1,198 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 1,504 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · browse and sort
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The court held that the Feres doctrine bars subject matter jurisdiction over a suit brought by a service member injured in an activity incident to service, even if the activity occurred off-base and involved alleged negligence in aircraft maintenance.
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The court held that the Flo-Sun Agreement did not constitute 'major federal action' requiring an EIS under NEPA, and that entering the agreement was a litigation decision not subject to APA notice-and-comment requirements.
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The court held that a sheriff can be liable for negligence in supervising deputies if the failure to train or supervise creates a foreseeable zone of risk, as such acts are operational, not discretionary, and thus not barred by sovereign immunity.
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The court held that the plaintiff's Florida Civil Rights Act claim was not barred, as she filed it after the 180-day administrative period had passed without a determination from the FCHR, and the EEOC's right-to-sue letter did not terminate the FCHR's jurisdiction.
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A financial institution is granted blanket immunity from civil liability for disclosures of suspicious transactions made pursuant to federal law or court order, including electronic fund transfers.
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839 F. Supp. 1538·
N.D. Fla.·
1993-11-30
·cited 2×
The court held that the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) does not require plaintiffs to comply with state medical malpractice pre-suit procedures or allege discharge for economic reasons to state a claim.
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The court held that a claim for compensatory relief arising from FDIC's repudiation of a contract is not subject to the administrative claims process under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d), and thus the district court erred in dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction.
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The court held that the Massachusetts IOLTA program does not violate the First Amendment rights of speech and association, nor does it constitute a taking of property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the cross-complaint for laches under Rule 12(b)(6) because the delay was not demonstrably unreasonable or unexcused, and prejudice was not sufficiently established on the pleadings.
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The court held that the plaintiffs' allegations of a binding promise, when viewed in the context of prior dealings and discussions, were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
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The court held that a state employee can state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a due process violation when state actors affirmatively create a danger that leads to harm by a third party, even without a custodial relationship.
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The validity of the underlying debt does not bar an action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and a plaintiff need not prove the debt is void or voidable to state a claim. The court also found the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts for claims under § 1983 and the Decla
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The court held that plaintiffs can pursue claims under the Administrative Procedure Act for injunctive and declaratory relief, and under the Rehabilitation Act for damages, as the latter waives sovereign immunity for suits against the government. The district court's dismissal wa
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The court held that federal adjudication of most of GPI's claims would not interfere with ongoing state proceedings, thus reversing the district court's dismissal on Younger abstention grounds for those claims.
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Parole board members are entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken in their official duties, but parole officers are entitled only to qualified immunity for such actions.
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966 F.2d 109·
2d Cir.·
1992-06-11
·cited 2×
The court held that the complaint sufficiently alleged loss causation under Section 10(b) by stating that the defendants' misrepresentations about future actions foreseeably caused the plaintiff's stock to lose value.
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The court held that a pro se litigant's complaint, even if styled as a mandamus petition, could be construed as a habeas corpus petition or a Section 1983 claim for deprivation of due process rights, and thus should not have been dismissed on abstention grounds.
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961 F.2d 245·
D.C. Cir.·
1992-04-14
·cited 2×
The court held that issue preclusion barred relitigation of claims under the Tariff and Lanham Acts, and that appellant had no cause of action under the treaties.
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Although the district court erred in dismissing the RICO claims for failure to plead an enterprise, the appellate court affirms the dismissal because the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.
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The court held that the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint as time-barred and for failure to plead fraud with particularity, and did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.
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The court held that the Federal Employees Compensation Act's (FECA) exclusive remedy provision barred the plaintiff's claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for injuries already compensated by FECA, and that the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Ac
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947 F.2d 1338·
7th Cir.·
1991-11-15
·cited 2×
The retroactive application of a victim notification statute to a parole hearing does not violate the ex post facto clause, and a State's Attorney's office cannot be held liable for denying a prisoner access to his parole file.
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The court held that the exclusion of the Wangs from the evidentiary hearing on Horio's certification was not harmless error, requiring a new hearing for the state law claims, but affirmed the dismissal of the constitutional claims.
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The court held that the plaintiff adequately pled the interstate commerce element necessary to invoke federal jurisdiction under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and sufficiently alleged a conspiracy and restraint of trade to survive a motion to dismiss.
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The court held that the dismissal of the law firm was proper, but the dismissal of the primary insurer on summary judgment was erroneous due to an intervening change in Louisiana law recognizing subrogation rights for excess insurers.
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The court held that the complaint stated a minimally sufficient claim for nondischargeability under Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(2)(A), but failed to state claims for constructive trust, conversion, or nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(B) and § 523(a)(4).
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770 F. Supp. 1530·
M.D. Fla.·
1991-07-02
·cited 2×
The court denied motions to dismiss, finding that plaintiffs adequately pleaded claims for RICO violations, antitrust violations, and tortious interference with business relationships, and that defendants were not entitled to sovereign immunity or state action immunity.
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The court held that the district judge should have considered the plaintiff's request for appointed counsel, as the case presented complex legal and procedural issues that a layperson might not navigate effectively, especially after the defendants moved for summary judgment.
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The court held that alleged misrepresentations or omissions in the 1983 Prospectus and the 1986 Transaction were not material under federal securities laws because the plaintiff lacked decision-making power regarding the transaction.
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The court held that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions.
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The court held that Talman failed to establish third-party beneficiary status under Texas law because the contracts at issue did not clearly express an intent to benefit Talman, and a clause in the insurance policy prohibited third-party suits.
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927 F.2d 259·
6th Cir.·
1991-03-05
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The court held that probable cause existed to prosecute the plaintiff, and his indictment and conviction were not void, thus affirming the dismissal of his claims.
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The court held that section 204(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, does not violate the procedural due process rights of U.S. citizen spouses, nor their fundamental rights to marry or reside in the U.S.
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A district court may dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint for failure to state a claim prior to service of process.
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The court held that the Illinois indemnity statute does not void Snap-On's agreement to indemnify Southern because Southern was not in a position to cause negligence in construction activities, and the scope of the indemnity clause is an issue of fact not resolvable on a motion t
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The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the section 1983 claims, as the social worker's actions in investigating child abuse and maintaining a name on the central registry were investigatory or administrative, not prosecutorial, and thus not entitled to absolut
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The court held that the alleged misuse of legal process by city officials, even if malicious or intended to circumvent a prior ruling, did not rise to the level of an "egregious" constitutional deprivation actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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866 F.2d 88·
3d Cir.·
1989-01-25
·cited 2×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the bulk of the plaintiff's claims, as the complaint and development agreement could be construed to create obligations that were breached by the defendant.
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A parent corporation's immunity from tort liability to its subsidiary's employees does not automatically extend from the subsidiary, and the parent can be liable for its own independent negligence if it undertakes affirmative action.
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689 F. Supp. 1164·
S.D. Fla.·
1988-06-27
·cited 2×
The court held that the insurance policies were incontestable after two years, and the insurers' claims of fraud and conspiracy were barred by the incontestability clauses and the purpose of the Federal Witness Protection Program.
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The court held that the plaintiff received all the process due him under the Fifth Amendment, and the Postal Service did not abuse its discretion in decertifying him from mail access.
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837 F.2d 210·
5th Cir.·
1988-02-11
·cited 2×
The court held that a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) for alleged perjury by witnesses is too remote, and there is no private cause of action for breach of the attorney-client privilege.
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The court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's claim based on the Massachusetts recreational use statute, as the statute was an affirmative defense improperly raised on a motion to dismiss and factual issues remained.
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The court held that the plaintiff has no available remedy under the Clayton Act for the alleged price-fixing scheme by members of the Hop Administrative Committee because the Secretary of Agriculture ultimately sets the marketing policy.
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819 F.2d 174·
7th Cir.·
1987-05-18
·cited 2×
The court held that the parents lacked standing to sue as special administrators because their appointment was void under Illinois law, and they failed to plead individual injuries to themselves in their own right.
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657 F. Supp. 739·
S.D. Fla.·
1986-12-11
·cited 2×
The court held that the plaintiff's claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 could proceed, but the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 and § 1985 were dismissed or held in abeyance, and the Fair Housing Act and Fourth Amendment claims were dismissed.
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The Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for an employee seeking benefits for injuries sustained during employment, and the Industrial Board has exclusive jurisdiction over such claims, including those involving allegations of fraud that would toll the
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The court held that the complaint adequately stated causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for interference with mail and retaliation for litigation.
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Contractors and their sureties, who are not signatories to a collective bargaining agreement, are not considered 'employers' under ERISA, and therefore, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims seeking contributions to employee benefit funds.