-
288 F.2d 794·
9th Cir.·
1961-03-23
·cited 4×
The court held that the transportation of money after a bank robbery is a distinct offense from the robbery itself, and thus not subject to merger for sentencing purposes.
-
78 So. 3d 46·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2012-01-11
·cited 2×
Tillman Moore appeals his convictions for first-degree murder and aggravated child abuse of his three-month-old son, arguing that the charges merged under Brooks v. State and that evidence of prior burn injuries was improperly admitted. The Fourth District affirmed, holding that
-
987 F.2d 261·
5th Cir.·
1993-03-22
·cited 2×
The court held that the district court's failure to properly apprise the defendant of the direct consequences of his guilty plea, in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 11, constituted an entire failure to address a core concern, requiring automatic reversal. Additionally, convictions for
-
861 F.2d 350·
2d Cir.·
1988-11-01
·cited 2×
A defendant convicted of theft and possession of the proceeds of that theft may not also be convicted of possessing the proceeds of a different theft, but failure to request a limiting jury instruction waives this objection.
-
833 F.2d 238·
10th Cir.·
1987-11-12
·cited 2×
The court held that a conviction for criminal sexual penetration (CSP) did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, the CSP statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, and there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.
-
710 F.2d 270·
6th Cir.·
1983-06-27
·cited 2×
The court held that the resentencing did not violate due process or double jeopardy because the judge provided reasons for the increased sentence based on the original intent and the new sentence did not exceed the total originally imposed.
-
330 So. 2d 203·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1976-04-14
·cited 2×
Florida appellate court affirmed conviction but vacated the improper sentencing on the second count, holding that when two offenses arise from the same criminal transaction, only one sentence for the higher offense may be imposed.
-
323 So. 2d 630·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1975-12-02
·cited 2×
Appellant's conviction for robbery, aggravated assault, and firearm use was affirmed in part and reversed in part; the firearm charge was vacated as part of the same transaction as the robbery, but the robbery and assault convictions stood as separate crimes against different vic
-
287 So. 2d 369·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1973-12-19
·cited 2×
The court held that imposing separate consecutive sentences for using a firearm in the commission of a felony is impermissible when the firearm use is part of the same transaction as the underlying felony.
-
432 F.2d 440·
4th Cir.·
1970-10-08
·cited 2×
The court affirmed the conviction, finding the indictment legally sufficient and no prejudice from concurrent sentences despite potential merger of offenses.
-
415 F.2d 745·
6th Cir.·
1969-09-17
·cited 2×
The court held that the appellant's claims of double jeopardy and duplicitous sentencing did not present a federal constitutional question, as the offenses could be independently proven and sentencing is a matter of state law.
-
408 F.2d 1375·
3d Cir.·
1969-04-07
·cited 2×
The court held that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the degree of resistance necessary for a rape conviction did not violate due process or constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
-
358 F.2d 676·
5th Cir.·
1966-03-28
·cited 2×
The court held that the appellant's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 473 (transferring counterfeit money) and 18 U.S.C. § 472 (possessing counterfeit money) constituted two distinct offenses, allowing for consecutive sentences.
-
308 F.2d 802·
10th Cir.·
1962-09-10
·cited 2×
The court held that the appellant suffered no injury from an illegal sentence because it ran concurrently with a lawful sentence.
-
282 F.2d 564·
9th Cir.·
1960-09-12
·cited 2×
-
168 F.2d 776·
8th Cir.·
1948-06-22
·cited 2×
The court affirmed the denial of the motion to vacate the sentence, finding that the appellant's arguments regarding merger of offenses, prosecutorial discretion, and penitentiary placement were without merit.
-
954 So. 2d 47·
Fla. 5th DCA·
2007-03-16
·cited 1×
Thomas Spioch appealed the trial court's partial denial of his ineffective assistance of counsel motion under Rule 3.850. The court held that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately move for judgment of acquittal on thirteen lewd and lascivious assault counts,
-
573 So. 2d 449·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1991-02-06
·cited 1×
Ramon Morales was convicted of both purchase and possession of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school. The appellate court affirmed the purchase conviction but reversed the possession conviction because both arose from the same transaction and cocaine rock, violating principles est
-
Del. Super. Ct.·
2025-08-01
The Court denied the defendant's motions for postconviction relief and sentence modification, finding them either procedurally barred or lacking in merit. The defendant's sentence was deemed legal, there was no Brady violation, and his trial counsel was effective, ensuring his gu
-
Fla. 5th DCA·
2022-08-26
The sexual predator designation was affirmed because the defendant forfeited the issue by failing to raise the specific statutory argument—that conspiracy does not constitute the substantive offense of sexual battery—at the trial court level. Although the statutory interpretation
-
Del. Super. Ct.·
2018-03-16
The court affirmed the denial of the defendant's motion for postconviction relief, finding that his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were without merit. The defendant was properly advised of the potential consequences of going to trial, including habitual offender sent
-
139 So. 3d 461·
Fla. 1st DCA·
2014-05-29
The court reversed the summary denial of a Rule 3.850 motion on the ground that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to dual convictions for burglary with assault and home invasion robbery as violating double jeopardy, remanding for the trial court to address the claim o
-
Del.·
2002-12-13
The Delaware Supreme Court held that for a felony murder conviction to stand, the homicide must not only occur during the commission of the felony but must also be in furtherance of it, meaning it must facilitate an independent objective of the felony. The Court reversed the defe
-
599 So. 2d 752·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1992-06-03
Jackson appealed a denial of his motion to correct an allegedly illegal sentence imposed in 1973 for robbery, assault with intent to commit second-degree murder, and aggravated assault. The court affirmed, holding that the single transaction rule did not require merger of these c
-
942 F.2d 508·
8th Cir.·
1991-08-19
The district court erred in granting the writ of habeas corpus because the petitioner failed to fairly present his claim to the state courts, and he could not demonstrate sufficient cause and prejudice to excuse this failure.
-
573 So. 2d 1010·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1991-01-30
Florida appellate court affirmed murder and attempted robbery convictions but reversed the firearm possession conviction as a lesser-included offense of attempted robbery under pre-Carawan law.
-
553 So. 2d 800·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1989-12-21
Court affirmed trafficking and drug paraphernalia convictions but quashed the possession of cocaine conviction because all charges arose from the same cocaine and the defendant could not be punished for both possession and trafficking of the same drug under Carawan v. State.
-
534 So. 2d 811·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1988-11-29
T.J., a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent for throwing a rock through a car windshield, resulting in three convictions: throwing a deadly missile into an occupied conveyance, culpable negligence, and criminal mischief. The court held that while separate convictions for throwin
-
834 F.2d 1067·
D.C. Cir.·
1987-12-11
A conviction for felony murder does not require a formal conviction on the underlying felony; proof of all elements of the underlying felony is sufficient. Furthermore, the District of Columbia's insanity burden of proof applies to all offenses committed in the District, includin
-
793 F.2d 786·
6th Cir.·
1986-06-19
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) for escape by force, and that this conviction was not barred by a prior conviction for bank robbery under subsections (a) and (d) because the escape constituted a separate offense.
-
487 So. 2d 407·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1986-04-29
Paul Hamilton, a Black defendant tried by an all-white jury, challenged the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove Black jurors as racially discriminatory. The court affirmed the trial court's finding of no discrimination under State v. Neil, but reversed Hamilton's
-
616 F.2d 1049·
8th Cir.·
1980-03-10
The court held that a change in state law regarding double jeopardy necessitates remand for further consideration by the district court.
-
370 So. 2d 440·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1979-05-08
Florida appellate court affirmed sentences for robbery, sexual battery, and false imprisonment, but vacated the separate sentence for unlawful display of a firearm during commission of those felonies as improper under Gonzalez and Cone.
-
336 So. 2d 1227·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1976-09-08
-
295 So. 2d 692·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1974-06-07
The court held that the sentence for petit larceny should be vacated because it was the same offense intended during the breaking and entering.
-
300 So. 2d 64·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1974-04-02
The court held that separate sentences cannot be imposed for robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of that same robbery.
-
280 So. 2d 517·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1973-07-10
Defendant's conviction for buying and receiving stolen property was reversed because the evidence showed he was a principal in the larceny itself, not merely a receiver of stolen goods, and he could not be convicted of receiving property he helped steal.
-
423 F.2d 1221·
4th Cir.·
1970-04-08
The court summarily affirmed the judgment of conviction, finding the appellant's assignments of error to be without merit.
-
329 F.2d 685·
6th Cir.·
1964-04-08
The court held that the 25-year sentence for killing the mail custodian is valid, even if the robbery offense is considered merged into it.
-
268 F.2d 862·
7th Cir.·
1959-06-24
The court held that the District Court did not err in setting aside the lesser sentence and retaining the greater sentence for aggravated bank robbery, as the offenses were distinct.
-
254 F.2d 925·
7th Cir.·
1958-05-20
The court held that the defendant's conviction for possessing counterfeit currency did not merge with his conviction for passing counterfeit currency.
-
172 F.2d 386·
6th Cir.·
1949-02-01
The court held that the appellant's sentence was validly imposed, as the two subsections of the Bank Robbery Statute describe distinct offenses and the court retained the power to sentence on each count.