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327 F.2d 459·
9th Cir.·
1964-01-02
·cited 150×
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464 F.2d 26·
5th Cir.·
1972-03-15
·cited 104×
The court held that a single intrastate dealer can sue under the Sherman Act if their business is harmed by a broadly utilized practice that affects interstate commerce, even if the dealer's individual impact is de minimis. The court also found that Gulf's price support system, w
-
684 F.2d 1226·
7th Cir.·
1982-06-28
·cited 100×
The court held that evidence of termination following competitor complaints is sufficient to infer a conspiracy to fix resale prices, and that vertical non-price restrictions are per se unlawful if part of a price-fixing scheme.
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737 F.2d 698·
7th Cir.·
1984-06-22
·cited 81×
The court affirmed the district court's disposition of the issues raised on appeal.
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531 F.2d 92·
3d Cir.·
1975-12-24
·cited 72×
The court held that Mr. Pitchford lacked individual standing to sue for corporate antitrust injuries, and that Pitchford failed to prove fact of damage for price-fixing and exclusive dealing claims. The court also found insufficient evidence for full-line forcing and reversed tha
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498 F.2d 1137·
9th Cir.·
1974-05-17
·cited 72×
The court held that the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence to support claims of antitrust violations under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, affirming the district court's directed verdict.
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753 F.2d 416·
5th Cir.·
1985-02-20
·cited 70×
The court affirmed the jury's verdict, holding that the jury instructions adequately conveyed the legal standards for Sherman Act liability and business justification, and that the evidence supported the damages award.
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517 F.2d 635·
5th Cir.·
1975-08-11
·cited 62×
The court held that the plaintiff distributor's participation in the defendant's marketing scheme did not bar his antitrust claim, and that the defendant's MFSA pricing system violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
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40 So.2d 371·
Fla.·
1949-04-05
·cited 57×
The Florida Supreme Court quashed an order enforcing a Fair Trade Act, holding that the act unconstitutionally delegated sovereign power to private entities for private gain, stifling competition and violating property rights. The court found the act arbitrary and unreasonable, s
-
721 F.2d 1207·
9th Cir.·
1983-12-13
·cited 51×
The court held that the antitrust judgment was affirmed, but the contract/fraud judgment was reversed and remanded due to improper mitigation of damages calculation, and the FIPA claim was reversed and remanded.
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425 F.2d 932·
3d Cir.·
1970-04-27
·cited 50×
The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Wella Corporation. The appellate court found that Tripoli Company, Inc. failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding its antitrust claims. Specifically, Tripoli aba
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497 F.2d 1178·
10th Cir.·
1974-06-04
·cited 47×
The court held that Coors engaged in unlawful price fixing and territorial restrictions, but set aside the FTC's attempt to rewrite its contract termination provisions.
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537 F.2d 980·
9th Cir.·
1976-04-09
·cited 40×
The court held that manufacturer-imposed territorial restrictions on the resale of products by independent dealers are per se illegal under the Sherman Act. Such restrictions are deemed "obviously destructive" of intrabrand competition, and courts are not equipped to balance this
-
411 F.2d 897·
9th Cir.·
1969-04-30
·cited 40×
The court held that the trial court properly considered the equities and ruled that the Supreme Court's Simpson decision should apply only prospectively, thus dismissing the appellant's damage claim. The court also affirmed the trial court's grant of a new trial.
-
704 F.2d 787·
5th Cir.·
1983-05-09
·cited 37×
The court affirmed the directed verdict on antitrust claims and the jury verdict on the malicious prosecution counterclaim, finding no reversible error.
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849 F.2d 1336·
11th Cir.·
1987-08-27
·cited 35×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to prove a relevant market for its antitrust claims, and therefore the district court should have granted a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict on those claims.
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602 F.2d 1025·
2d Cir.·
1979-06-08
·cited 34×
The court held that a manufacturer's unilateral decision to change its distribution system and terminate brokers does not constitute an antitrust conspiracy under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, absent evidence of collateral anti-competitive advantage or coercion.
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448 F.2d 872·
2d Cir.·
1971-04-29
·cited 34×
The court denied Daly-Herring's petition for rehearing, finding its arguments regarding treble damages were either not sufficiently proven or not properly raised.
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391 F.2d 81·
9th Cir.·
1968-02-21
·cited 32×
The court held that a motion to dismiss, when accompanied by matters outside the pleadings that are not excluded by the court, must be treated as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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849 F.2d 1148·
9th Cir.·
1988-05-02
·cited 30×
The dissent argues that the majority misapplied antitrust law by requiring too much evidence of an agreement and by failing to consider relevant precedent.
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574 F.2d 824·
5th Cir.·
1978-06-07
·cited 30×
The court held that plaintiffs failed to present substantial evidence of a conspiracy to fix prices or eliminate competition, thus affirming the grant of summary judgment.
-
519 F.2d 418·
9th Cir.·
1975-06-26
·cited 30×
The court held that the district court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings for the dual distribution scheme and in dismissing the price-fixing claims, but affirmed the directed verdict on the dealership termination.
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325 F.2d 196·
9th Cir.·
1963-11-21
·cited 30×
The court held that the evidence presented was sufficient to allow a jury to infer a conspiracy to fix resale prices, and therefore the trial court erred in dismissing the action.
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246 F.2d 17·
1st Cir.·
1957-05-02
·cited 30×
The court held that agreements between retailers are invalid per se, preventing any relief even if parties compete in some areas.
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195 F.2d 853·
1st Cir.·
1952-04-04
·cited 30×
Service of process on a consignee distributor does not make it a 'managing or general agent' for the consignor, thus not subjecting the consignor to jurisdiction in that district.
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449 F.2d 1374·
Ct. Cl.·
1971-10-15
·cited 28×
The court should consider patent misuse when determining just compensation for a taking, but it should not necessarily forfeit the entire claim.
-
396 F.2d 398·
2d Cir.·
1968-06-05
·cited 28×
The court held that whether Lanvin's accommodation sales made it a retailer, and whether Lanvin and plaintiffs were in competition, were questions of fact for the jury.
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745 F.2d 248·
3d Cir.·
1984-10-01
·cited 27×
The court held that Blue Shield's UCR reimbursement system and related practices did not violate federal antitrust laws as price-fixing or illegal boycotts, and affirmed the district court's summary judgment. The court also affirmed the refusal to certify a subclass.
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823 F.2d 1215·
8th Cir.·
1987-06-29
·cited 26×
The court held that Eden failed to present sufficient evidence that Ryko's National Account Program (NAP) constituted resale price maintenance, as Eden acted as Ryko's agent in NAP sales where Ryko set the price.
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797 F.2d 1430·
7th Cir.·
1986-07-31
·cited 26×
The court held that the plaintiff forfeited his right to a trial by inaction and that the termination did not violate antitrust laws because there was no evidence of a price-fixing conspiracy.
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523 F.2d 668·
9th Cir.·
1975-08-28
·cited 26×
The court held that CX failed to present sufficient evidence for its antitrust claims and that the trial court did not err in admitting parol evidence or in its jury instructions and rulings on freight charges and interest.
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567 F.2d 701·
7th Cir.·
1977-12-06
·cited 25×
The court held that Cahn possessed a monopoly in the electromagnetic microbalance submarket and remanded for further findings on whether this monopoly power was misused to the detriment of the plaintiff. The court affirmed the dismissal of price-fixing and tie-in claims.
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779 F.2d 444·
8th Cir.·
1985-12-12
·cited 24×
The court held that WCCO lacked standing to pursue its federal and state antitrust claims because it did not suffer an antitrust injury, and affirmed the district court's dismissal of these claims.
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702 F.2d 1207·
4th Cir.·
1983-03-14
·cited 22×
The court held that sufficient evidence existed to submit Bostick's claims of antitrust violations under the Sherman Act and South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act to a jury, reversing the directed verdict.
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496 F.2d 434·
1st Cir.·
1974-05-02
·cited 22×
The court held that a supplier's system of adjusting wholesale gasoline prices through after-sale credits, even if it impacts retail pricing, does not constitute illegal resale price maintenance under the Sherman Act if the dealer remains free to set their own retail prices.
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669 F.2d 14·
1st Cir.·
1982-01-11
·cited 20×
The court held that summary judgment was properly granted because the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding antitrust violations, particularly concerning conspiracy and price-fixing claims.
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557 F.2d 511·
5th Cir.·
1977-08-12
·cited 20×
The court held that the transfer of diesel fuel from Central to the Watsons was a consignment for sale, making Central liable for the federal excise tax.
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675 F.2d 502·
2d Cir.·
1982-04-01
·cited 19×
The court held that Blue Cross's pharmacy agreements, which set maximum reimbursement rates, are not per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and affirmed summary judgment for Blue Cross because the plaintiff failed to allege or prove an anticompetitive effect under the
-
678 F.2d 1253·
5th Cir.·
1982-06-23
·cited 18×
The court held that a manufacturer's substitution of distributors, absent further evidence, is a vertical non-price restraint subject to rule of reason analysis, and that a distributor raised genuine issues of material fact regarding breach of contract claims.
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375 F.2d 273·
1st Cir.·
1967-03-31
·cited 18×
The court held that the plaintiff's amended complaint failed to allege a federal antitrust law violation under Section 1 of the Sherman Act because it did not sufficiently allege a contract, combination, or conspiracy.
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344 F.2d 599·
6th Cir.·
1965-04-12
·cited 18×
A consignment agreement used by a gasoline producer to fix retail prices, even if temporary or during a price war, violates antitrust laws.
-
288 F.2d 403·
D.C. Cir.·
1961-02-09
·cited 18×
The Court held that the 1959 amendment to the Clayton Act does not apply to consent orders issued before its enactment, as Congress did not intend retroactive application to such orders.
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321 F.2d 825·
7th Cir.·
1963-07-30
·cited 16×
The dissenting judge would credit the Federal Trade Commission's findings over the hearing examiner's and enforce the Commission's order.
-
225 F.2d 191·
5th Cir.·
1955-07-22
·cited 16×
The dissenting judge argues that the majority erred in concluding that Florida's public policy opposes fair trade contracts. He asserts that the Florida Legislature's enactment of Fla. Stat. § 541.03, which permits price maintenance by contract, establishes the state's public pol
-
705 F.2d 1203·
10th Cir.·
1982-12-03
·cited 15×
Funding a wholesaler's price discount program, even if passed through to select retailers, does not constitute a per se violation of the Sherman Act's prohibition against contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade, absent coercion or a relinquishment of indepe
-
589 F.2d 806·
5th Cir.·
1979-02-14
·cited 15×
The court held that the agreement between Nu-Way and Marcelina Hardwick did not constitute illegal price fixing under the Sherman Act because she operated as an employee, not an independent retailer, with respect to gasoline sales.
-
889 F.2d 751·
7th Cir.·
1989-11-13
·cited 14×
Airlines can prohibit travel agents from advertising discounts on their tickets, as travel agents are considered agents of the airline, and such prohibitions do not violate antitrust laws or state consumer protection laws due to federal preemption.
-
806 F.2d 722·
7th Cir.·
1986-11-19
·cited 14×
The court concurred in the judgment, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction, despite potential issues with the preliminary injunction standard applied.
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690 F.2d 689·
9th Cir.·
1982-10-19
·cited 14×
Coors breached Maykuth's contract and statutory rights by terminating him without proper notice and opportunity to cure, but Maykuth failed to establish Coors' liability under antitrust laws. Coors' counterclaim for damages from Maykuth's sale of beer was also reversed.
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402 F.2d 69·
10th Cir.·
1968-10-16
·cited 14×
The court held that a resale price maintenance agreement, even if repudiated, can support a Section 1 Sherman Act claim if tied to and enforced by related agreements, such as a lease termination clause used for coercion.