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902 F.2d 1221·
7th Cir.·
1990-05-15
·cited 165×
The court held that sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict of conspiracy and telephone facilitation, and that the district court properly enhanced the offense level for firearm possession.
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632 F.2d 605·
5th Cir.·
1980-12-11
·cited 115×
The court held that the state impermissibly shifted the burden of persuasion on the issue of self-defense to the defendant, violating due process, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction under the Jackson v. Virginia standard.
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658 F.2d 1225·
7th Cir.·
1981-09-09
·cited 104×
The court held that the trial court's jury instructions on withdrawal from a conspiracy were erroneous because they improperly placed the burden of persuasion on the defendant, rather than requiring the government to disprove withdrawal beyond a reasonable doubt. However, withdra
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946 F.2d 654·
9th Cir.·
1991-10-04
·cited 79×
The severity of penal consequences and the quantitative effect of a sentencing factor are relevant in determining the need for heightened procedural protections.
-
733 F.2d 766·
11th Cir.·
1984-05-16
·cited 74×
The court held that a defendant may waive their right to be present at critical stages of a capital trial, and the specific circumstances of the defendant's absence during voir dire require further inquiry into knowing and voluntary waiver.
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843 F.2d 741·
3d Cir.·
1988-03-31
·cited 64×
The court held that the prosecutor's explanation for striking black jurors was race-neutral and complied with Batson, and that while the jury instruction on the witness intimidation statute was problematic, any error was harmless.
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738 F.2d 1573·
11th Cir.·
1984-08-20
·cited 62×
The court held that the district court properly denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, affirming the denial of an evidentiary hearing and the rejection of the petitioner's claims.
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574 So. 2d 1066·
Fla.·
1990-11-29
·cited 61×
Charles Michael Kight, a death row inmate, appealed the trial court's denial of his Rule 3.850 motion to vacate conviction and sentence and filed a habeas corpus petition, raising various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, constitutional violations in jury instructions,
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716 F.2d 615·
9th Cir.·
1983-09-19
·cited 60×
The court held that the mail cover did not violate the defendant's First Amendment rights and that costs of prosecution were properly taxed. However, the restitution order was impermissible as it exceeded the amounts alleged in the indictment.
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643 F.2d 1095·
5th Cir.·
1981-04-27
·cited 46×
The court held that while the jury charge on presumptions was unconstitutional, federal habeas relief was barred by procedural default due to the failure to object at trial, absent a showing of cause.
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735 F.2d 1242·
11th Cir.·
1984-06-20
·cited 43×
The court held that the petitioner's confession was not tainted by an illegal arrest, unlawful inducement, or stale Miranda warnings, and that the trial court conducted an adequate voluntariness hearing.
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640 F.2d 126·
8th Cir.·
1981-01-30
·cited 43×
A jury instruction creating a burden-shifting presumption of intent violates due process and requires federal habeas relief, even if not objected to at trial, provided the petitioner can show cause for the failure to object.
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853 F.2d 1193·
5th Cir.·
1988-08-24
·cited 42×
The court held that the supervised release term imposed for Count One was illegal and must be vacated, but the conviction on Count One is affirmed. The court also held that the plea on Count Two must be set aside due to the trial court's failure to properly advise the defendant o
-
826 F.2d 747·
8th Cir.·
1987-08-14
·cited 42×
The court affirmed the denial of the habeas petition, finding no constitutional error in the admission of evidence or jury instructions, and sufficient evidence for the conviction.
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545 F.2d 301·
2d Cir.·
1976-11-10
·cited 42×
The court held that proof of non-receipt alone is insufficient to infer theft from the mails, and an erroneous jury instruction on intent can be reversible error.
-
882 F.2d 1095·
6th Cir.·
1989-08-18
·cited 40×
The court held that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' enhancement for firearm possession during a drug offense is constitutional as applied, and that sufficient evidence supported the enhancement and the jury instructions were adequate.
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572 F.2d 994·
4th Cir.·
1978-02-27
·cited 38×
Jury instructions placing the burden of proving affirmative defenses on the defendant are constitutional if they do not require disproving elements of the crime. Failure to comply with state procedural rules for objecting to jury instructions bars federal habeas review.
-
674 F.2d 279·
4th Cir.·
1982-03-24
·cited 34×
The court held that the alibi instruction unconstitutionally shifted the burden of persuasion, but the double jeopardy claim was barred because the defendant's own motion necessitated the mistrial, and the failure to transcribe a hearing did not violate due process.
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546 F.2d 851·
10th Cir.·
1976-12-06
·cited 34×
The court held that the administrative summonses were properly issued, the bank deposit method of proof was permissible, and the judge's conduct did not warrant disqualification. However, setting bail in the jury's presence constituted plain error requiring reversal.
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646 F.2d 1129·
6th Cir.·
1980-12-12
·cited 32×
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683 F.2d 820·
4th Cir.·
1982-07-06
·cited 30×
The dissenting judge holds that the jury instructions did not improperly place the burden of proof for self-defense on the defendant.
-
720 F.2d 1206·
11th Cir.·
1983-11-16
·cited 29×
A jury instruction creating a mandatory rebuttable presumption that a person intends the natural consequences of their voluntary acts unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof on the element of intent, violating due process.
-
905 F.2d 1050·
7th Cir.·
1990-06-20
·cited 28×
The Sentencing Guidelines do not violate due process by assigning weight to factors without adjustment for uncertainty, and the evidence supported the finding that the defendant was capable of participating in the negotiated drug transaction.
-
778 F.2d 168·
4th Cir.·
1985-11-27
·cited 28×
The court held that a suspect was not in custody for Miranda purposes and that a state's shifting of the burden of production on malice was constitutional. It also held that a procedural default at trial bars federal habeas review even if the state court discussed the merits.
-
540 F.2d 1088·
D.C. Cir.·
1976-05-25
·cited 28×
The court held that the enhanced punishment under 21 U.S.C. § 845(a) was improper because the age of the distributee, which triggers the enhancement, is an element of the offense that must be alleged in the indictment and found by the jury.
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670 F.2d 690·
7th Cir.·
1982-02-03
·cited 26×
The dissenting judge believes the jury instruction unconstitutionally presumed intent, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, violating due process.
-
672 F.2d 266·
2d Cir.·
1982-01-28
·cited 26×
The court held that a jury instruction on the presumption of intent, when viewed in the context of the entire charge which emphasized the presumption of innocence and the state's burden to prove specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt, did not violate due process.
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637 F.2d 449·
6th Cir.·
1980-12-22
·cited 26×
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622 F.2d 172·
5th Cir.·
1980-07-24
·cited 26×
The court held that a jury charge creating a presumption that a defendant intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts, when intent is a disputed element, unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof. This unconstitutionality requires habeas relief even if the defen
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595 F.2d 407·
8th Cir.·
1979-03-23
·cited 26×
The court held that while some claims were properly denied, others related to the application of the felony-murder rule were unexhausted and should be dismissed without prejudice for state courts to address first.
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587 F.2d 636·
4th Cir.·
1978-11-28
·cited 26×
The court's discussion and decision on an unnecessary Sixth Amendment question creates a large exception to Stone v. Powell, potentially endangering its future application in habeas corpus cases.
-
555 F.2d 103·
3d Cir.·
1977-04-22
·cited 26×
The dissenting judge believes the jury charge improperly placed the burden of persuasion regarding provocation on the defendant, violating Mullaney v. Wilbur.
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619 F.2d 327·
4th Cir.·
1980-04-24
·cited 24×
Jury instructions that created a mandatory presumption of premeditation unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof from the State to the defendant, violating due process.
-
600 F.2d 448·
4th Cir.·
1979-06-29
·cited 24×
The court affirmed the grant of a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the jury instruction placing the burden of proving self-defense on the defendant violated the due process clause.
-
694 F.2d 75·
5th Cir.·
1982-12-07
·cited 23×
The court held that a jury instruction which allowed co-conspirators to be held responsible for a murder committed during a robbery, without requiring proof of specific intent to kill by the defendant, violated the Fourteenth Amendment by relieving the state of its burden of proo
-
572 F.2d 443·
4th Cir.·
1978-01-23
·cited 22×
The prosecutor's comment on the defendant's failure to testify did not invalidate the conviction because the trial judge disregarded it.
-
954 F.2d 441·
7th Cir.·
1992-01-21
·cited 20×
The court held that the jury instructions invalidated in Reddick were based solely on Illinois state law and did not present a federal constitutional claim, thus not entitling the petitioner to federal habeas relief. However, the court found that Falconer v. Lane did not announce
-
776 F.2d 918·
10th Cir.·
1985-11-12
·cited 20×
The court held that the jury instructions were inadequate because they failed to inform the jury that the government must prove the absence of heat of passion beyond a reasonable doubt to secure a murder conviction.
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698 F.2d 213·
4th Cir.·
1983-01-10
·cited 18×
The dissent argues that the petitioner received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to object to jury instructions that were later found to be unconstitutional.
-
614 F.2d 929·
3d Cir.·
1980-02-12
·cited 18×
A state may constitutionally require a defendant to prove the affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication by a preponderance of the evidence, even when intoxication negates a specific intent element of the crime.
-
833 F.2d 156·
9th Cir.·
1987-11-27
·cited 16×
The court held that the jury instructions were erroneous because they failed to adequately distinguish the mens rea requirements for second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter, and failed to instruct the jury on the defense of accidental killing and the government's burden
-
728 F.2d 1389·
11th Cir.·
1984-04-02
·cited 16×
The dissenting judge would affirm the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief, finding the jury instruction constitutional and the defendant not prejudiced by any alleged defect.
-
599 F.2d 1074·
1st Cir.·
1979-06-07
·cited 15×
The court held that requiring a defendant to personally exercise peremptory challenges, when sanity is the sole issue and the prosecutor uses this as evidence of sanity, violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
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704 F.2d 705·
4th Cir.·
1983-03-31
·cited 14×
The court held that the novelty of the constitutional claim at the time of trial constituted cause for failing to raise it on appeal, and prejudice was present, thus satisfying the cause and prejudice exception to the procedural bar rule.
-
667 F.2d 742·
8th Cir.·
1982-01-08
·cited 14×
The court held that the petitioner was not denied effective assistance of counsel and that the Iowa law placing the burden on the defendant to prove intoxication was constitutional.
-
665 F.2d 863·
9th Cir.·
1981-10-30
·cited 14×
The court held that a state prisoner's failure to object to a constitutionally infirm jury instruction at trial or on direct appeal is excused by cause and prejudice, allowing federal habeas corpus relief.
-
750 F.2d 798·
9th Cir.·
1984-12-28
·cited 13×
The court held that the Arizona Court of Appeals did not apply a procedural bar when it addressed the merits of Huffman's federal constitutional claim, and that the jury instructions, when viewed as a whole, did not create an unconstitutional presumption that shifted the burden o
-
831 F.2d 1251·
5th Cir.·
1987-11-16
·cited 12×
The court held that the petitioner waived his Sandstrom claim due to failure to object at trial, Batson is not retroactive on collateral review, ineffective assistance of counsel was not demonstrated, joinder of charges was not prejudicial, and evidence was sufficient for convict
-
683 F.2d 697·
2d Cir.·
1982-06-29
·cited 12×
The dissenting judge argues that the majority opinion incorrectly upholds a jury instruction on intent that violates the Supreme Court's precedent in Sandstrom v. Montana.
-
768 F.2d 122·
6th Cir.·
1985-07-23
·cited 11×
The Sixth Circuit held that the denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing is subject to harmless error analysis, and that a conviction based solely on uncorroborated accomplice testimony does not violate due process.