Knowing And Intelligent Waiver

865 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 197 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort

• Burton v. State
  596 So. 2d 1184· Fla. 1st DCA· 1992-04-06 ·cited 12×
  John Burton was convicted of grand theft after representing himself at trial without the trial court conducting the required Faretta inquiry to ensure he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial because the
• United States v. Proa-Tovar
  945 F.2d 1450· 9th Cir.· 1991-09-18 ·cited 12×
  The use of a deportation order in a § 1326 conviction is subject to collateral attack if the right to appeal was not knowingly and intelligently waived, but the attack only succeeds if the defects rendered the use of the order fundamentally unfair, which was not shown here.
• Antone Jones v. State
  584 So. 2d 120· Fla. 4th DCA· 1991-08-07 ·cited 12×·via Knowing And Intelligent Waiver Of Counsel
  Antone Jones appeals his conviction and habitual offender sentence, challenging his waiver of the right to counsel. The court reverses because the trial court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into whether Jones's waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent, as required by
• Hoffman v. Leeke
  903 F.2d 280· 4th Cir.· 1990-05-02 ·cited 12×
  The court held that the defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel due to an actual conflict of interest by his attorney, and that the defendant's purported waiver of this right was not knowing and intelligent.
• Dziurgot v. Luther
  897 F.2d 1222· 1st Cir.· 1990-03-16 ·cited 12×
  A district court cannot dismiss a claim of a drug-induced waiver of the right to be present at trial based solely on the judge's personal observation; an evidentiary hearing is required if the allegations are not conclusively contradicted by the record.
• Riddick v. Edmiston
  894 F.2d 586· 3d Cir.· 1990-01-16 ·cited 12×
  The court held that Miranda warnings are sufficient to inform a defendant of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel after indictment, and that a prosecutor's race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge, found credible by the trial court, satisfies Batson requirements.
• Shedelbower v. Estelle
  885 F.2d 570· 9th Cir.· 1989-09-12 ·cited 12×
  The court held that the appellant's confession was not obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, as he initiated further discussion after invoking his right to counsel and validly waived those rights under the totality of the circumstances.
• In the Interest of R.K., Jr.
  535 So. 2d 312· Fla. 2d DCA· 1988-12-07 ·cited 12×
  The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a final judgment permanently committing a minor to the custody of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, holding that the juvenile court violated the mother's constitutional right to counsel by failing to comply with pr
• United States v. Zaleta-Sosa
  854 F.2d 48· 5th Cir.· 1988-08-17 ·cited 12×
  The court held that the defendant's procedural complaints did not render his deportation hearing fundamentally unfair, and therefore, the predicate deportation order was valid for use in a prosecution for illegal reentry.
• Torrey v. Estelle
  842 F.2d 234· 9th Cir.· 1988-03-23 ·cited 12×
  The court held that a prisoner's resentencing to state prison after being committed to the Youth Authority was a collateral consequence, not a direct one, and thus the trial court was not required to advise him of this possibility at the time of his guilty plea.
• United States v. Mathews
  833 F.2d 161· 9th Cir.· 1987-11-27 ·cited 12×
  A guilty plea conclusively admits the factual allegations in the indictment, including those establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction, and cannot be collaterally attacked on factual grounds if voluntary and intelligent.
• United States v. Beniach
  825 F.2d 1207· 7th Cir.· 1987-08-06 ·cited 12×
  The court held that a criminal defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive their right to conflict-free counsel, and that the trial court's warnings were sufficient to establish such a waiver. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conspiracy conv
• Sassower v. The Sheriff OF Westchester Cnty.
  824 F.2d 184· 2d Cir.· 1987-07-15 ·cited 12×
  The court held that the petitioner received adequate due process and waived his right to a hearing, thus his conviction for criminal contempt was constitutional.
• United States v. Babb
  807 F.2d 272· 1st Cir.· 1986-12-17 ·cited 12×
  A prosecutor's misrepresentation that a grand jury witness is neither a subject nor a target does not excuse the witness's subsequent perjury, nor does it warrant suppression of testimony under supervisory powers if the perjury was not a product of the misconduct.
• Bradley v. State
  485 So. 2d 1285· Fla.· 1986-04-10 ·cited 12×
• Stawicki v. Thomas Israel & the Attorney Gen. of the State of Wis.
  778 F.2d 380· 7th Cir.· 1985-12-04 ·cited 12×
  The court held that a subsequent confession made after proper Miranda warnings is not automatically suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree, even if initial on-street questioning violated Miranda, provided the confession itself was voluntary. The court also found the waiver of
• Stinyard v. State
  476 So. 2d 277· Fla. 2d DCA· 1985-10-04 ·cited 12×
  The court reversed the summary denial of a post-conviction relief motion because the trial court failed to attach record portions supporting its ground for denial, requiring either proper summary denial with attached record excerpts or an evidentiary hearing on appeal.
• Vassar v. Solem
  763 F.2d 975· 8th Cir.· 1985-06-04 ·cited 12×
  The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motions for an expert witness, refusing to suppress his confession, refusing to disqualify itself, or denying his motion for a new trial.
• Brown v. E.P. Perini
  718 F.2d 784· 6th Cir.· 1983-10-05 ·cited 12×
  A guilty plea is not invalidated by misinformation regarding parole eligibility, as parole is considered a collateral, not direct, consequence of the plea.
• Hawk v. Solem
  693 F.2d 825· 8th Cir.· 1982-12-03 ·cited 12×
  A guilty plea is not subject to collateral attack based on a coerced confession unless counsel was ineffective, and there is no constitutional right to a jury determination of competency to stand trial or plead guilty.
• Sambo's Rests., Inc. v. The City OF ANN Arbor
  663 F.2d 686· 6th Cir.· 1981-11-04 ·cited 12×
  The court held that a contract obtained through economic coercion or duress, specifically threatening to withhold a building permit to force a company to waive its First Amendment right to use a name, is not binding.
• Moore v. Ballone
  658 F.2d 218· 4th Cir.· 1981-08-20 ·cited 12×
  The court held that the prolonged custodial interrogation of the defendant without timely Miranda warnings violated his constitutional rights, and any subsequent statements were tainted.
• Gov't OF the Canal Zone v. Sierra
  594 F.2d 60· 5th Cir.· 1979-04-26 ·cited 12×
  The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting the appellant's confession and seized items into evidence, affirming the conviction.
• United States v. Kirkland
  578 F.2d 170· 6th Cir.· 1978-07-07 ·cited 12×·via Knowing And Intelligent Guilty Plea
  A defendant's contention that they did not knowingly and intelligently enter a guilty plea is unavailing when the record shows they understood and accepted the terms, especially after plea bargaining.
• United States v. Edwards
  568 F.2d 68· 8th Cir.· 1977-12-19 ·cited 12×
  A prior conviction, even if constitutionally infirm, can support a federal falsification prosecution under the Gun Control Act, as the offense lies in the false statement, not the status of being a felon.
• Louie L. Wainwright v. Sykes
  528 F.2d 522· 5th Cir.· 1976-02-25 ·cited 12×
  A state prisoner's failure to object to the admissibility of incriminating statements does not constitute a waiver of his right to challenge their voluntariness if the trial court failed to conduct a proper hearing to determine admissibility.
• Franklin v. State
  324 So. 2d 187· Fla. 1st DCA· 1975-12-23 ·cited 12×
  Franklin was convicted of robbery and appealed the admission of his confession, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the confession was valid because Franklin voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently wai
• United States v. Valenzuela
  521 F.2d 414· 8th Cir.· 1975-07-24 ·cited 12×
  The dissenting judge would find that the appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel and would reverse the conviction.
• Parker v. United States
  507 F.2d 587· 8th Cir.· 1974-12-13 ·cited 12×
  A retrial following a mistrial declared due to manifest necessity, even if the defendant moved for the mistrial, does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
• Evans v. Swenson
  455 F.2d 291· 8th Cir.· 1972-02-10 ·cited 12×
  The court held that the warnings given to the appellant substantially complied with Miranda requirements, and his subsequent statements were voluntary and admissible.
• United States v. Harrison
  451 F.2d 1013· 2d Cir.· 1971-11-24 ·cited 12×
  The court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated because the record did not show an intelligent and knowing waiver of that right.
• Lopez v. United States
  439 F.2d 997· 9th Cir.· 1971-03-08 ·cited 12×
  The court held that the district judge's dismissal of the petition was appropriate and should be affirmed.
• Kates v. Nelson
  435 F.2d 1085· 9th Cir.· 1970-11-25 ·cited 12×·via Intelligent And Understanding Waiver
  A defendant who unequivocally refuses appointed counsel and insists on representing himself, even after being offered the choice to proceed with counsel or represent himself, waives his right to counsel.
• Oran Young v. United States
  433 F.2d 626· 10th Cir.· 1970-10-07 ·cited 12×
  The court held that the petitioner's guilty plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently, despite the sentencing judge not fully advising him of the maximum penalties, because other circumstances indicated his full understanding.
• Mejia v. United States
  430 F.2d 1273· 5th Cir.· 1970-09-02 ·cited 12×
  The court held that the petitioner's grounds for vacating his judgment and sentence were without merit, affirming the district court's denial of his motion.
• United States v. Tucker
  425 F.2d 624· 4th Cir.· 1970-05-12 ·cited 12×
  The court held that the district court failed to comply with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure when accepting the defendant's guilty plea, as it did not personally address the defendant to ascertain his understanding of the charge or ensure a factual basis for th
• United States v. Berlin Acey Odom
  423 F.2d 875· 9th Cir.· 1970-03-24 ·cited 12×·via Knowing And Intelligent Waiver Of Counsel
• United States v. Clayton
  418 F.2d 1274· 6th Cir.· 1969-12-16 ·cited 12×·via Knowing And Intelligent Waiver Of Counsel
  The court held that the admission of a co-defendant's statement, even if violating Bruton, was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt due to overwhelming evidence of guilt. It also held that the defendant knowingly waived his right to have his own counsel present when the verdi
• James v. United States
  388 F.2d 453· 5th Cir.· 1968-01-24 ·cited 12×
  The court held that a sentence imposed under the Federal Youth Corrections Act is invalid if the defendant was not informed of the maximum possible sentence under that Act before pleading guilty, even if other concurrent sentences exist.
• Meadows v. Maxwell
  371 F.2d 664· 6th Cir.· 1967-02-02 ·cited 12×·via Intelligent And Understanding Waiver
  The court held that a petitioner with limited education, facing a life sentence, was entitled to appointed counsel unless counsel was intelligently and understandingly waived, and a conclusory statement in the court order was insufficient to establish such waiver.
• Burch v. United States
  359 F.2d 69· 8th Cir.· 1966-04-11 ·cited 12×·via Knowing And Intelligent Waiver Of Counsel
  The court held that the appellant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, and the trial judge properly investigated the competency of this waiver.
• Asa Cook v. State
  167 So. 2d 793· Fla. 1st DCA· 1964-10-06 ·cited 12×·via Intelligent And Understanding Waiver
  Asa Cook appealed his guilty plea conviction, claiming he lacked legal counsel to advise him of his rights. The court affirmed the conviction, finding that Cook had executed a written waiver of counsel after being fully advised of his right to representation and the availability
• Panagos v. United States
  324 F.2d 764· 10th Cir.· 1963-12-06 ·cited 12×
  A knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel at arraignment extends to the sentencing phase, absent intervening circumstances.
• United States v. Roland
  318 F.2d 406· 4th Cir.· 1963-06-03 ·cited 12×
  A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing must demonstrate manifest injustice, and claims of mental distress or coercion by a spouse, which were considered at sentencing, do not meet this standard.
• Kent v. Sanford
  121 F.2d 216· 5th Cir.· 1941-06-23 ·cited 12×·via Knowing And Intelligent Waiver Of Counsel
  The court held that the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel at sentencing.
• Hooks v. State
  286 So. 3d 163· Fla.· 2019-12-19 ·cited 11×·via Knowing And Intelligent Waiver Of Counsel
  A Faretta colloquy is not invalid simply because the trial court fails to inquire about the defendant's age, experience, and understanding of the rules of criminal procedure. Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(3) and the principles established in Faretta v. Califor
• Calder v. State
  133 So. 3d 1025· Fla. 4th DCA· 2014-01-08 ·cited 11×
  Winston Calder appeals his first-degree murder conviction, challenging the admission of his confession made after he invoked his right to counsel. The appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, finding that police failed to scrupulously honor Cal
• Lindsey v. State
  69 So. 3d 363· Fla. 5th DCA· 2011-09-09 ·cited 11×
  The court held that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's unequivocal request to represent himself based on his lack of legal experience.
• Vega v. State
  57 So. 3d 259· Fla. 5th DCA· 2011-03-25 ·cited 11×
  David Vega appeals his drug trafficking and obstruction convictions, arguing the trial court conducted an inadequate Faretta inquiry before allowing him to represent himself at trial. The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial
• Newton Carlton Slawson v. State
  796 So. 2d 491· Fla.· 2001-07-05 ·cited 11×
  A death-sentenced inmate, Slawson, sought to waive his right to collateral counsel and all postconviction proceedings. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the circuit court's determination that Slawson was mentally competent to make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of hi