-
665 F.2d 649·
5th Cir.·
1982-01-11
·cited 22×
-
649 F.2d 428·
6th Cir.·
1981-05-21
·cited 22×
The dissenting judge argues that the majority erred in granting habeas relief based on a single word in jury instructions, as the instructions as a whole were not prejudicial and the conviction was supported by overwhelming evidence.
-
805 F.2d 569·
5th Cir.·
1986-12-10
·cited 20×
The court held that federal habeas relief is barred by the procedural default rule (Wainwright v. Sykes) when a petitioner fails to make a contemporaneous objection in state court, unless cause and prejudice are shown.
-
763 F.2d 811·
6th Cir.·
1985-06-10
·cited 20×
The court held that the petitioner's Sandstrom claim is procedurally barred due to failure to object at trial, and the trial judge's comment did not render the trial fundamentally unfair.
-
683 F.2d 1056·
7th Cir.·
1982-07-16
·cited 18×
The court held that a judge's ex parte communication with the jury during deliberations, violating Rule 43(a), requires reversal of the affected conviction, but other convictions may stand if unaffected.
-
670 F.2d 1358·
4th Cir.·
1982-02-16
·cited 17×
-
871 F.2d 18·
4th Cir.·
1989-03-28
·cited 16×
The court held that the appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice from his counsel's failure to object to a jury instruction, thus the procedural bar foreclosed review of the Sandstrom violation.
-
821 F.2d 1054·
5th Cir.·
1987-07-03
·cited 16×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and death sentence, and that petitioner's federal constitutional rights were not violated.
-
778 F.2d 1044·
5th Cir.·
1985-12-17
·cited 16×
The court held that the petitioner is procedurally barred from raising a due process claim regarding jury instructions because his trial counsel failed to object, and he failed to demonstrate cause for this failure.
-
767 F.2d 679·
10th Cir.·
1985-07-05
·cited 16×
The court held that a jury instruction creating a mandatory rebuttable presumption of criminal intent unconstitutionally shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant.
-
728 F.2d 1389·
11th Cir.·
1984-04-02
·cited 16×
The dissenting judge would affirm the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief, finding the jury instruction constitutional and the defendant not prejudiced by any alleged defect.
-
718 F.2d 979·
11th Cir.·
1983-10-13
·cited 16×
The court held that a defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney actively represents conflicting interests and fails to present mitigating evidence at sentencing, and prejudice is presumed in conflict of interest cases.
-
719 F.2d 166·
6th Cir.·
1983-10-13
·cited 16×
The court held that the defendant's statement after being informed of his rights was not a waiver of his right to remain silent and should not have been introduced by the government.
-
686 F. Supp. 1523·
S.D. Fla.·
1988-06-01
·cited 15×
The court denies the writ of habeas corpus for claims I, III, and IV, finding them procedurally barred or without merit, but orders an evidentiary hearing for claim II regarding competency to be executed.
-
836 F.2d 1557·
11th Cir.·
1988-03-01
·cited 14×
The court held that an unconstitutional jury instruction shifting the burden of proof on intent was not harmless error given evidence of a dissociative attack, but that the introduction of a state psychiatrist's testimony did not violate the defendant's right to counsel. The cour
-
801 F.2d 252·
6th Cir.·
1986-09-18
·cited 14×
A jury instruction that impermissibly shifts the burden of proof on mens rea, violating Sandstrom v. Montana, is subject to the Chapman harmless error standard and is not automatically reversible if the defendant contested intent.
-
785 F.2d 890·
11th Cir.·
1986-03-13
·cited 14×
The court held that while the jury instruction on intent was constitutionally infirm, the error was harmless because the evidence overwhelmingly proved intent and the defendant did not affirmatively raise intent as an issue.
-
766 F.2d 452·
11th Cir.·
1985-07-08
·cited 14×
The court held that the unconstitutional burden-shifting jury instruction on intent was not harmless error because the issue of intent was actively contested at trial.
-
733 F.2d 737·
10th Cir.·
1984-05-07
·cited 14×
The court held that the jury instruction did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof, and therefore, no Sandstrom error occurred.
-
750 F.2d 798·
9th Cir.·
1984-12-28
·cited 13×
The court held that the Arizona Court of Appeals did not apply a procedural bar when it addressed the merits of Huffman's federal constitutional claim, and that the jury instructions, when viewed as a whole, did not create an unconstitutional presumption that shifted the burden o
-
831 F.2d 1251·
5th Cir.·
1987-11-16
·cited 12×
The court held that the petitioner waived his Sandstrom claim due to failure to object at trial, Batson is not retroactive on collateral review, ineffective assistance of counsel was not demonstrated, joinder of charges was not prejudicial, and evidence was sufficient for convict
-
773 F.2d 711·
6th Cir.·
1985-09-30
·cited 12×
The court affirmed the denial of the habeas corpus petition, holding that any errors in the state trial were either harmless beyond a reasonable doubt or did not rise to the level of constitutional violations.
-
728 F.2d 266·
6th Cir.·
1984-07-03
·cited 12×
The court held that the appellant's failure to raise constitutional objections to jury instructions at trial procedurally barred federal habeas review, absent a showing of cause and prejudice, and that her other claims were without merit.
-
683 F.2d 697·
2d Cir.·
1982-06-29
·cited 12×
The dissenting judge argues that the majority opinion incorrectly upholds a jury instruction on intent that violates the Supreme Court's precedent in Sandstrom v. Montana.
-
653 F.2d 799·
3d Cir.·
1981-06-30
·cited 12×
The court held that the pretrial publicity did not create a presumption of prejudice, the voir dire was not unconstitutionally restrictive, and the felony-murder jury instructions did not violate due process.
-
685 F.2d 35·
2d Cir.·
1982-07-23
·cited 11×
The court held that a supplemental jury instruction creating a presumption that people intend the natural consequences of their acts, when given in response to jury questions about intent, is not harmless error and violates due process.
-
959 F.2d 1237·
3d Cir.·
1992-03-24
·cited 10×
The court held that an improper jury instruction regarding intent was not harmless error because the jury struggled with the presumption and was repeatedly misinstructed.
-
923 F.2d 801·
11th Cir.·
1991-02-08
·cited 10×
The court held that the jury instruction, when viewed in the context of the entire charge, did not create an unconstitutional mandatory rebuttable presumption that shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.
-
864 F.2d 1536·
11th Cir.·
1989-01-17
·cited 10×
The court affirmed the denial of the habeas corpus petition, finding that Richardson's claims were either procedurally defaulted, lacked merit under applicable legal standards, or were barred by his own contradictory trial testimony.
-
811 F.2d 557·
11th Cir.·
1987-03-02
·cited 10×
A jury instruction creating a mandatory presumption of intent to kill, while unconstitutional, can be harmless error if the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and the defendant's defenses are frivolous.
-
744 F.2d 1026·
4th Cir.·
1984-09-20
·cited 10×
The court held that although jury instructions on alibi defenses were constitutionally infirm by shifting the burden of proof, the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in both cases, and did not render the trials fundamentally unfair.
-
855 F.2d 631·
9th Cir.·
1988-08-22
·cited 9×
The court held that the defendant's conviction is affirmed, but the death sentence is reversed due to ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase.
-
710 F.2d 374·
7th Cir.·
1983-06-21
·cited 9×
The court held that Wisconsin's presumptive intent and party-to-a-crime jury instructions did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights, and affirmed the denial of habeas corpus.
-
833 F.2d 927·
11th Cir.·
1987-12-07
·cited 8×
The court affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief, finding no constitutional violations in the trial court's rulings on Miranda, lesser included offenses, sufficiency of evidence, or jury instructions.
-
785 F.2d 1495·
11th Cir.·
1986-03-25
·cited 8×
The court held that the jury instructions on implied malice and intent did not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof or create a mandatory presumption, and the vagueness claim was procedurally barred.
-
786 F.2d 993·
10th Cir.·
1986-03-17
·cited 8×
The court held that the jury instruction regarding presumed fear was harmless error, the sentencing error did not warrant habeas relief under Hicks, and Oklahoma's rule for proving prior convictions by documentary evidence alone does not violate due process.
-
695 F.2d 62·
2d Cir.·
1982-12-09
·cited 8×
The court's opinion, while not explicitly stated as a holding in this concurring opinion, implies that the jury charge was permissible under current circuit law, despite reservations.
-
682 F.2d 461·
4th Cir.·
1982-06-10
·cited 8×
The dissenting judge would grant the writ of habeas corpus, finding that a jury instruction violated constitutional rights and that the procedural bar of a contemporaneous objection rule was improperly applied.
-
602 F.2d 471·
1st Cir.·
1979-07-31
·cited 8×
The court held that the state trial judge's jury instructions did not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to the defendant regarding self-defense or malice.
-
819 F.2d 978·
11th Cir.·
1987-05-27
·cited 7×
The court held that the petitioner abused the writ by raising new claims in a successive habeas petition without adequate excuse, and denied his application for a certificate of probable cause and stay of execution.
-
879 F.2d 685·
9th Cir.·
1989-07-14
·cited 6×
The court held that imposing two sentences for rape in concert did not violate due process, as the defendant aided and abetted two separate criminal acts. The court also held that a defective jury instruction regarding aiding and abetting was harmless error.
-
779 F.2d 1115·
5th Cir.·
1986-01-08
·cited 6×
The court held that the jury instructions in the first-degree murder trial impermissibly relieved the state of its burden to prove the defendant's specific intent to kill, violating due process.
-
763 F.2d 1207·
11th Cir.·
1985-06-05
·cited 6×
The court held that the jury instructions on mitigating circumstances failed to adequately explain their nature and function, violating the Eighth Amendment, and that the jury instructions on malice and intent impermissibly shifted the burden of proof, violating the Fourteenth Am
-
747 F.2d 251·
4th Cir.·
1984-10-25
·cited 6×
The court held that the defendant's failure to raise the jury instruction issue on direct appeal constitutes a procedural default for which he has not shown cause.
-
640 F.2d 125·
8th Cir.·
1981-01-30
·cited 6×
The court held that the jury instruction did not create an unconstitutional presumption, thus the petitioner's due process rights were not violated.
-
630 F.2d 749·
10th Cir.·
1980-08-29
·cited 6×
The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting the defendant's confession and a prior threat, nor in its jury instruction regarding malice, as these rulings were supported by the evidence and established legal principles.
-
904 F.2d 882·
4th Cir.·
1990-05-24
·cited 5×
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the habeas petition, finding no constitutional error in the petitioner's capital murder conviction and death sentence.
-
927 F.2d 646·
1st Cir.·
1990-11-21
·cited 4×
A jury instruction that 'malice is implied from any deliberate or cruel act against another, however sudden' creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption that relieves the prosecution of its burden to prove malice beyond a reasonable doubt.
-
851 F.2d 1294·
11th Cir.·
1988-08-08
·cited 4×
-
825 F.2d 702·
2d Cir.·
1987-08-04
·cited 4×