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344 F.2d 173·
D.C. Cir.·
1965-02-11
·cited 14×
The court held that while Parke, Davis's actions were reprehensible, relief must be denied in this specific case.
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825 F.2d 1158·
7th Cir.·
1987-08-04
·cited 13×
The court held that while the jury's verdict on liability had some basis in the evidence, the damages awarded were excessive and the district court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict without ruling on the alternative motion for a new trial. The court also addr
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826 F.2d 177·
2d Cir.·
1987-08-07
·cited 12×
The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, finding no abuse of discretion in discovery or amendment rulings, and no grounds for disqualifying the special master.
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777 F.2d 306·
5th Cir.·
1985-11-29
·cited 12×
The court held that Jayco lacked standing to challenge most of Savin's alleged antitrust violations due to insufficient evidence of preparedness and direct injury.
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702 F.2d 854·
10th Cir.·
1983-03-21
·cited 12×
The court held that licensed real estate agents operating under Colorado law are employees of the broker for antitrust purposes and thus incapable of conspiring with the broker or each other under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
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376 F.2d 692·
7th Cir.·
1967-04-25
·cited 12×
The court held that the in pari delicto defense is not applicable when a party with coercive power forces another into an illegal contract, and that a conspiracy is not required to prove certain antitrust violations.
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787 F.2d 59·
2d Cir.·
1986-03-31
·cited 11×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by abstaining from adjudicating federal antitrust claims over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. The court also dismissed the cross-appeal regarding dismissal for failure to state a claim, finding the com
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597 F. Supp. 1045·
S.D. Fla.·
1984-11-01
·cited 11×
The court held that intra-corporate entities cannot conspire under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and that a distributor's injury from a manufacturer's termination does not constitute an 'antitrust injury' for standing purposes. It also found that a manufacturer's sales allowance p
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664 F.2d 353·
2d Cir.·
1981-11-16
·cited 10×
The court held that Connecticut's statutory scheme for regulating alcoholic beverage prices is immune from federal antitrust laws under the state action doctrine.
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581 F.2d 1308·
8th Cir.·
1978-08-21
·cited 10×
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243 F.2d 274·
3d Cir.·
1957-03-26
·cited 10×
An exclusive United States distributor for a trademarked product can stipulate resale prices under the Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act, and the Act, along with the McGuire Act, is constitutional.
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745 F.2d 166·
2d Cir.·
1984-09-21
·cited 8×
The dissenting judge holds that the New York legislation mandating adherence to announced prices constitutes a per se violation of the Sherman Act and fails the Midcal test for state action immunity.
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577 F.2d 468·
9th Cir.·
1978-02-17
·cited 8×
The court held that the appellants' antitrust complaint sufficiently alleged an impact on interstate commerce to establish federal jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, and that the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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283 F.2d 86·
9th Cir.·
1960-08-12
·cited 8×
The court held that the Hawaii Fair Trade Act, as re-enacted and applied to non-signers, is valid under the McGuire Act and does not violate due process or antitrust laws.
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750 F.2d 1154·
2d Cir.·
1984-12-18
·cited 6×
The dissenting judge would hold that the appellee's allegedly anticompetitive activities are not protected from federal antitrust scrutiny by state action immunity because New York has not clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed a policy to displace competition in the tel
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735 F.2d 1184·
9th Cir.·
1984-06-26
·cited 6×
The court held that the newspapers' practices did not constitute a per se violation of the Sherman Act, and the carriers failed to prove a violation under the rule of reason or to prove damages.
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718 F.2d 256·
8th Cir.·
1983-09-29
·cited 6×
The court held that a manufacturer's policy of refusing to deal with retailers who sell below designated prices, without more, is permissible under the Sherman Act, consistent with the Colgate doctrine.
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243 F.2d 501·
6th Cir.·
1957-04-11
·cited 6×
The court held that the district court erred in finding the McGuire Act unconstitutional, but should defer ruling on the Kentucky Fair Trade Act's state constitutional validity pending a decision by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
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238 F.2d 108·
1st Cir.·
1956-11-05
·cited 6×
The court held that substantial evidence supported the Federal Trade Commission's finding of an unlawful agreement among jobbers and manufacturers to maintain resale prices for advertising specialties.
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184 F.2d 11·
5th Cir.·
1950-07-27
·cited 6×
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714 F.2d 842·
8th Cir.·
1983-08-18
·cited 5×
The court held that Mack's sales assistance program, a vertical restraint, should not have been evaluated under a per se standard of illegality and, under the rule of reason, does not violate the Sherman Act.
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908 F.2d 200·
7th Cir.·
1990-07-26
·cited 4×
The court held that vertical price restraints are not per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act without evidence of an agreement on specific prices, and affirmed summary judgment for defendants due to lack of evidence of unreasonable restraint, monopolization, or conspira
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906 F.2d 432·
9th Cir.·
1990-06-22
·cited 4×
The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to fix prices, and the defendants' alternative explanation of interdependent pricing was not sufficiently plausible to warrant summary ju
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803 F.2d 1463·
9th Cir.·
1986-11-05
·cited 4×
The court held that General Motors' arrangements for compensating dealers for transit damage repairs and warranty repairs did not violate federal antitrust laws.
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575 F.2d 1169·
6th Cir.·
1978-05-04
·cited 4×
Agreements between wholesalers that maintained retail prices were not exempt from antitrust laws under the McGuire Act's fair trade provisions, even if they involved customer restrictions rather than direct price setting between the wholesalers.
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691 F. Supp. 291·
M.D. Fla.·
1988-05-06
·cited 2×
Summary judgment is granted for the Manufacturer Defendants because the Plaintiffs failed to establish that the Manufacturers controlled the resale prices or terms of sale of the Warehouse Distributors, thus precluding application of the indirect purchaser doctrine under the Robi
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604 F.2d 266·
4th Cir.·
1979-07-19
·cited 2×
The court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding no antitrust violations and no grounds for recusal or a new trial.
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510 F.2d 986·
5th Cir.·
1975-04-03
·cited 2×
A distributor's unilateral refusal to deal with a retailer for reasons unrelated to anti-competitive distribution patterns does not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
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417 F.2d 126·
2d Cir.·
1969-10-10
·cited 2×
The court held that while the FTC had substantial evidence of illegal price maintenance, the order forbidding lawful fair trade contracts in states where they are permitted by law was unjustified and punitive, requiring modification.
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351 F.2d 938·
1st Cir.·
1965-10-29
·cited 2×
A manufacturer is considered 'in competition' with retailers for purposes of the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts if it holds itself out as selling its products to consumers in retail quantities, regardless of the success of those sales.
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244 F.2d 681·
2d Cir.·
1957-05-15
·cited 2×
The court held that the defendant's mail order sales from the District of Columbia to New York consumers did not violate New York's Fair Trade Act because title passed in the District of Columbia, a non-fair trade jurisdiction, and the McGuire Act only permits enforcement actions
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158 F.2d 592·
2d Cir.·
1946-11-27
·cited 2×
Resale price maintenance agreements for Kodachrome and Magazine Film are not protected by the Miller-Tydings amendment because the commodities are not in free and open competition with others of the same general class.
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564 F. Supp. 1121·
M.D. Fla.·
1983-04-25
·cited 1×
The court held that the plaintiffs' federal and state antitrust claims were time-barred by the statute of limitations and that the remaining claims lacked substantive merit due to insufficient evidence of conspiracy or illegal conduct.
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M.D. Fla.·
2024-12-04
The court held that the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege claims under the Sherman Act and Robinson-Patman Act, and therefore dismissed the state law claims as well.
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995 F.2d 735·
7th Cir.·
1993-06-08
A vertical restraint is not illegal per se under the Sherman Act unless it includes an agreement on price or price levels; an agreement to terminate a price cutter alone is insufficient.
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948 F.2d 1018·
6th Cir.·
1991-11-06
The court held that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and non-terminated distributors were acting independently, thus affirming the summary judgment.
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684 F.2d 174·
1st Cir.·
1982-07-09
The court affirmed the district court's finding that the distributor's termination was for legitimate business reasons, not unlawful price fixing, and affirmed the denial of the counterclaim due to insufficient evidence of damages.
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546 F.2d 328·
10th Cir.·
1976-11-23
The court held that the defendant Mead Foods, Inc. was not entitled to an antitrust exemption under the Miller-Tydings Act because its price maintenance agreement with the plaintiff likely fell within the Act's proviso excluding agreements between competitors or parties on the sa
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364 F.2d 765·
6th Cir.·
1966-08-18
A Fair Trade contract allowing a limited percentage discount for concessions qualifies for enforcement under Tennessee's Fair Trade statute, and a manufacturer's vigorous, albeit not 100% effective, enforcement program does not constitute a lack of good faith.