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788 F.2d 338·
6th Cir.·
1986-04-09
·cited 10×
The court held that Ohio's statute requiring defendants to prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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596 F.2d 628·
4th Cir.·
1979-04-19
·cited 10×
The jury instructions, when viewed in their entirety, correctly placed the burden of proof on the state and did not deprive the defendant of due process.
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566 F.2d 507·
5th Cir.·
1978-01-17
·cited 10×
The Court held that Georgia law, which places the burden on the defendant to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, is constitutional and consistent with Supreme Court precedent like Leland v. Oregon.
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716 F.2d 396·
6th Cir.·
1983-09-09
·cited 8×
Placing the burden on a defendant to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence does not violate due process, provided the state proves all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
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682 F.2d 461·
4th Cir.·
1982-06-10
·cited 8×
The dissenting judge would grant the writ of habeas corpus, finding that a jury instruction violated constitutional rights and that the procedural bar of a contemporaneous objection rule was improperly applied.
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602 F.2d 471·
1st Cir.·
1979-07-31
·cited 8×
The court held that the state trial judge's jury instructions did not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to the defendant regarding self-defense or malice.
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566 F.2d 381·
2d Cir.·
1977-09-30
·cited 8×
The New York first degree robbery statute, which places the burden of proving an affirmative defense on the defendant, is constitutional under the Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. New York.
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715 F.2d 106·
4th Cir.·
1983-08-09
·cited 6×
The dissenting judge held that erroneous jury instructions on lesser offenses were cured by the jury's first-degree murder verdict, thus the conviction was not fundamentally unfair.
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763 F. Supp. 1110·
M.D. Fla.·
1989-08-17
·cited 5×
The court held that the trial court erred by precluding mitigating evidence regarding Petitioner's drug and alcohol abuse and cousin's dominance, violating the Eighth Amendment, and granted a new sentencing hearing on that claim.
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722 F.2d 1296·
6th Cir.·
1983-12-08
·cited 5×
The court held that jury instructions imposing an equal burden of proof on the defendant for self-defense as the state has for proving murder constitutes a due process violation.
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871 F.2d 432·
3d Cir.·
1989-03-31
·cited 4×
The court held that the New Jersey diminished capacity statute, as applied through the trial court's jury instructions, violated due process by impermissibly shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant on an issue that negated an element of the crime.
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746 F.2d 1011·
4th Cir.·
1984-10-18
·cited 4×
The court's concurrence rests on binding precedent regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, despite the judge's personal view on the impropriety of the jury instruction.
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719 F.2d 518·
1st Cir.·
1983-10-25
·cited 4×
-
702 F.2d 766·
9th Cir.·
1983-03-28
·cited 4×
The court held that the majority's interpretation of the Supreme Court's mandate was incorrect and that prior case law regarding constitutional objections was binding.
-
694 F.2d 6·
1st Cir.·
1982-12-03
·cited 4×
The court affirmed the denial of the habeas corpus petition, holding that the state trial court's jury instructions on reasonable doubt and burden of proof, including the burden of proving absence of duress, were not unconstitutional.
-
550 F.2d 896·
3d Cir.·
1977-02-22
·cited 4×
An acquittal on criminal charges does not preclude prison authorities from imposing disciplinary measures for the same conduct, as the burdens of proof and interests involved differ significantly.
-
946 F.2d 695·
9th Cir.·
1991-10-08
·cited 2×
-
873 F.2d 1558·
4th Cir.·
1989-05-04
·cited 2×
The court held that the burden of persuasion for self-defense, as defined by South Carolina law, cannot constitutionally be placed on the defendant because it negates an element of the crime rather than being an affirmative defense.
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859 F.2d 1054·
1st Cir.·
1988-10-20
·cited 2×
The court held that the district court erred in granting habeas corpus relief, as the Massachusetts felony-murder rule as applied at the time of petitioner's conviction was constitutional and supported by the evidence.
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856 F.2d 609·
4th Cir.·
1988-09-06
·cited 2×
The court held that a jury instruction placing the burden of proving self-defense on the defendant in a South Carolina murder trial violated due process because self-defense is an element of murder in South Carolina, which the prosecution must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt.
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850 F.2d 1529·
11th Cir.·
1988-08-03
·cited 2×
The court held that the jury instructions on implied malice did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof and that a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant failed to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.
-
566 F.2d 616·
8th Cir.·
1977-12-06
·cited 2×
The court held that placing the burden of proving insanity on the defendant does not violate due process, reaffirming prior precedent.
-
906 F.2d 1300·
8th Cir.·
1990-07-05
The court held that the jury instructions on premeditation and intoxication, as well as the evidentiary rulings, did not violate due process and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.
-
879 F.2d 1203·
3d Cir.·
1989-07-19
The court held that the warrantless entry into Singer's home was not justified by exigent circumstances, rendering the aggravated assault conviction unconstitutional. It also held that Singer was denied effective assistance of counsel for the simple assault charges.
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859 F.2d 110·
9th Cir.·
1988-10-07
The court held that the trial court's jury instructions, when viewed as a whole, adequately informed the jury of the State's burden to prove all elements of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, including the absence of adequate provocation, thus satisfying due process.
-
787 F.2d 1346·
9th Cir.·
1986-04-22
The court held that the jury instruction for the affirmative defense to felony murder did not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to the defendant.
-
709 F.2d 232·
3d Cir.·
1983-06-09
The court held that the petitioner had not fairly presented his claim regarding the malice jury instruction to the state courts, thus requiring dismissal of the habeas petition for failure to exhaust state remedies.
-
570 F.2d 510·
4th Cir.·
1978-02-23
The court held that the district court correctly found the manslaughter instruction violated Mullaney, and that this error was not harmless.