639 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 169 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · browse and sort
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The court held that the jury's verdict was inconsistent and damages inadequate, requiring a new trial on some claims. It also reversed the dismissal of state tort claims against Officer Simpson and the Port Authority.
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The court held that the trial court erred in allocating the burden of proof in a Title VII disparate treatment case and in awarding punitive damages under certain statutes, requiring reversal and remand for a new trial.
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The court held that individual officers are immune from liability due to good faith reliance on existing Tennessee law, but the city may be liable under Monell for constitutional violations resulting from its policy or custom.
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The court reinstated its prior judgment on antitrust claims and reversed the dismissal of a civil rights claim against the Park District, remanding for further proceedings.
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915 F.2d 1530·
11th Cir.·
1990-10-31
·cited 23×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing official-capacity claims and applying collateral estoppel without proper notice, and that the police officers were not in privity with the state for collateral estoppel purposes under Georgia law.
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505 So. 2d 489·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1987-03-18
·cited 23×
Southern Alliance Corporation appealed the dismissal of its complaint against the City of Winter Haven and its employees for alleged constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, as well as tortious interference. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the § 1
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The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a Fourth Amendment claim due to a lack of demonstrated expectation of privacy and that procedural due process was satisfied by the notices provided.
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927 F.2d 1473·
9th Cir.·
1991-03-12
·cited 22×
The court held that the sheriff is not the final policymaker for deputy training under Washington law, and the jury instructions on municipal liability did not meet the deliberate indifference standard required by Canton v. Harris.
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The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting protective orders, that summary judgment for the city and police chief was appropriate, but that directed verdicts for one officer on claims of false arrest, imprisonment, and civil rights violations
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885 F.2d 1439·
9th Cir.·
1989-09-18
·cited 22×
The court held that the University of California Regents, as an arm of the state, is not a 'person' amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court also held that while the County's strip search, x-ray, and blood test policies were reasonable, its failure to provide a bed or m
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The court held that a plaintiff must be given an opportunity to prove that a municipality's policymakers absolutely delegated final policymaking authority to a subordinate official, even if positive law suggests otherwise, by demonstrating a custom or usage of abdicating review p
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845 F.2d 1451·
7th Cir.·
1988-05-09
·cited 22×
The court held that the amended complaint sufficiently suggested the incorporation of a previously omitted claim regarding denial of access to newspapers.
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786 F.2d 516·
2d Cir.·
1986-03-19
·cited 22×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying discovery and improperly granting summary judgment on the sexual assault claim, but correctly dismissed the wrongful confinement claim.
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A plaintiff arrested pursuant to a facially valid warrant generally has no claim for unconstitutional deprivation of liberty under § 1983, even if the arresting officers had malicious motives, unless the plaintiff can show the warrant was procured by misrepresentation of material
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758 F.2d 181·
6th Cir.·
1985-04-03
·cited 22×
The court held that a sheriff and county can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a prisoner's injuries resulting from excessive force if such injuries were inflicted pursuant to an official policy or custom of failing to train, discipline, or investigate misconduct.
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750 F.2d 205·
2d Cir.·
1984-12-11
·cited 22×
The court held that the statute of limitations did not bar the malicious prosecution claim, and that the dismissal of claims against the Martabanos, Bano Buick, and Vincent Cerbone in his individual capacity should be reversed, while affirming dismissals against the Village of Mo
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The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's claim regarding a deprivation of his liberty interest, as the alleged stigmatizing charge of intoxication could be a factual question for trial. The court also vacated the dismissal of the property interes
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The court held that the facts of the case do not rise to the level of a constitutional question, and the complaint should be dismissed.
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942 F.2d 1435·
9th Cir.·
1991-08-26
·cited 21×
The court held that the majority's application of deliberate indifference standards to jail management was incorrect, suggesting judicial overreach.
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853 F.2d 73·
2d Cir.·
1988-07-27
·cited 21×
A District Attorney is absolutely immune from civil liability for prosecutorial acts, and a county is not liable for a District Attorney's prosecutorial acts as they do not represent official county policy.
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681 F.2d 1362·
11th Cir.·
1982-08-05
·cited 21×
A probation condition requiring participation in a program with disputed religious content raises a material factual issue, precluding summary judgment. However, conditions allowing warrantless searches and psychological stress evaluations are constitutional.
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599 F.2d 573·
3d Cir.·
1979-06-15
·cited 21×
A state prisoner's complaint alleging prison officials denied him medical care, leading to severe withdrawal symptoms, states a claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment.
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The court held that there is no implied cause of action for damages against a municipality under the Fourteenth Amendment, even with federal question jurisdiction, for the acts of its employees.
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121 F.4th 873·
11th Cir.·
2024-11-13
·cited 20×
Deputy Jafet Santiago-Miranda fired ten shots into a vehicle that was accelerating toward him after he issued multiple commands for the driver to stop, killing two young occupants, and the plaintiffs sued for excessive force, failure to render medical aid, and battery. The Eleven
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The court held that a genuine issue of fact existed regarding whether the officer obtaining the warrant acted with reckless disregard for the truth, requiring a jury trial. It also held that the manner of executing the search warrant presented factual issues for a jury.
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820 F.2d 170·
6th Cir.·
1987-06-01
·cited 20×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a claim for malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or violations of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, affirming the directed verdict.
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638 F. Supp. 856·
S.D. Fla.·
1986-06-25
·cited 20×
The court held that the plaintiffs' amended complaint sufficiently stated claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against both defendants, as well as pendent state law claims, and therefore denied the defendants' motions to dismiss.
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782 F.2d 947·
11th Cir.·
1986-02-20
·cited 20×
A person injured in an automobile accident caused by a police officer's negligent operation of a vehicle does not have a section 1983 cause of action for violation of a federal right, as such negligence does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation.
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The court held that the school board and its members in their official capacities are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and that the actual malice standard applies to defamation claims brought by public officials against non-media defendants.
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771 F.2d 1475·
11th Cir.·
1985-09-24
·cited 20×
The court held that the use of deadly force against an unarmed, fleeing burglary suspect who posed no immediate threat was an unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment, affirming summary judgment for the plaintiff.
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The jury's verdict for the arresting officer does not preclude claims against municipal entities based on policy or custom, nor does it preclude claims against individual officials who may have authorized unconstitutional conduct.
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The dissenting judge argues that a public defender, representing an indigent defendant, does not operate under color of state law for the purposes of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. The judge also believes public defenders should have absolute immunity.
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A party is not entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 unless they are a prevailing party who has essentially succeeded on a claim.
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852 F.2d 1205·
9th Cir.·
1988-07-27
·cited 19×
The court held that prison staff acted with deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs, but reversed the judgment against prison administrators due to lack of personal involvement and remanded the attorney's fees award for reconsideration.
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192 F. Supp. 3d 1353·
M.D. Fla.·
2023-10-20
·cited 18×
A governmental entity is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based solely on respondeat superior; liability requires proof of an official policy or custom that caused the constitutional violation.
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906 F.2d 491·
10th Cir.·
1990-06-20
·cited 18×
The court held that the employee's speech regarding hospital waste and inefficiency constituted a matter of public concern protected by the First Amendment, but the administrator was entitled to qualified immunity from individual liability.
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861 F.2d 1421·
9th Cir.·
1988-11-23
·cited 18×
A district court may dismiss a pro se in forma pauperis complaint as frivolous only if it lacks any "arguable substance in law or fact," and cannot dismiss based on credibility determinations of the allegations.
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811 F.2d 1139·
7th Cir.·
1987-02-11
·cited 18×
The court held that the officers had probable cause to arrest and detain the juvenile, and the conditions and duration of his confinement did not violate his constitutional rights.
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814 F.2d 1142·
7th Cir.·
1987-01-20
·cited 18×
The court holds that the Village of Robbins is not liable for acts of its officials that are clearly outside the scope of their employment, distinguishing this case from prior precedent.
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765 F.2d 102·
7th Cir.·
1985-06-19
·cited 18×
The court held that the plaintiff's civil rights suit was barred by the statute of limitations, and affirmed the dismissal on alternative grounds of the defendant's lack of personal liability.
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The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the excessive force claim against an unnamed defendant and other claims without allowing the pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint.
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The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the § 1981 claims and the discriminatory discharge claim, and that the back-pay award for the Title VII demotion claim was not an abuse of discretion.
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746 F.2d 1413·
10th Cir.·
1984-10-24
·cited 18×
The court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to recuse himself, did not err in excluding evidence of a supervisor's alleged misconduct, and did not err in its jury instructions regarding good faith defenses and the use of force.
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The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant because the civil rights action brought was frivolous and without foundation.
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790 F.2d 1063·
3d Cir.·
1986-05-22
·cited 17×
The court held that a municipality's adherence to a state judge's illegal bail schedule, even if blatantly illegal, does not constitute a municipal policy for Monell liability purposes.
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768 F.2d 765·
6th Cir.·
1985-07-16
·cited 17×
The court held that denying a non-tenured teacher employment based on her divorce proceedings violates her constitutional right to privacy, and qualified immunity does not shield the superintendent from all forms of relief sought.
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752 F.2d 42·
2d Cir.·
1985-01-04
·cited 17×
The court held that a prior administrative finding of probable cause collaterally estops claims based on that finding, but claims of excessive force and those related to resisting arrest are not precluded and require further proceedings.
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110 F.4th 1309·
11th Cir.·
2024-08-07
·cited 16×
Title II of the ADA does not allow recovery of emotional distress damages, but a dismissal was premature if other relief could be granted. Claims under Section 1983 for constitutional violations failed because the alleged abuse did not shock the conscience.