-
211 F. Supp. 2d 1345·
M.D. Fla.·
2002-04-16
·cited 154×
The court held that the plaintiff's amended complaint sufficiently stated claims for negligence and violation of nursing home residents' rights, and that the defendant's motions to dismiss and strike were denied.
-
804 F.2d 970·
7th Cir.·
1986-10-23
·cited 112×
The court held that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged a pattern of racketeering activity and that the Bank could be both a defendant and an enterprise under RICO § 1962(a), reversing the dismissal of the complaint.
-
685 F.2d 1053·
8th Cir.·
1982-08-11
·cited 100×
The court held that plaintiffs adequately alleged an "enterprise" distinct from the pattern of racketeering and that a commercial or competitive injury is not required for standing under RICO. However, the court found that Count II failed to properly allege the "enterprise" disti
-
821 F.2d 913·
2d Cir.·
1987-06-17
·cited 88×
The court held that the force used by Harrison was not constitutionally excessive, and therefore summary judgment should be granted on the excessive force claim.
-
792 F.2d 975·
10th Cir.·
1986-06-03
·cited 72×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the federal action based on res judicata, as the prior state court proceeding did not constitute a full and fair adjudication of the § 1983 claims, and the defendant DeHerrera was not in privity with the City for the purp
-
532 F.2d 920·
3d Cir.·
1976-03-22
·cited 70×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing civil rights complaints without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend, particularly regarding jurisdictional allegations and conclusory factual claims.
-
880 F.2d 305·
11th Cir.·
1989-08-10
·cited 69×
The court held that coercing a minor to abort violates her constitutional right to privacy and that coercing minors to refrain from consulting parents violates parental rights to direct upbringing. It also held that compelling action against religious beliefs can violate free exe
-
791 F.2d 1182·
5th Cir.·
1986-06-13
·cited 69×
The dissenting judge believes the majority opinion incorrectly interprets precedent and collapses the distinction between negligence and wanton conduct.
-
708 F.2d 647·
11th Cir.·
1983-07-01
·cited 68×
The court affirmed the dismissals of the plaintiff's claims, finding no error in the district court's rulings on procedural grounds, the scope of EEOC charges, or the application of legal standards for retaliation and discrimination.
-
771 F.2d 194·
7th Cir.·
1985-08-15
·cited 65×
The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of all claims and the assessment of Rule 11 sanctions, finding the plaintiff's allegations failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that the attorneys' conduct warranted sanctions.
-
660 F.2d 280·
7th Cir.·
1981-09-18
·cited 63×
The court held that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 because they did not allege an actual deprivation of constitutional rights or injury, and affirmed the award of attorney's fees to the defendants.
-
742 F.2d 786·
3d Cir.·
1984-09-06
·cited 60×
The court held that the plaintiff adequately pleaded the existence of RICO enterprises and the circumstances of the alleged fraud, and that the interstate transportation allegations were sufficient.
-
460 F.2d 348·
7th Cir.·
1972-04-28
·cited 53×
A magistrate lacks the power to rule on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, and a district court cannot delegate such ultimate decision-making authority.
-
904 F.2d 236·
5th Cir.·
1990-06-15
·cited 52×
The court held that the group health insurance policy constituted an ERISA plan, but that the hospital's claim for deceptive trade practices under Texas law was not preempted by ERISA because it arose from the insurer's misrepresentation to a third-party provider, not from a clai
-
600 F.2d 458·
4th Cir.·
1979-06-29
·cited 52×
The court held that summary judgment was improperly granted because genuine issues of material fact existed and the pro se plaintiff did not receive proper notice of the conversion of a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.
-
798 F.2d 1279·
9th Cir.·
1986-09-02
·cited 51×
Unreviewed state administrative determinations of unemployment benefits do not have collateral estoppel effect in federal court for subsequent discrimination claims, as parties lack an adequate opportunity to litigate federal issues.
-
607 F.2d 1014·
1st Cir.·
1979-10-25
·cited 50×
The court held that the plaintiff's employment discrimination claims were time-barred because he failed to file charges with the appropriate agencies within the statutory 180-day period, and the allegations did not establish a continuing violation.
-
811 F.2d 225·
3d Cir.·
1987-02-06
·cited 45×
The court held that the district court's grant of summary judgment was proper because the defendants were immune from antitrust liability under the state action doctrine and the haulers' procedural challenges were either harmless error or based on insufficient grounds.
-
730 F.2d 99·
3d Cir.·
1984-03-14
·cited 41×
A court may consider documents relied upon in a complaint on a motion to dismiss, even if not attached, if their authenticity is unchallenged.
-
868 F.2d 943·
7th Cir.·
1989-02-16
·cited 36×
The court's majority opinion, which the author disagrees with, appears to allow "politics as usual" for government workers in certain cities, contrary to other circuits.
-
570 F.2d 86·
3d Cir.·
1978-01-20
·cited 33×
A complaint alleging a police-promoted plan to photograph individuals based on race states a claim under the Civil Rights Acts, and dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) must be vacated.
-
692 F.2d 910·
3d Cir.·
1982-11-08
·cited 32×
The dissenting judge believes the court should recognize a cause of action for termination of at-will employment violating public policy against discrimination based on handicap.
-
697 F.2d 1297·
9th Cir.·
1982-11-09
·cited 31×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the discrimination claims against the employer and that the shareholder preference plan, as it affects employment terms and conditions, is subject to Title VII. The court also found that the union may be liable for breach
-
818 F.2d 513·
6th Cir.·
1987-05-06
·cited 30×
The court held that the plaintiff's complaint stated a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
-
805 F.2d 558·
5th Cir.·
1986-12-09
·cited 30×
An arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity when there is no clearly established constitutional duty to discover a prisoner's suicidal tendencies or prevent their suicide.
-
600 F.2d 1218·
6th Cir.·
1979-06-25
·cited 30×
The court held that the decedent was an employee of a nonappropriated fund instrumentality, and therefore, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act provided the sole and exclusive remedy, precluding a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
-
821 F.2d 408·
7th Cir.·
1987-06-04
·cited 26×
The court held that the plaintiff stated a valid claim under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and that her conditions of confinement claim was prematurely dismissed.
-
673 F.2d 873·
5th Cir.·
1982-04-23
·cited 26×
The court held that Georgia's bifurcated statute of limitations, § 3-704, applies to employment discrimination claims under both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983, barring back pay claims but not equitable relief. The court also reversed dismissal of the Title VII claim, remanding for
-
673 F.2d 1171·
10th Cir.·
1982-04-02
·cited 26×
The prosecution of a lawsuit, even if without probable cause and for an anticompetitive purpose, is protected by the First Amendment and immune from antitrust attack.
-
930 F.2d 277·
3d Cir.·
1991-04-08
·cited 23×
The court held that Ford's motion for a new trial was valid, granting jurisdiction over the later appeals, and that the 1970 divestiture order did not require Ford to divest the 'Ghosted GT' tradename, thus dismissing Altran's RICO counterclaim.
-
779 F.2d 397·
7th Cir.·
1985-12-17
·cited 23×
The court held that a bank can be both the 'person' and the 'enterprise' under RICO § 1962(a), and that the denial of punitive damages and attorney's fees for breach of fiduciary duty requires a remand for further findings.
-
620 F.2d 362·
2d Cir.·
1980-05-02
·cited 23×
A teacher's transfer to a different grade level, even without loss of salary or benefits, can constitute unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII if it adversely affects her employment status or opportunities. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages require an allegation of
-
836 F.2d 659·
1st Cir.·
1987-12-29
·cited 22×
State officials are entitled to qualified immunity from civil damages when their actions do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights, and a declaratory judgment is not warranted on this record.
-
793 F.2d 58·
2d Cir.·
1986-06-05
·cited 22×
The district court did not abuse its discretion in construing a prior stipulated dismissal to allow a subsequent ERISA claim, finding a mutual misunderstanding regarding the scope of the dismissal.
-
747 F.2d 1137·
7th Cir.·
1984-10-30
·cited 22×
The court held that while a prisoner's Fourth Amendment claim regarding cell searches is barred, the claim that he was denied due process by not receiving a statement of evidence relied upon for a guilty finding states a claim upon which relief can be granted.
-
705 F.2d 1316·
Fed. Cir.·
1983-04-12
·cited 22×
The court held that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board abused its discretion by treating a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment without providing adequate notice to the appellant, and that the board should have considered the estoppel issue.
-
866 F.2d 172·
6th Cir.·
1989-01-18
·cited 20×
The court held that the Offutts' claims of bias and property damage were not ripe for judicial review because they had not exhausted state administrative remedies or obtained a final decision from the state agency.
-
676 F.2d 332·
8th Cir.·
1982-04-28
·cited 20×
The court held that appellants sufficiently stated a cause of action for price discrimination regarding the used 800-type word processors, but not for the 850-type equipment.
-
589 F. Supp. 2d 1336·
S.D. Fla.·
2008-12-08
·cited 19×
A claim for breach of the implied warranty of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance contract is premature and must be dismissed if it overlaps with a statutory bad faith claim that has not yet ripened. A claim for declaratory judgment regarding contract validity and coverag
-
755 F.2d 786·
11th Cir.·
1985-03-19
·cited 19×
The court held that claims of substantive constitutional right violations are not barred by the availability of state remedies, but claims of procedural due process violations are barred if adequate state remedies exist. The court affirmed dismissal of claims barred by Parratt v.
-
588 F.2d 400·
3d Cir.·
1978-12-04
·cited 19×
A breach of fiduciary duty, without accompanying deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure, does not state a cause of action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act or Rule 10b-5.
-
764 F.2d 939·
3d Cir.·
1985-06-12
·cited 18×
Misrepresentations and nondisclosures regarding margin account credit terms are actionable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and a private right of action exists under Rule 10b-16.
-
603 F.2d 1266·
7th Cir.·
1979-08-13
·cited 18×
The court held that the trial court erred in dismissing Count I, which alleged due process and equal protection violations regarding the police pension fund, but affirmed the dismissal of Counts II and III, which alleged sex and racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1
-
861 F.2d 1053·
7th Cir.·
1988-11-18
·cited 17×
A conditional commitment letter for a loan does not constitute a binding contract if it is subject to numerous conditions precedent that are not met, and oral assurances contradicting the written terms do not create a binding agreement or support a fraud claim when the party is e
-
264 F. Supp. 2d 1064·
S.D. Fla.·
2003-05-29
·cited 16×
The court held that while unjust enrichment claims may proceed, claims for lack of informed consent, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent concealment, and conversion fail for insufficient pleading.
-
959 F.2d 75·
7th Cir.·
1992-03-25
·cited 16×
The court held that the plaintiff's amended complaint, alleging he was misled by the EEOC regarding the timeliness of his charge, should have been allowed to proceed, and the case should not have been dismissed at the pleading stage.
-
763 F.2d 236·
7th Cir.·
1985-05-15
·cited 16×
The court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding probable cause for the arrest.
-
491 F.2d 539·
5th Cir.·
1974-03-22
·cited 16×
The court held that a pro se inmate's complaint alleging deprivation of constitutional rights, even if inartfully pleaded, is sufficient to withstand dismissal if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief.
-
976 F.2d 1016·
7th Cir.·
1992-09-16
·cited 14×
The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of certain claims and grant of summary judgment, finding no pattern of racketeering activity sufficient for a civil RICO claim.
-
949 F.2d 42·
2d Cir.·
1991-11-08
·cited 14×
The court held that while Westinghouse was not a statutory seller under § 12(2) because it sold to plaintiffs' seller, plaintiffs may be allowed to replead their claim based on solicitation if they can allege facts showing Westinghouse was motivated by financial interest in solic