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850 F.2d 876·
2d Cir.·
1988-06-15
·cited 14×
The court held that allowing recovery for both intentional infliction of emotional distress and prima facie tort for the same conduct constitutes an impermissible double recovery under New York law, requiring reversal of the prima facie tort awards.
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790 F.2d 260·
2d Cir.·
1986-05-13
·cited 14×
The court held that the plaintiff's allegations, liberally construed, stated a claim for deliberate indifference to a known risk of harm and that the complaint sufficiently implicated supervisory officers Waters and Spinner in this claim.
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614 F.2d 1244·
9th Cir.·
1980-03-10
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim or grant summary judgment, as the plaintiff alleged facts that, if proven, would entitle them to relief and material facts remained in dispute.
-
875 F.2d 146·
7th Cir.·
1989-05-22
·cited 13×
The court held that a plaintiff can state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for selective enforcement of a facially neutral ordinance if they can prove they were singled out for reasons other than legitimate governmental concerns.
-
869 F.2d 202·
3d Cir.·
1989-02-28
·cited 13×
The court held that the "same address" test used by the DPW to presume siblings lived together for food stamp purposes was an impermissible interpretation of the Food Stamp Act. It also held that the dismissal of third-party verification claims and denial of leave to amend were e
-
741 F.2d 524·
2d Cir.·
1984-07-27
·cited 13×
A plaintiff need not allege a "separate, distinct racketeering enterprise injury" beyond the injury caused by the predicate acts to state a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
-
694 F. Supp. 2d 1302·
S.D. Fla.·
2010-03-11
·cited 12×
The court held that federal law does not preempt state law claims challenging the manipulative practices of national banks in assessing overdraft fees, as these claims only incidentally affect the banks' deposit-taking powers and do not conflict with the National Bank Act.
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987 F.2d 1·
1st Cir.·
1993-02-09
·cited 12×
The court held that the psychologists were immune from suit under § 1983 because the plaintiffs failed to allege a violation of a constitutional right, and immune from state law claims under a state statute protecting good faith reporting of child abuse.
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943 F.2d 1406·
5th Cir.·
1991-09-26
·cited 12×
The court held that the district court erred in denying the plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint and in dismissing his suit under Rule 12(b)(6) without accepting his allegations of bias as true.
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926 F.2d 109·
1st Cir.·
1991-02-27
·cited 12×
The court held that the plaintiff's claims for breach of an oral employment contract and fraud in signing a release were properly dismissed for failure to state a claim.
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883 F.2d 245·
3d Cir.·
1989-08-25
·cited 12×
The operation of a landfill by Lycoming County is not protected by the market participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause because it unduly burdens interstate commerce and is indistinguishable from prior cases limiting the exception.
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761 F.2d 148·
3d Cir.·
1985-05-02
·cited 12×
The court held that the prior consent decree does not automatically extend to all future operations of the defendant and that summary judgment was improperly granted on the plaintiffs' primary claim.
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736 F.2d 912·
3d Cir.·
1984-06-15
·cited 12×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint, as the allegations were sufficient to alert the defendant to the nature of the claim.
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836 F. Supp. 827·
M.D. Fla.·
1993-10-22
·cited 11×
The court held that the plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to state claims under MSAWPA, FLSA, FICA, and FUTA, and that the complaint was not so vague as to require a more definite statement.
-
709 F.2d 173·
2d Cir.·
1983-06-08
·cited 11×
The court held that the inmate's complaint failed to state a claim for a due process violation, as he received adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, and his conspiracy claim was too vague.
-
673 F.2d 189·
7th Cir.·
1982-03-17
·cited 11×
A manufacturer has no duty to warn consumers of the commonly known dangers associated with alcoholic beverages, as such dangers are not considered unreasonably dangerous.
-
640 F.2d 963·
9th Cir.·
1981-02-23
·cited 11×
The court held that the United States may sue non-owners directly for wreck removal costs under the Wreck Removal Act and for oil cleanup costs under the FWPCA, and that maritime tort and nuisance claims are not precluded by the FWPCA.
-
595 F. Supp. 2d 1349·
S.D. Fla.·
2009-01-28
·cited 10×
The court affirmed and adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, denying dismissal of the ERISA claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but granting dismissal of state law claims due to ERISA preemption, and partially granting dismissal of the ADA's
-
510 F. Supp. 2d 1003·
S.D. Fla.·
2007-01-10
·cited 10×
The court held that most claims stated a valid cause of action, but dismissed the retaliation claim and limited the statute of limitations for one plaintiff.
-
920 F.2d 1520·
10th Cir.·
1990-12-10
·cited 10×
The court held that while the district court correctly dismissed the bankruptcy claims as time-barred under a proper interpretation of § 546(a), it erred in not considering the equitable claim for unjust enrichment under the doctrine of laches.
-
919 F.2d 273·
5th Cir.·
1990-11-30
·cited 10×
The court held that a district court's refusal to allow a late-filed motion for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity is not an immediately appealable "final decision" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, even if the refusal is an abuse of discretion.
-
863 F.2d 1190·
5th Cir.·
1989-01-23
·cited 10×
The court held that the district court did not err in finding Combi Line not negligent and denying Captain Nunley's salvage claim, as Nunley's actions were part of his contractual duties with ChemLink.
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842 F.2d 249·
10th Cir.·
1988-03-24
·cited 10×
The court held that a plaintiff alleging property deprivation without due process must demonstrate they were denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard or avail themselves of available state remedies.
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814 F.2d 223·
5th Cir.·
1987-04-13
·cited 10×
The court held that the plaintiff's allegations sufficiently stated claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act, RICO, and § 1983, and that dismissal was premature.
-
506 F.2d 131·
D.C. Cir.·
1974-09-12
·cited 10×
The court concurred in the result that the case should be dismissed as frivolous and potentially transferred to the Northern District of Georgia.
-
945 F.2d 40·
2d Cir.·
1991-09-11
·cited 9×
The court held that the plaintiffs' complaint adequately stated a claim for rescission of the release agreement based on allegations of fraud and mutual mistake, thus surviving a motion to dismiss.
-
824 F.2d 223·
3d Cir.·
1987-07-09
·cited 9×
The court affirmed the dismissal of antitrust and state law claims, finding that the allegations did not establish monopoly power, unlawful restraint of trade, or actionable duress or tortious interference.
-
428 F. Supp. 2d 1260·
M.D. Fla.·
2006-04-26
·cited 8×
The court held that the defendant, Gables Residential Services, Inc., is not a debt collector under the FDCPA or FCCPA, and therefore dismissed the claims against it. The court also denied the defendant's request for attorney's fees.
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972 F.2d 440·
1st Cir.·
1992-08-17
·cited 8×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for violations of due process, equal protection, or freedom of speech under federal law, and affirmed the dismissal of state law claims.
-
796 F. Supp. 1477·
N.D. Fla.·
1992-06-15
·cited 8×
The court held that claims alleging the denial of all economically viable use of land are not ripe until the landowner seeks approval for development under current regulations and is denied. Claims for just compensation are also not ripe until state remedies are exhausted.
-
943 F.2d 1363·
4th Cir.·
1991-08-08
·cited 8×
The court affirmed the district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions, finding that the plaintiffs' claims were not well-grounded in fact or warranted by existing law after reasonable inquiry.
-
925 F.2d 866·
5th Cir.·
1991-03-11
·cited 8×
The court held that the district court's denial of a jury trial motion was not reviewable because the order was too opaque and failed to demonstrate the exercise of discretion under Rule 39(b).
-
870 F.2d 304·
5th Cir.·
1989-04-19
·cited 8×
The court held that parents do not possess a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest in the bodies of their deceased children that would support a § 1983 claim when adequate state post-deprivation remedies exist for procedural due process claims, and no such subst
-
869 F.2d 1073·
7th Cir.·
1989-03-09
·cited 8×
The dissenting judge would hold that the landlord's construction impaired the tenant's use, breaching the covenant of quiet enjoyment and entitling the tenant to compensation.
-
854 F.2d 802·
6th Cir.·
1988-08-04
·cited 8×
The court held that the allegations against Bucyrus-Erie and GPS Equipment were insufficient to state a cause of action for antitrust violation.
-
848 F.2d 24·
2d Cir.·
1988-05-25
·cited 8×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment when matters outside the pleadings were presented.
-
840 F.2d 359·
6th Cir.·
1988-03-07
·cited 8×
The court held that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged state action for his section 1983 claim, as the commissioners' predicate actions in their official capacities and use of public funds to finance the ouster suit constituted action 'under color of law'.
-
629 F.2d 497·
8th Cir.·
1980-06-12
·cited 8×
The court held that the plaintiff's complaint stated a claim for relief under Arkansas law, specifically a tort claim in deceit, and therefore the district court erred in dismissing the action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
-
989 F.2d 142·
3d Cir.·
1993-03-29
·cited 7×
The court held that the district court properly exercised diversity jurisdiction and correctly granted summary judgment, as the plaintiff failed to state a claim for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress under Pennsylvania law.
-
956 F.2d 610·
6th Cir.·
1992-02-13
·cited 7×
The court held that the disability clause must be read literally as requiring total disability from any occupation, but reversed the denial of benefits due to the insurer's failure to provide adequate written notice of denial as required by ERISA.
-
900 F.2d 804·
5th Cir.·
1990-05-09
·cited 7×
The court held that where a state provides adequate civil and criminal remedies for excessive corporal punishment, the use of such punishment, even if excessive, does not implicate federal substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because it does not constitut
-
790 F.2d 442·
5th Cir.·
1986-06-02
·cited 7×
The court held that a magistrate lacks jurisdiction to enter a final judgment if not all parties have explicitly consented to the magistrate's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
-
874 F. Supp. 1328·
S.D. Fla.·
1994-01-03
·cited 6×
Individual defendants cannot be held liable under Title VII or the Florida Human Rights Act, but the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress survives dismissal, and all remaining claims must be arbitrated.
-
956 F.2d 560·
6th Cir.·
1992-02-10
·cited 6×
The dissent argues that the predicate acts were sufficiently related to meet the continuity requirement for a RICO claim.
-
931 F.2d 698·
10th Cir.·
1991-04-30
·cited 6×
The court held that the record lacked sufficient indicia of reliability for confidential informant testimony, thus violating due process, and vacated the dismissal.
-
931 F.2d 573·
9th Cir.·
1991-04-25
·cited 6×
The court held that because the prisoner was paroled, his civil rights action challenging conditions of confinement was proper, even if it should have initially been a habeas corpus petition.
-
790 F.2d 472·
6th Cir.·
1986-05-07
·cited 6×
The ninety-day period for filing a Title VII suit begins to run when the EEOC mails the right-to-sue notice to the claimant's last known address, even if the claimant does not actually receive it, provided the claimant failed to notify the EEOC of an address change.
-
769 F.2d 414·
7th Cir.·
1985-07-30
·cited 6×
The court held that the statements in the newsletter were expressions of opinion and not libelous per se, thus the district court properly granted the motion to dismiss.
-
764 F.2d 76·
2d Cir.·
1985-05-30
·cited 6×
-
671 F.2d 533·
D.C. Cir.·
1982-01-22
·cited 6×
The court held that the Commissioner's determination that the delay in prosecuting the patent application was not unavoidable was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.