Sandstrom V. Montana

140 Florida cases classified under this topic · sorted by citation count · browse and sort

• State v. Batraville Vincent Delva
  575 So. 2d 643· Fla.· 1991-02-21 ·cited 319×
  Failure to instruct a jury that the defendant knew the substance was cocaine is not fundamental error when the defendant's knowledge of the nature of the substance was not an issue in the case, even absent trial objection. Such error may only be preserved through contemporaneous
• Ford v. Strickland
  696 F.2d 804· 11th Cir.· 1983-01-07 ·cited 214×
  The court held that the Florida Supreme Court's practice of considering non-record material on direct appeal in capital cases violates due process, and that failure to require full resentencing after invalidating aggravating factors is an error.
• Brooks v. Kemp
  762 F.2d 1383· 11th Cir.· 1985-05-31 ·cited 177×
  The court denied petitions for rehearing, with a dissenting opinion arguing the majority's prejudice test conflicts with Supreme Court precedent.
• Holloway v. Clay E. McELROY
  632 F.2d 605· 5th Cir.· 1980-12-11 ·cited 115×
  The court held that the state impermissibly shifted the burden of persuasion on the issue of self-defense to the defendant, violating due process, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction under the Jackson v. Virginia standard.
• Drake v. Kemp
  762 F.2d 1449· 11th Cir.· 1985-05-31 ·cited 96×
  The court held that a Sandstrom violation occurred and was not harmless error. The prosecutor's argument also rendered the sentencing phase fundamentally unfair.
• Curfew Davis v. Kemp
  752 F.2d 1515· 11th Cir.· 1985-01-24 ·cited 88×
  The court held that the distinction between non-participation and mens rea defenses is flawed and that a Sandstrom error cannot be harmless when intent is an element of the crime.
• Gates v. Zant
  863 F.2d 1492· 11th Cir.· 1989-01-06 ·cited 86×
  The court held that the petitioner was not denied effective assistance of counsel and that his other claims regarding the jury venire, videotaped confession, and jury instructions lacked merit.
• Spencer v. Zant
  715 F.2d 1562· 11th Cir.· 1983-09-30 ·cited 82×
• Stephens v. Kemp
  846 F.2d 642· 11th Cir.· 1988-04-22 ·cited 77×
  The court held that a jury instruction creating a presumption of intent is unconstitutional but the error was harmless because the defendant raised self-defense, thereby conceding the intent to kill, and alternatively, the evidence of intent was overwhelming. The court also held
• Tucker v. Kemp
  762 F.2d 1496· 11th Cir.· 1985-05-31 ·cited 77×
• Presnell v. Kemp
  835 F.2d 1567· 11th Cir.· 1988-01-11 ·cited 74×
  The court held that the cause and prejudice standard from Wainwright v. Sykes applies to claims barred by a state's successive petition rule, and the petitioner bears the burden of proving cause and prejudice.
• Hall v. Louie L. Wainwright
  733 F.2d 766· 11th Cir.· 1984-05-16 ·cited 74×
  The court held that a defendant may waive their right to be present at critical stages of a capital trial, and the specific circumstances of the defendant's absence during voir dire require further inquiry into knowing and voluntary waiver.
• United States v. Clemons
  843 F.2d 741· 3d Cir.· 1988-03-31 ·cited 64×
  The court held that the prosecutor's explanation for striking black jurors was race-neutral and complied with Batson, and that while the jury instruction on the witness intimidation statute was problematic, any error was harmless.
• United States v. Gering
  716 F.2d 615· 9th Cir.· 1983-09-19 ·cited 60×
  The court held that the mail cover did not violate the defendant's First Amendment rights and that costs of prosecution were properly taxed. However, the restitution order was impermissible as it exceeded the amounts alleged in the indictment.
• Collins v. Francis
  728 F.2d 1322· 11th Cir.· 1984-03-15 ·cited 56×
  The court held that the trial judge's jury instruction on intent, while erroneous, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the defendant's intent to kill was not a contested issue. The court also found that the statutory aggravating circumstance was properly applied and th
• Tilden N. Engle v. Koehler
  707 F.2d 241· 6th Cir.· 1983-05-09 ·cited 54×
  Jury instructions that could have shifted the burden of proof on malice and intent to the defendant are unconstitutional under Sandstrom v. Montana and are not harmless error when the defense is lack of mens rea.
• Tyler v. Phelps
  643 F.2d 1095· 5th Cir.· 1981-04-27 ·cited 46×
  The court held that while the jury charge on presumptions was unconstitutional, federal habeas relief was barred by procedural default due to the failure to object at trial, absent a showing of cause.
• Jarrell v. Balkcom
  735 F.2d 1242· 11th Cir.· 1984-06-20 ·cited 43×
  The court held that the petitioner's confession was not tainted by an illegal arrest, unlawful inducement, or stale Miranda warnings, and that the trial court conducted an adequate voluntariness hearing.
• Dietz v. Warden
  640 F.2d 126· 8th Cir.· 1981-01-30 ·cited 43×
  A jury instruction creating a burden-shifting presumption of intent violates due process and requires federal habeas relief, even if not objected to at trial, provided the petitioner can show cause for the failure to object.
• Berrisford v. Wood
  826 F.2d 747· 8th Cir.· 1987-08-14 ·cited 42×
  The court affirmed the denial of the habeas petition, finding no constitutional error in the admission of evidence or jury instructions, and sufficient evidence for the conviction.
• United States v. Lentz
  624 F.2d 1280· 5th Cir.· 1980-08-25 ·cited 42×
  The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict regarding the 'wire communication' element and that the defendants' claims of entrapment, due process violations, evidentiary errors, and indictment issues were without merit.
• Wilburn Dobbs v. Kemp
  790 F.2d 1499· 11th Cir.· 1986-05-21 ·cited 41×
  The court held that while the trial court's jury instruction impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on intent, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to overwhelming evidence of intent. The court also affirmed the reliability of witness identifications despite su
• Houston Earl Mays v. Balkcom
  631 F.2d 48· 5th Cir.· 1980-11-19 ·cited 41×
• Gunn v. Lanson Newsome
  881 F.2d 949· 11th Cir.· 1989-08-07 ·cited 39×
• Booker v. Louie L. Wainwright
  703 F.2d 1251· 11th Cir.· 1983-04-25 ·cited 37×
  The court held that the prosecutor's use of psychiatric examination information during cross-examination for impeachment purposes was permissible, and that the jury instructions did not unconstitutionally limit consideration of mitigating factors.
• Prihoda v. McCAUGHTRY
  910 F.2d 1379· 7th Cir.· 1990-08-14 ·cited 36×
• Potts v. Zant
  734 F.2d 526· 11th Cir.· 1984-05-29 ·cited 36×
  The court held that a prosecutor's misrepresentation of state law regarding jury sentimentality was improper and potentially unconstitutional.
• Drake v. Francis
  727 F.2d 990· 11th Cir.· 1984-02-29 ·cited 34×
• Smith v. Lanson Newsome and Michael Bowers
  876 F.2d 1461· 11th Cir.· 1989-06-19 ·cited 32×
  The court held that the trial court did not err in its handling of potential conflicts of interest regarding joint representation and that faulty jury instructions on intent were harmless error given the facts of the case.
• Muench v. Israel
  715 F.2d 1124· 7th Cir.· 1983-08-15 ·cited 30×
  The dissenting judge would grant the writs, finding the state's justifications for excluding psychiatric testimony on mens rea unpersuasive.
• Fornash v. Marshall
  686 F.2d 1179· 6th Cir.· 1982-08-16 ·cited 30×
  The court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate actual prejudice from the jury instructions and did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.
• Guthrie v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary
  683 F.2d 820· 4th Cir.· 1982-07-06 ·cited 30×
  The dissenting judge holds that the jury instructions did not improperly place the burden of proof for self-defense on the defendant.
• United States v. Vreeken
  803 F.2d 1085· 10th Cir.· 1986-10-21 ·cited 29×
  The court held that Kurt Vreeken waived his rule of speciality claim by failing to raise it timely, and that other alleged errors, including the exclusion of evidence and jury instructions, were either harmless or within the trial court's discretion.
• Franklin v. Francis
  720 F.2d 1206· 11th Cir.· 1983-11-16 ·cited 29×
  A jury instruction creating a mandatory rebuttable presumption that a person intends the natural consequences of their voluntary acts unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof on the element of intent, violating due process.
• Conway v. Anderson
  698 F.2d 282· 6th Cir.· 1983-01-21 ·cited 28×
  The court held that a jury instruction creating a mandatory presumption of intent, similar to that in Sandstrom v. Montana, was harmless error in this case because the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated the perpetrators' intent.
• Bowen v. Kemp
  769 F.2d 672· 11th Cir.· 1985-08-06 ·cited 27×
  The petitioner lacks standing to assert an Equal Protection claim based on the underrepresentation of women on the jury pool, as he is not a member of the underrepresented group.
• Albert v. Montgomery
  732 F.2d 865· 11th Cir.· 1984-05-21 ·cited 26×
  The admission of evidence concerning a prior offense for which the appellant was acquitted violated the constitutional principle of collateral estoppel, and this error was not harmless.
• Pigee v. Israel
  670 F.2d 690· 7th Cir.· 1982-02-03 ·cited 26×
  The dissenting judge believes the jury instruction unconstitutionally presumed intent, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, violating due process.
• Nelson v. Scully
  672 F.2d 266· 2d Cir.· 1982-01-28 ·cited 26×
  The court held that a jury instruction on the presumption of intent, when viewed in the context of the entire charge which emphasized the presumption of innocence and the state's burden to prove specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt, did not violate due process.
• Tyler v. Phelps
  622 F.2d 172· 5th Cir.· 1980-07-24 ·cited 26×
  The court held that a jury charge creating a presumption that a defendant intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts, when intent is a disputed element, unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof. This unconstitutionality requires habeas relief even if the defen
• Clark v. Maggio
  737 F.2d 471· 5th Cir.· 1984-07-30 ·cited 24×
  The court held that the state judge's jury charge did not violate the accused's constitutional rights, and while the admission of a codefendant's statements violated the confrontation clause, it did not prejudice the defendant.
• Al Mancuso v. Harris
  677 F.2d 206· 2d Cir.· 1982-04-13 ·cited 24×
  The court held that the jury charge, when viewed in its entirety and in the context of the specific charges and defenses, did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defendant regarding intent for the underlying felony.
• McGUINN v. Crist
  657 F.2d 1107· 9th Cir.· 1981-10-01 ·cited 24×
  The court held that the erroneous jury instruction regarding the presumption of intent was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt because any reasonable juror would have found the defendant acted knowingly or purposely given the evidence.
• Baker v. Muncy
  619 F.2d 327· 4th Cir.· 1980-04-24 ·cited 24×
  Jury instructions that created a mandatory presumption of premeditation unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof from the State to the defendant, violating due process.
• Curfew Davis v. Zant
  721 F.2d 1478· 11th Cir.· 1983-12-27 ·cited 23×
  The trial court's jury instruction on malice unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to the petitioner, and this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Colin Clark v. La. State Penitentiary & Attorney Gen.
  694 F.2d 75· 5th Cir.· 1982-12-07 ·cited 23×
  The court held that a jury instruction which allowed co-conspirators to be held responsible for a murder committed during a robbery, without requiring proof of specific intent to kill by the defendant, violated the Fourteenth Amendment by relieving the state of its burden of proo
• Collins v. Zant
  892 F.2d 1502· 11th Cir.· 1990-01-08 ·cited 22×
  The court held that both the Sandstrom and Jackson claims must be dismissed under Rule 9(b) as successive petitions, and the district court's denial of relief is affirmed.
• Coleman v. McCORMICK
  874 F.2d 1280· 9th Cir.· 1989-05-05 ·cited 22×
  The court held that the defendant's sentence must be reversed due to procedural issues in place at the time of trial regarding capital punishment hearings.
• High v. Kemp
  819 F.2d 988· 11th Cir.· 1987-06-04 ·cited 22×
  The court held that the jury instructions regarding mitigating circumstances were adequate and that the prosecutor's comments about other murders did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. The court also found that Batson v. Kentucky does not apply retroactively to collateral
• Vito Matarese v. LeFEVRE
  801 F.2d 98· 2d Cir.· 1986-09-12 ·cited 22×
  The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the original habeas corpus judgment due to an untimely notice of appeal, but it had jurisdiction to review the denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion.