stat. (1979).
5. No other reversible error is shown on this record. The defendant insurer’s “precautionary” appeal from the final judgment on damages after a subsequent non-jury trial in this cause is also affirmed as no point on appeal is directed to such judgment.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Irven George Pressley v. State, 395 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…defendant has no intent to hit or kill anyone, firing a gun into a crowd of people constitutes second degree murder when a person is killed as a result. Golding v. State, 26 Fla. 530, 8 So. 311 (1890); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Perez, 384 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). In the instant case, moreover, there is evidence that the appellant did intend to either kill or cause serious bodily injury to Eddie Reddick. As a matter of law, this original malice is transferred from the one against whom it w…
-
Wright v. State, 402 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…er. We disagree. If Wright’s act caused the death of Hall, then her contention that she intended only to harm, not kill, is unavailing. Hines v. State, 227 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969). See also United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Perez, 384 So. 2d 904 (Fla.3d DCA 1980) (“recklessly firing a gun into a crowd of people constitutes second degree murder when a person is killed thereby even though . .. the defendant had no intent to hit or kill anyone”); Berry v. State, 114 Fla. 73, 153 So. 507 (1934)…
-
de Ferrari v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 613 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…breach of cooperation clause case ... the insurer must show a material failure to cooperate which substantially prejudiced the insured. See Ramos v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 336 So. 2d 71 (Fla.1976); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Perez, 384 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 392 So. 2d 1381 (Fla.1980); Torres v. Protective Nat’l Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Korschun, 350 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1216 (Fla.1978). We conclu…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pauline v. LEE, 147 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Ramos v. Nw. Mut. Ins. Co. & Lawrence J. Williams, 336 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1976)
- Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Thomas, 301 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Cuna Mut. Ins. Soc'y v. Adamides, 334 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Golding v. State, 26 Fla. 530 (Fla. 1890)