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758 So. 2d 618·
Fla.·
2000-01-27
·cited 78×
Joe Elton Nixon, a death row inmate, challenged his conviction for first-degree murder, claiming his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by admitting his guilt during opening and closing arguments without his consent. The Florida Supreme Court held that such guilt admis
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784 F.2d 1434·
9th Cir.·
1986-03-19
·cited 35×
A guilty plea is involuntary if the defendant does not receive actual notice of the true nature of the charge against him or possess an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.
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667 F.2d 255·
2d Cir.·
1981-05-22
·cited 33×
The court affirmed convictions, holding that pre-trial motions to suppress evidence were properly denied, including evidence obtained from pen registers, wiretaps, warrantless arrests, and searches, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding continuances or j
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429 F.2d 104·
2d Cir.·
1970-07-06
·cited 27×
A guilty plea induced by defense counsel's good-faith, but erroneous, sentence estimate or misstatement of law regarding withdrawal does not render the plea involuntary, absent evidence of government inducement.
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541 F.2d 979·
2d Cir.·
1976-09-03
·cited 24×
A guilty plea is constitutionally valid if the defendant was aware of the actual sentencing possibilities, and if not, whether accurate information would have made a difference in the decision to plead.
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678 F.2d 1062·
11th Cir.·
1982-06-18
·cited 23×
The court held that the defendant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, despite allegations of misleading advice from FBI agents, because he was represented by counsel before pleading and affirmed his plea in court.
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443 F.2d 493·
10th Cir.·
1971-05-27
·cited 18×
The court held that the appellant's guilty pleas were valid under pre-Boykin standards, and the Boykin decision's procedural rule does not apply retroactively.
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763 F.2d 250·
7th Cir.·
1985-05-17
·cited 14×
The court held that the State is estopped from contesting Zellers' assertion of cause for his procedural default due to systemic failures in providing due process rights. The court also found sufficient prejudice to justify a hearing.
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622 F.2d 914·
5th Cir.·
1980-08-01
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying the habeas petition, as the petitioner's guilty plea was voluntary and knowing, and other claims lacked merit.
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578 F.2d 170·
6th Cir.·
1978-07-07
·cited 12×
A defendant's contention that they did not knowingly and intelligently enter a guilty plea is unavailing when the record shows they understood and accepted the terms, especially after plea bargaining.
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939 F.2d 222·
5th Cir.·
1991-08-02
·cited 10×
The court held that a defendant's allegations, if true, could support a due process claim that her guilty plea was not knowing and intelligent because the conduct for which she was convicted did not constitute bank fraud under the statute.
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853 F.2d 1062·
2d Cir.·
1988-08-11
·cited 8×
The court held that the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was properly denied because the plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly, despite claims of a heart condition affecting his understanding.
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693 F.2d 59·
8th Cir.·
1982-11-23
·cited 8×
The court held that the appellant's guilty plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and that his sentence did not violate equal protection principles.
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679 F.2d 513·
5th Cir.·
1982-07-02
·cited 8×
The court held that a federal habeas petition can be dismissed as successive and an abuse of the writ if it raises the same claims previously decided on the merits and fails to allege new grounds for relief.
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424 F.2d 1205·
7th Cir.·
1970-01-29
·cited 8×
The court held that the petitioner's contentions regarding his guilty plea being involuntary, unknowing, or impeached were without merit, affirming the denial of his habeas corpus petition.
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923 F.2d 917·
1st Cir.·
1991-01-23
·cited 6×
A guilty plea is not knowing and intelligent if the defendant is not informed of all essential elements of the charged offense, particularly when the court and prosecution also appear to misunderstand the jurisdictional requirements.
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553 F.2d 1152·
8th Cir.·
1977-04-18
·cited 6×
The court held that a Rule 11 violation does not necessitate vacating a conviction if the defendant was aware of the maximum penalty at the time of the plea.
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434 F.2d 1292·
5th Cir.·
1970-11-16
·cited 6×
The court held that the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claims that his guilty pleas were not knowing and intelligent.
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465 F.2d 970·
5th Cir.·
1972-08-31
·cited 4×
The court held that the petitioner's guilty plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly, despite his claims of drug influence and misrepresentation.
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930 F.2d 1246·
7th Cir.·
1991-04-26
·cited 2×
The dissenting judge would vacate the guilty plea due to deficiencies in the plea-taking procedure and the government's failure to fulfill its commitment regarding the return of cows.
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818 F.2d 554·
6th Cir.·
1987-05-12
·cited 2×
The court held that the state court's factual finding that the petitioner was aware of the maximum sentence was entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and was not overcome by the evidence presented.
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732 F.2d 659·
8th Cir.·
1984-04-25
·cited 2×
The court affirmed the denial of federal habeas corpus relief, holding that the petitioner's guilty plea was voluntary and knowing, and that jurisdictional and coercion claims were waived or unsupported.
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425 F.2d 612·
9th Cir.·
1970-04-17
·cited 2×
The dissenting judge would affirm the trial court's finding that the appellant failed to meet the burden of proving an inadequate waiver of counsel.
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965 F.2d 10·
5th Cir.·
1992-07-09
The court held that the defendant's implied misrepresentation of authority to make unauthorized wire transfers was sufficient to support a conviction for bank fraud, and her guilty plea was therefore knowing and intelligent.
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443 F.2d 326·
7th Cir.·
1971-05-13
The court held that the district court did not err in finding that the petitioner was properly admonished of the mandatory consecutive nature of his sentence, despite potential ambiguities in the common law record.